

EDITORIALS

- Impacts of COVID-19 on Labour
- Locked Out at the Margins

FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

- Numbers and the Anxiety of the State

COMMENTARY

- Child Protection and Preparedness in COVID-19 Epoch
- Lessons for Indian Opposition in Sanders–Corbyn Projects
- Reviving Industrial Growth: Need to Address Demand Constraint
- Did Public Investment Crowd Out Private Investment in India?

BOOK REVIEWS

- *Special Category States of India*
- *Unmaking the Global Sweatshop: Health and Safety of the World's Garment Workers*
- *Jugaad Time: Ecologies of Everyday Hacking in India*

PERSPECTIVES

- Relocation from Tiger Reserves under the NTCA Guidelines

SPECIAL ARTICLES

- Caste and Class in Higher Education Enrolments: Challenges in Conceptualising Social Inequality
- Adivasis and Land: The Story of Postcolonial Development in Kerala

CURRENT STATISTICS

Children in the Pandemic

In the post-lockdown period, how can we deal with the imminent risks of increased exposure and hardships for the already immiserated children from the marginalised communities? [page 10](#)

Upping Electability

Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn's political projects should be lessons for the opposition in Indian politics on the relevance of mass politics with clear ideological moorings. [page 13](#)

Industrial Demand Management

Reviving the industrial growth in the post-pandemic scenario in India, will require a coherent heavy lifting of the sector through demand injection and stimulation, instead of scattered short-run policies. [page 16](#)

Relocation vs Displacement


Could the use of "relocation" for "displacement" from the protected areas improve the execution of the National Tiger Conservation Authority Guidelines 2011 and, thereby, the state of such shifting? [page 33](#)

Social Inequality in Education

With caste differences being directly proportional to class hierarchy, caste and class must be conceptualised as generative processes and examined empirically to understand their actual roles in educational inequality. [page 40](#)

**Order now and
get 20%* off**

EXPLORE THESE NEW RELEASES FROM SAGE!



₹ 1,250



Energy Economics and the Environment integrates a network of diverse disciplines to provide a theoretical and practical understanding of the constantly neglected challenges associated with conservation, preservation and sustainability of environment and energy.

HB: 9789353883102

₹ 1,250

E-Commerce in India book presents a comprehensive analysis of the economic and regulatory aspects of the e-commerce sector by assessing the trends and characteristics, and addressing the issues and challenges associated with it.

HB: 9789353883560



₹ 1,195


Politics, Ideology and Nationalism: Jinnah, Savarkar and Ambedkar versus Gandhi is a new argument based on familiar historical evidences. It discusses three leaders—Savarkar, Ambedkar and Jinnah—in their opposition to Gandhi.

HB: 9789353883843

₹ 1,295

India in the United Nations: Interplay of Interests and Principles presents a holistic and systematic understanding of India's long and rich association with the United Nations (UN) ever since it was established nearly 75 years ago.

HB: 9789353883522



₹ 1,150


Post-Conflict Reconstruction: From Extremism to Peaceful Co-Existence is a comprehensive presentation on the root causes of state fragility, which provides an enabling environment for violent religious extremism.

HB: 9789353884116

₹ 1,395

Drought Risk Management in South and South-East Asia is a comprehensive reference on overall perspectives and scenarios on drought risk mitigation and management, based on researches and case studies from South and South-East Asian countries.

HB: 9789353883881



Forthcoming!

₹ 1,595

Food and Power: Expressions of Food-Politics in South Asia studies power relations between those who eat and those who decide (or at least try to decide) what people should eat. It raises questions pertaining to the politicization of ethnographic tradition in South Asia.


HB: 9789353883768

₹ 1,250

Forthcoming!

Political Economy of Caste in India presents the caste mode of production as an important analytical tool to understand the socio-economic and political dynamics of India and presents empirical studies to show that the social habits of discrimination.

HB: 9789353884079



*Write to marketing@sagepub.in with priority code **EPW20**

www.sagepub.in

Impacts of COVID-19 on Labour

7 The costs of the pandemic disproportionately fall on labour.

Locked Out at the Margins

8 The pandemic and lockdown have been particularly hard on those at society's margins.

Child Protection and Preparedness in COVID-19 Epoch

10 The COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdown have meant immense hardship, especially for children, and those from the marginalised communities. — *Priti Mahara*

Lessons for Indian Opposition in Sanders–Corbyn Projects

13 The consolidation of support behind the political projects articulated by Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn underscores the relevance of mass politics with clear ideological moorings. — *Satyendra Ranjan*

Reviving Industrial Growth

16 The Indian economy faces an uphill task of reviving industrial growth in the post-pandemic scenario as the early onset of domestic slowdown and global disruptions have affected the industrial sector. — *M Suresh Babu, P Jithin*

Did Public Investment Crowd Out Private Investment in India?

21 The maximum entropy bootstrap method is applied to overcome the econometric constraints of using a short time series after the publication of a new macroeconomic series in India to confirm the positive role of public infrastructure investment. — *Honey Karun, Hrishikesh Vinod & Lekha S Chakraborty*

Relocation from Tiger Reserves under the NTCA Guidelines

33 Relocation under the National Tiger Conservation Authority Guidelines for Voluntary Village Relocation in Notified Core/Critical Tiger Habitats of 2011 represents a paradigmatic shift from the previous history of displacement from protected areas. — *Ujjal Kumar Sarma, Indrani Barpujari*

Caste and Class in Higher Education Enrolments

40 The National Sample Survey 2014 data is used to explore the character of class inequality in higher education, over and beyond that of caste. — *Amman Madan*

Adivasis and Land: The Story of Postcolonial Development in Kerala

48 This paper attempts to frame an understanding of the land question of Adivasis to show the limitations of the dominant developmental historiography. — *Suresh M*

EDITORIALS

Impacts of COVID-19 on Labour7
 Locked Out at the Margins8

FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

Numbers and the Anxiety of the State 9

FROM 50 YEARS AGO 9

COMMENTARY

Child Protection and Preparedness in COVID-19 Epoch
 — *Priti Mahara* 10

Lessons for Indian Opposition in Sanders–Corbyn Projects
 — *Satyendra Ranjan*13

Reviving Industrial Growth: Need to Address Demand Constraint
 — *M Suresh Babu, P Jithin*16

Did Public Investment Crowd Out Private Investment in India?
 — *Honey Karun, Hrishikesh Vinod, Lekha S Chakraborty*21

BOOK REVIEWS

Special Category States of India—The Special States of India: A Composite Index for Study
 — *Akash Solanki* 26

Unmaking the Global Sweatshop: Health and Safety of the World's Garment Workers—The RMG Industry: Jeopardising Lives of Workers
 — *Anu Muhammad* 28

Jugaad Time: Ecologies of Everyday Hacking in India—No Limits to 'Jugaad'
 — *Ratnakar Tripathy*31

PERSPECTIVES

Relocation from Tiger Reserves under the NTCA Guidelines
 — *Ujjal Kumar Sarma, Indrani Barpujari* 33

SPECIAL ARTICLES

Caste and Class in Higher Education Enrolments: Challenges in Conceptualising Social Inequality
 — *Amman Madan* 40

Adivasis and Land: The Story of Postcolonial Development in Kerala
 — *Suresh M* 48

CURRENT STATISTICS 55

LETTERS 4

Ever since the first issue in 1966, EPW has been India's premier journal for comment on current affairs and research in the social sciences. It succeeded *Economic Weekly* (1949–1965), which was launched and shepherded by SACHIN CHAUDHURI, who was also the founder-editor of EPW. As editor for 35 years (1969–2004) KRISHNA RAJ gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys.

EDITOR
GOPAL GURU

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
LINA MATHIAS

SENIOR ASSISTANT EDITORS
LUBNA DUGGAL
INDU K
SUNIPA DASGUPTA

COPY EDITORS
JYOTI SHETTY
TEJAS HARAD

ASSISTANT EDITORS
NACHIKET KULKARNI
SHRUTI JAIN

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
MALVIKA SHARAD

CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR

PRODUCTION
SUNEETHI NAIR

CIRCULATION
KULDEEP NAWATHE

ADVERTISEMENT MANAGER
KAMAL G FANIBANDA

GENERAL MANAGER & PUBLISHER
GAURAANG PRADHAN

EDITORIAL: edit@epw.in

CIRCULATION: circulation@epw.in

ADVERTISING: advertisement@epw.in

ECONOMIC & POLITICAL WEEKLY

320–322, A TO Z INDUSTRIAL ESTATE
GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER PAREL
MUMBAI 400 013
PHONE: (022) 4063 8282

EPW RESEARCH FOUNDATION

EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts research on financial and macro-economic issues in India.

DIRECTOR
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR
C 212, AKURLI INDUSTRIAL ESTATE
KANDIVALI (EAST), MUMBAI 400 101
PHONES: (022) 2887 3038/41
epwrf@epwrf.in

SAMEEKSHA TRUST

(Publishers of *Economic & Political Weekly*)

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

DEEPAK NAYYAR, CHAIRMAN
SHYAM MENON, MANAGING TRUSTEE
ANDRÉ BÉTEILLE, **D N GHOSH**,
DEEPAK PAREKH, **ROMILA THAPAR**,
RAJEEV BHARGAVA, **DIPANKAR GUPTA**,
N JAYARAM, **SUDIPTO MUNDLE**

Printed and published by Gauraang Pradhan, for and on behalf of Sameeksha Trust and printed at Modern Arts and Industries, 151, A–Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013 and published at 320–322, A–Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
Editor: Gopal Guru (Editor responsible for selection of news under the FRB Act)

Sustainable Development for Migrant Workers

The challenges facing migrant labourers in the country are quite complex. *The Census 2011* found that India has approximately 139 million internal migrants. The COVID-19 pandemic has made the issue of the migrant labourers come out in the open as the effects of the lockdown on them were quite devastating.

The government needs to craft a sustainable strategy for these migrant labourers. Unless we view migrant workers as a dynamic part of a changing India, we will not be able to solve the problem of urbanisation. The central government, after 41 years since the Inter-state Migrant Workmen Act, 1979 was implemented, has now regarded these migrant workers as an entity that can be given social security and health benefits through the Employees' State Insurance corporation. The importance of migrant workers in the economy can be seen in numbers, as 43% of Delhi's and Mumbai's population are migrants.

The states are responding to these challenges. For example, Madhya Pradesh (MP) has decided to create a database of all the migrant workers from the state. So, even if the labourers go outside the state for work, the MP government can track and help them if the need arises. MP, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Bihar governments have decided to create a skill register wherein all the migrant labourers' skill sets will be recorded and prospective employers will be connected to the labourers as the requirement arises. The MP government has already rolled it out and named it as "Rozgar Setu" or employment bridge wherein industries can see the workers' availabilities and their skill sets online.

Large states affected by migrant workers' issues have decided to focus on skill development. State governments like that of Punjab have decided to go for a survey for job requirements in the state and focus on self-employment schemes. The Uttar Pradesh government has formed a migration commission to identify the skills of returning migrant workers and provide

employment to them. The Bihar government is committed to giving employment to the workers as per their skills. Self-employment and skill development have become the mantra for dealing with the migrant workers' problem.

The issue that arises is how should the government plan for the sustainable development of its workers?

As per the research conducted by the Indian Institute of Management Indore, a state government can implement a two-step process for the sustainable development of the workers' community.

In the first step, the state government needs to acquire data from the bottom of the pyramid. The gram panchayat, through the panchayat and family members of rural workers, can give information about the ground realities and the skill sets that the workers possess. Once village-wise data is collected, block development officers come in at the second stage, wherein data from the villages coming under a particular block can be collected and analysed. Similarly, with multiple blocks, district-level skill development requirements and availabilities can be mapped and taken in a consolidated whole to the state level.

Governments can then take inputs from various value-creation partners like industries, educational institutes and experts for the skill sets available as well as required by them in the present and in the future. This process needs to be agile and updated periodically.

Each worker needs to be given a unique ID linked with Aadhar. This will ensure data set management plus distribution of social benefits, health benefits, insurance, and a seamless distribution of other benefits.

Once the availability and requirement (present and future) of skills are mapped, a three-pronged strategy can be implemented. Connect: In this stage, the state government can connect the skills available with the industry requirements. State governments can use various institutes and agencies to marry the value-creation partners together. This will also ensure that proper facilities, benefits and working conditions are available for the workers.

Creation of skill: In the creation stage, state governments need to develop/upgrade the skills required by the state industries and other segments of value creation. State governments need to come up with proper planning and use educational institutes as well as manufacturing and service firms' facilities for internship training of upskilling its workforce. The National Skill Development Corporation and state skill development councils can be of great help.

Catalyse: State governments need to take two steps—one, give insurance, medical and educational facilities to workers and their families, and two, help industries and allied areas to flourish. Entrepreneurship, allowing contemporary technologies, interest rates, land reforms, and other strategies that help industries to start, expand and grow need to be crafted and implemented. Certification of skill development courses can be a good analysis of quality and employability potential. For self-employment, financing, facilitation of selling their produce, the Tribal Cooperative Marketing Development Federation of India model can be implemented.

These steps are feasible and achievable. The benefits will go a long way in building a self-reliant India.

Prashant Salwan

INDORE

Impact of COVID-19 on the Tourism Sector

The COVID-19 global pandemic has created havoc and an unprecedented economic bearing on global economics, demand and supply disruption, etc. The virulence and the severity of the spread of the virus is so acute that it has caused a lot of job loss, unemployment, temporary shutdown of manufacturing output, and reduction in the consumption expenditure by people.

The COVID-19 outbreak has also brought a hard effect on the travel and tourism industry due to the temporary travel ban imposed by most of the countries. Tourism food services, transportation, entertainment, and hotel business are the main industries that would face the heat of the crisis. The economic costs

in terms of tourism revenue out of this pandemic outbreak will continue to mount if the further spread of the virus is not taken care of. Methods like complete lockdown of the city and hard quarantine measures adopted by various countries are mostly a difficult affair for a third-world country like India. As per the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) interim economic assessment, if the number of visitors would decline due to the coronavirus outbreak, it would impose sizeable economic costs in OECD countries, as tourism comprises of 4.25% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 7% of employment share.

Tourism in India is remarkably affected due to the outbreak of COVID-19. The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), in its 2018 report, said that the tourism sector in India generated 9.2% of India's GDP in 2018 and contributed 8.1% of the total employment opportunities generated in the country. The WTTC has also ranked India 34th out of 140 countries in terms of contribution to tourism. The foreign exchange earnings of India during January 2020 were ₹20,282 crore as compared to ₹18,079 crore in January 2019. Among the top destination states, Maharashtra ranks highest, followed by Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. The tourism sector's contribution to the GDP is mainly by domestic travel, which is 88%, and the remaining 12% is due to international visitors.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) data set, 2020 has explored the impact of this epidemic on the world economy. The best case scenario is one when the tourism and travel ban will last for two months, for a moderate case scenario, three months, and worse case scenarios, for six months. As the number of months of the travel ban is increasing, the economic condition would become more critical.

In the worse case, decline in tourism revenues by the percentage of the highest decline in GDP would be Maldives (5.5%), Cambodia (3.5%), Thailand (2.4%), Mongolia (1.6%), Singapore (1.5%), China (0.26%), and India (0.009%). In most of these countries, revenue generated from tourism comprises a major share of the

GDP. This virus outbreak would result in the GDP of the tourism sector declining by around 3% in the best baseline period. There is already ample evidence pointing out that tourists' arrivals in most of developing Asian countries have been dropped by 50%–90% in February 2020 in comparison to the previous year. Overall, it is estimated that there will be a loss of \$15 billion to \$35 billion in tourism revenue for China and \$19 billion to \$45 billion in tourism revenue for the rest of developing Asia. The outbreak caused a temporary decline in consumption demand. For economies like India, with weak health systems, containment, prevention, and the response would be more difficult. The tourism sector will be much affected, as the potentiality of employment generation of the tourism sector is relatively good.

We can say that the ability to respond, detect and prevent such a pandemic on part of India is quite challenging. Due to the ban on travel, there is a temporary drop of all businesses in the tourism industry; this outbreak will also cause a long-term jolt. The substantial decline in business and recreation travel are likely to constrain consumption demand for some time. The government in India has taken a significant step to contain its impact and to save human resources at a huge economic cost. With proper policy formulation, this economic shock may subsequently fade away by early 2021, and "catch up" in tourism may be initiated.

Balkrushna Padhi

BHUBANESWAR

T Triveni

NEW DELHI

Corrigendum

In the letter "Impact of the Lockdown on Urban Livelihoods" by Balwant Singh Mehta and Arjun Kumar (*EPW*, 27 June 2020), the phrase "unit record data of the PLFS" (p 4) should have read as "unit level data of the PLFS."

The error has been corrected on the *EPW* website.

Erratum

In the article "Seeking Truth and Practising Satyagraha" by Sundar Sarukkai (*EPW*, 11 July 2020), the author note should have read as "Sundar Sarukkai is a philosopher based in Bengaluru."

The error has been corrected on the *EPW* website.

The error is regretted —Ed

Subscription Rates

(Revised rates effective April, 2019)

Print Edition – For India

Rates for Six Months (in Rs)

Category	Print	Print + Digital Archives
Individuals	1,900	2,655

Rates for One Year (in Rs)

Category	Print	Print + Digital Archives (According to Number of Concurrent Users)		
		Up to 5	More than 5	Single User
Institutions	5,500	11,800	17,700	
Individuals	3,300			4,720
Students	1,800			3,068

Rates for Three Years (in Rs)

Category	Print	Print + Digital Archives Single User
Individuals	9,000	11,800

Concessional rates are restricted to students in India. To subscribe at concessional rates, please submit proof of eligibility from an institution.

Print Edition: Subscriber receives the print copy by post to the address given.

Print plus Digital Archives: Subscriber receives the print copy and has access to the entire archives on the EPW web site.

Print Edition — For SAARC and Rest of the World (Air Mail)

Airmail Subscription for One Year (in US \$)

	Print	Print + Digital Archives (According to Number of Concurrent Users)		
		Up to 5	More than 5	Single User
Institutions				
SAARC	215		500	
Rest of the World	430	600	1,000	
Individuals				
SAARC	175			200
Rest of the World	250			300

Web Edition/Digital Archives

The full content of the EPW and the entire archives are also available to those who do not wish to subscribe to the print edition.

Category	India (in Rs)		SAARC (in US \$)		Rest of the World (in US \$)	
	Number of Concurrent Users		Number of Concurrent Users		Number of Concurrent Users	
Institutions	Up to Five	6,490			Up to Five	300
	More than 5	14,160	More than 5	250	More than 5	750
Individuals	Single User	2,360	Single User	100	Single User	150

Types of Web Access to the Digital Archives

Individual subscribers can access the site by a username and a password, while institutional subscribers get access by specifying IP ranges.

To know more about online access to the archives and how to access the archives send us an email at circulation@epw.in and we will be pleased to explain the process.

How to Subscribe:

Payment can be made by either sending a demand draft/cheque in favour of **Economic and Political Weekly** or by making online payment with a credit card/net banking on our secure site at www.epw.in.

Address for communication: **Economic & Political Weekly**

320–322, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013, India

Increase in Subscription Rates

The EPW is compelled to raise the Digital Subscription Rates on account of Goods and Service Tax (GST) being applicable to Digital Subscriptions. The GST rate for Online Information Data Base Access and Retrieval (OIDAR) is 18%. The category Print plus Digital will also attract 18% as GST. The subscription rates quoted are inclusive of the 18% GST rate.

Notes for Contributors

Submission Guidelines

EPW welcomes original contributions that have not been submitted, published, or accepted for publication elsewhere. Contributors must specify the same in the article submission email. Contributors are urged to follow EPW's stylesheet (<https://www.epw.in/style-sheet.html>). All contributions must be accompanied by:

- An abstract of 150–200 words
- Six to eight keywords
- Author name, email address and contact number for correspondence, one-line author note for each author stating current designation and affiliation, and author photographs (optional). We include the provided email address in the author note.

Contributors are cautioned against plagiarism and excessive self-referencing. Figures, graphs and tables must be used sparingly to avoid repetition of content. All supplementary files such as figures, tables, maps, etc, must be provided in MS Office (Word/ Excel) or other editable formats, wherever possible.

The EPW editorial team reserves the right to slot an article in a specific section, as deemed fit.

Receipt of articles is immediately acknowledged by email. If contributors have not received an acknowledgement and reference number within a week of submission, they are requested to check their spam folders for the mail and write to us at edit@epw.in.

Every effort is taken to complete early processing of the articles we receive. Given the high volume of articles received daily, it can take up to six months for a final decision on whether an article is accepted for publication. Articles accepted for publication can take up to 12 months from the date of acceptance to appear in print.

Letters (Word limit: 500–800)

Readers are encouraged to comment on current affairs and/or respond to published articles in EPW. Letters must contain the author's full name and postal address.

Commentary (Word limit: 2,000–3,000)

Short, analytical articles on topical and contemporary social, economic and political developments will be considered for this section.

Book Reviews (Word limit: 1,500–2,000)

EPW commissions book reviews. However, on occasion, unsolicited reviews may be considered for publication.

Insight (Word limit: 4,000–5,000)

Innovative and focused analyses of social, economic, and political phenomena would be considered for this section.

Perspectives (Word limit: 4,000–5,000)

Articles presenting unique viewpoints and standpoints on existing scholarship and contemporary phenomena are welcome for this section.

Special Articles (Word limit: Up to 7,000)

Original, unpublished research papers in any of the humanities and social sciences are welcome.

Notes (Word limit: 4,000–5,000)

Short, original articles covering preliminary research in any of the humanities and social sciences would be considered for this section.

Discussion (Word limit: 1,500–2,000)

In order to foster debate and discussion, responses to articles published in EPW are encouraged.

Postscript (Word limit: 800–1,200)

Short accounts or reflections on different aspects of culture (travel, literature, dance, music and film) will be considered under this section.

Engage

Contributions to this section may be in the form of articles (2,500–3,000 words), photo essays, podcasts and videos on topical social, cultural, economic and political developments. For more details, visit: <https://www.epw.in/notes-contributors-epw-engage>.

Copyright

EPW posts all published articles on its website as well as on select databases. Published articles may be considered for translation into Indian languages under our ongoing project.

The copyright of all articles published in EPW belongs to the author or to the organisation where the author is employed, as determined by the author's terms of employment.

Permission for Reproduction

1. EPW has no objection to authors republishing or revising their articles for other publications. However, the republished article must mention prominently that a version of the article first appeared in *Economic & Political Weekly*. It must also include the publication details along with the URL of the original EPW article.
2. No published article or part thereof should be reproduced in any form without prior permission of the author(s). A soft/hard copy of the author(s)'s approval should be sent to EPW.

Please refer to the detailed Notes for Contributors (<https://www.epw.in/notes-contributors.html>) and Frequently Asked Questions (<https://www.epw.in/frequently-asked-questions>) section on the EPW website. Send us your submissions on edit@epw.in.

Impacts of COVID-19 on Labour

The costs of the pandemic disproportionately fall on labour.

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and ensuing lockdowns have severely affected the labour market. In India, the pandemic and the prolonged lockdowns have led to a reduction or complete loss of their livelihoods, which has disproportionately affected the migrants and the working poor. Others, such as health workers and those in essential services, have experienced a huge increase in workloads and schedules amidst the onslaught of the pandemic. In the services sectors, the pandemic not only led to lay-offs and retrenchments but has also been a catalyst for the transformation of the workplace. Most technically qualified employees, especially in the services sectors, have been able to continue their work from home through remote working arrangements. This has often caused shifts in their work-life balance, which in turn has created uncertain net effects on productivity. Most employees have been forced into working remotely, often under stressful situations due to the pandemic, which could erode motivation as well as focus. Most often, longer working hours have not been compensated at wages prevalent before the onset of the pandemic.

The pandemic has, thus, directly disrupted the lives of millions of workers in countries across the world by causing lay-offs, reduction in working hours and wages. Emphasising on the catastrophic effects of the pandemic on working hours and employment globally, an International Labour Organization (ILO) report states that it is expected to erode 6.7% of working hours in the second quarter of 2020, which is equivalent to that of 195 million full-time workers. The scale of reductions leading to large-scale unemployment globally was expected to vary with higher percentages accounted by the Arab nations, Europe, Asia and the Pacific regions, while the sectors most at risk comprised accommodation and food services, manufacturing, retail, and business and administrative activities.

The global economy has also been witnessing a decade-long declining phase in labour productivity since the global financial crisis of 2007–09. Studies also reveal that pandemics have had adverse effects on labour productivity. Drawing from a data set covering 35 advanced and 129 emerging market and developing economies, the World Bank study shows that four epidemics that occurred during the period 2000–18 had adversely affected labour productivity, through investment declines occasioned by

an increased sense of uncertainty. Further to it, the growing sense of uncertainty about the current global pandemic and its duration could hinder trade and foreign direct investment. However, it was expected that changes in behaviour resulting from the pandemic would accelerate the adoption of new technologies, spur greater efficiencies, and the pace of scientific innovation among businesses.

Many emerging and developing economies were witnessing much weaker growth before the onset of the pandemic. Combined with the structural nature of the slowdown, this would exacerbate the long-term effects of deep recessions associated with the pandemic. The Indian economy was also passing through a deep slowdown, even before the pandemic struck the country. The real gross domestic product (GDP) growth had fallen over nine consecutive quarters. The prospect of revival in private and corporate investment is expected to be delayed, given the risk aversion at the global level. However, to mitigate the shortage of humanpower amid the pandemic, the manufacturing sector could also witness mass adoptions of technologies, such as robotics, artificial intelligence, and big data, according to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. This would lead to a 10%–20% cut in existing jobs, particularly in labour-intensive sectors. In countries like India, with a labour surplus, the adoption of technologies that displace labour would have adverse impacts on employment generation. However, new jobs that would be created are expected to accommodate up to 5%–10% of highly skilled workers.

In the organised manufacturing sector, the analysis of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data had revealed that labour productivity had fallen significantly over the last eight years. Labour productivity was also significantly lower than that of neighbouring China. However, much of this decline was blamed on India's complex labour laws. In order to benefit from the disruptions in global supply chain due to trade conflicts, to invite foreign investments for international firms seeking to move production out of China, and help businesses recover from the shock of the pandemic, several state governments, such as Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, in recent months, declared a slew of labour law suspensions. These policy changes have led to

undermining worker rights and dismantling of decades-old protective measures that were framed to abide by ILO conventions and constitutional obligations.

The impacts of the pandemic and proposed changes disproportionately shift the costs of the pandemic and revival to be borne by labour—impinging on labour rights and adoption of

labour-displacing technologies. This has been done without exploring suitable and viable alternatives to expand public investment in the economy, which could be financed through measures such as the introduction of wealth tax, to raise resources for the government to revive the economy by stimulating aggregate demand and increase purchasing power.

Locked Out at the Margins

The pandemic and lockdown have been particularly hard on those at society's margins.

The deleterious effects of the pandemic and the strict measures of lockdown have brought immense misery and risks for those who continue to be at the margins and fringes of the Indian society, even during non-COVID-19 times. These marginalised sections include the transgender community, the disabled, street children, sex workers, and others. The imposition of lockdown has not only aggravated precarity in their everyday survival but has also created more odds and obstacles in their efforts to earn their living and lead a “normal” life.

For a large number of these communities, the streets of cities and towns have become their main sites to earn their livelihoods. Begging and selling petty goods are the two main sources, and these have not been chosen by them but have been thrust upon them. Each of these sections is vulnerable in its own way. The disabled hawkers in public transport and on the streets make a living for their entire families. A number of transgender persons, sex workers and the disabled have formed associations and organisations to pressure policymakers and governments to heed their rightful demands. These organisations petitioned the courts and governments to ensure access to basic services like food, medicines, etc, during the lockdown. Others, like the street children, have to depend on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to practically help them and plead their case.

In Jharkhand, Telangana and Karnataka, for example, the respective high courts directed the state governments to supply foodgrains, medicines and other basic necessities to the transgender community. The Telangana High Court instructed that there should be no insistence on the production of ration cards to get these supplies. A public interest litigation has also been filed in the Delhi High Court on the behalf of sex workers and the transgender community there.

That these organisations are forced to plead their own case before the high courts and petition the government is illustrative of their struggle for a dignified existence. But more than that, it is also an indictment of the entire society that thinks nothing of excluding, marginalising and even persecuting lakhs of persons who are “not like us.” The Telangana High Court’s directive not to demand the ration card before distributing necessities is also telling of a huge problem that these communities face: lack of documentation, which in many cases, leads to their being virtually treated as non-citizens. Again, except

for a few states like Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh that have welfare boards for transgender persons, these sections have to fight for survival every single day. Just how difficult the lockdown is for those who live only by what they manage to beg and earn each day, can be well-imagined.

News reports have recorded how children from a children’s shelter home in Mumbai escaped but were brought back by the police. The child inmates of such custodial institutions have been suffering indescribable emotional distress, according to reports. For those who live on the streets or whose parents are daily wagers and labourers in acute economic distress, being locked down also means physical violence and abuse, if they demand food and necessities that are in scarce supply. Transgender and non-binary persons have pointed out that the lockdown has forced them to stay among their families which are hostile to them. For all these communities, the long lockdown period has also meant great difficulties in accessing even non-COVID-19 medical and health services. As is obvious, even in non-COVID-19 times, major sections from the marginalised have faced stigma and discrimination from health services personnel. The lockdown has only added to their woes. Almost all these sections have had to depend on the charity and voluntary services of NGOs and public-spirited individuals.

The disturbing aspect is that even the potential end of the lockdown will not really improve their access to livelihoods and health services. If anything, the economic slowdown and the impact on services will render them even more vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination. Their access to government welfare programmes is also not an assured one. While cities depend on the labour and services of these sections, it is also a truism that the latter in turn depend on the economic vibrancy of the cities for their living.

In most societies, the so-called privileged sections that are at the centre rarely look out for the well-being of those who are at the margins and fringes. In the case of the communities and sections that we have mentioned, society has not bothered about their welfare; on the contrary, it has sought to stigmatise them. However, it is an encouraging sign that many from the marginalised got together to demand their rights during this critical and painful period. It is now the turn of the policymakers and society at large to realise and help end this entirely human-made misery.

Numbers and the Anxiety of the State

It is needless to mention that numbers as countable entities play an important role in different spheres of the economy, polity and society. But they also play a rather decisive role in institutional politics and policy regimes. Although numbers are vital, particularly in the conditions of political uncertainty, in the moment prevailing in Rajasthan right now, they also set the limits on the capacity of the state to debate about and distribute opportunities, such as reservation quotas and distributing compensatory benefits. The state in accordance with regulatory mechanisms, such as the legal system, sets limits on its own power of distribution. Thus, numbers in turn work as a cap on their own proliferation manifested, for example, in the multiplication of demands for reservations made by different castes. Arguably, in the case where the numbers enjoy constitutional legitimacy, they tend to enjoy more credibility as they are ratified from time to time. These numbers could be inadequate in terms of their capacity to embody in them the total problem, but they cannot be fake.

Numbers, thus, enjoy credibility inasmuch as they flow from constitutional provisions and through their legal ratification by the court system. They become more powerful as they tend to impose definite limits on the ruling government's politics of extravagant populism. Put differently, politics of such populism makes the numbers and statistics lose their credibility as they get infused with fakery and deception. Numbers floated during the election campaigns are more vulnerable to such a loss. Numbers have such a quality that they can raise dust rather than raising level. Politicians use numbers just to raise dust or illusion rather than the level of the people.

However, there are number sets that are reflexive of the falling standards of governance and, thereby, tend to expose the deficiency of the government in power. Such sets are likely to be treated as ungovernable since such "difficult" numbers, which are swelling in excess, do create moral discomfort if the government were to make them public. In this regard, we can talk about the government refusing to accept the growing numbers of COVID-19 patients, numbers that are seen to have become "ungovernable;" ungovernability, which is evident in the "community" spread of the pandemic. Arguably, central and some of the state governments seem to be keen to exclude these numbers from the official calculation, as it would help these governments make a claim that such governments have been

efficiently proactive in their governance to control the spread of the virus. The studied reluctance to conduct more COVID-19 tests may help such states save themselves from possible public criticism. However, such a safety move is just temporary; temporary on account of it getting discredited due to the growing real numbers of COVID-19 patients whose identification can no longer be concealed. This rather fragile sense of complacency was evident with regard to those states that were in the forefront of making claims of success in controlling the virus. Ungovernability of numbers thus makes the government acutely anxious about its own ability to deal with the COVID-19 crisis.

The current pandemic has also led to the extension of this sense of anxiety encapsulating, in its morally corrosive logic, the members from the general public. As has been evident on many occasions erupting through the outbreak of the pandemic, the presence of health workers in the midst of COVID-19 infected/affected localities has been treated by the residents of such locations as the source of social stigma. The sense of stigma was evident in many states, and most recently in Maharashtra, village people were seen opposing the entry of health workers and government officials. But this sense of stigma, which probably is at the root of the reported resistance to health workers, is likely to remain only temporary in terms of its impact. But the social stigma inflicted by caste practice, particularly during the pandemic, is so entrenched that upper-caste patients who face imminent danger of death are reported to be observing caste distinctions in some of the COVID-19 centres in the country.

Arguably, the fear of the village being branded as an object of social stigma is constitutive of a hidden anxiety that can explain certain state governments' reluctance to conduct more COVID-19 tests on the one hand and the opposition of the village community and urban localities to both the health workers and the local government officials on the other hand. The pandemic that has led to the under-reporting of numbers has thus given rise to two kinds of anxiety: official, involving the government, and social, involving the village community. It is needless to say that those states and members of civil society that frontally confront the pandemic are less likely to suffer a sense of anxiety.

Lopallpuru

FROM 50 YEARS AGO

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

VOL V, NOS 29-30-31

JULY 1970

'Growth With Social Justice'

A Correspondent writes:

Yesterday's clichés have a haunting quality about them. For weeks on end, tired season piling on tired season, the, slogan keeps churning,

whirling: 'growth with social justice', that will-o'-the-wisp of a twin goal — economic development to be married to an optimum effort towards a larger measure of equality in this hierarchy laden society of ours. Let it not be said — even in malice retrospectively thought out — that the intent was altogether missing toward the beginning. This year's Union Budget did raise one or two heart-throbs. Nothing much perhaps in terms of actual outlays, nothing much perhaps in terms of a thorough overhaul of the inter- and intni-sector allocations. But at

least there was a certain ring of empathy in what the Prime Minister was trying to say. As of that moment, one almost felt like believing that the time, had indeed come as the Walrus said; as if hail, blithe spirit, we were indeed moving into a dazzling era of egalitarianism. It is barely a half-year since those dizzy-spring days; and yet, in this mid-point of the dull summer, even the memory of all that would seem to have wilted. Prices have maintained their long march; the employment- and welfare-oriented projects are lost somewhere in the files.

Child Protection and Preparedness in COVID-19 Epoch

PRITI MAHARA

The COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdown has meant immense hardship for many sections of society. For children, and especially those from the marginalised communities, the impact has been harsher. They will also face increased risks and hardships in the post-lockdown period. A look at what can be done to deal with these hardships.

The Census 2011 data suggests that 37% of India's population is accounted for by children. And for rather a long time, the country has been struggling to combat the challenges directly impacting children's lives—especially the lives of the ones from marginalised and vulnerable communities. For over four decades, Child Rights and You (CRY) has been working with issues of malnutrition, infant mortality, school dropouts, child labour, child marriage and child abuse, among many other vulnerabilities faced by underprivileged children. Our grassroots experience and other evidences clearly show that illness, mortality and morbidity, productivity and developmental challenges are all connected to childhood trauma and exposure to violence. Any kind of conflict, crisis, natural calamities and health emergencies—like the one COVID-19 pandemic has hurled upon us—can further affect children's well-being, survival, safety, protection and overall development.

Child protection is usually defined as the issues related to protecting children from any kind of violence, exploitation, abuse, neglect and discrimination. Article 19 of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for the protection of children in and out of the home.

As said earlier, conflict and emergency situations like natural calamities and epidemics like COVID-19 jeopardise children's well-being, survival, safety, protection and overall development to a large extent. There is no denying the fact that even before this global pandemic, we could not provide adequate care and safety to our children. The continuum of vulnerability has increased now and hence, the chances of children falling out of the safety net have multiplied many times. Previous humanitarian

crises like frequent floods, earthquakes and epidemics have documented the threats to children and their devastating long-lasting effects.

Safety of children is dependent on the nature and scale of the emergency, quality and functioning of pre-existing child protection mechanisms, the community's preparedness and most importantly, the capacity of the state to respond. The protection risks include separation from families, trafficking, abuse, trauma, commercial exploitation and death. These realities always existed. But are we, as a society and nation, prepared to face and combat the protection issues of children in the world post COVID-19 (Table 1, p 11)?

If not, it will take us decades to give children a safe childhood.

With the global tally of deaths due to COVID-19 increasing, it is evident that children are losing parents, loved ones, caregivers and acquaintances. The trauma of losing people to death is long-lasting, causing stress and anxiety. Children, now more than ever, need psychosocial care to cope with the stress. There is emerging evidence that violence against children is increasing in all different forms—from domestic violence ranging from physical, psychological and sexual abuse at home to excessive use of force by law enforcement while enforcing lockdown decisions against the vulnerable children. In the words of the UN Secretary General,

What began as a health crisis risks evolving into a broader child-rights crisis. Are we doing enough for the well-being of children of frontline staff delivering essential services, children in conflict zones, children who lost their parents, children in childcare institutions and observation homes? Agenda for Action (2020)

To prevent child abuse and to save children from harms, child protection services must be declared as essential, children's health services must be accessible by all during lockdowns, quarantines and after removal of restrictions. National child helplines and gender-based violence services must get enough resources to reach and respond to survivors and/or witnesses of violence.

Priti Mahara (priti.mahara@crymail.org) is director, Policy, Research and Advocacy, CRY—Child Rights and You.

The child protection committees and other child protection units under the Integrated Child Protection Scheme (ICPS), various schools have always raised the issue of lack of counsellors and psychologists providing mental health or psychosocial support to children, parents and caregivers. The government and civil society need to build the capacity of teachers, social workers, front-line government

staffs, child protection service providers on basic counselling skills, psychosocial caring and addressing mental health issues. It is going to be a tough challenge to overcome.

Equally important is to identify children at risk as well as the follow-up methods to mitigate the risks during and after lockdowns. During the nationwide lockdown, children are already bearing the brunt of the mass migrant exodus and the lack of safe spaces. Street children, missing children, children who had fled their homes are at a greater risk of trafficking, forced begging and child labour. We need stronger tracking systems at local levels to keep record of families and children entering and exiting the villages/slums, to expedite follow-ups and reduce the risks.

Loss of livelihoods, absence of adequate financial and social protection in India's informal sector, will force the families to send their children to work. Children, being the cheapest source of labour, will also be in great demand as we face recession. They will also increasingly be working in agricultural fields and be engaged in household chores when movement is restricted. Financial support to vulnerable families, relaxation of school fees, incentive schemes supporting children's education, especially girls, support to innovative learning opportunities, minimising losses to income will be able to prevent children from entering the workforce.

With decreasing incomes and allied livelihood challenges of the poor families, there is a high chance that child trafficking will see an increase. Strong family- and community-level support for children, active community-based child protection mechanisms, long-term multi-sectoral response to address trafficking and mainstreaming of children are ways to mitigate this risk.

Table 1: Status of Issues Affecting Children in India

Percentage	Status
80	Of children under five years of age have birth registrations Source: IIPS and ICF (2017), National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015–16, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, India
9	Children in India are working. 9% of the child population is working. 4% of children between five years and 14 years are working, and 23% of children between 15 years and 18 years are working. There are 3.3 crore working children in India (1.01 crore are between five years and 14 years of age, and 2.3 crore are between 15 years and 18 years) Source: Census of India, (2011), Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
30	Currently married women were married before they turned 18 Source: Census of India (2011), Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
27	Women were first married or in union between 15 years and 18 years of age Source: IIPS and ICF (2017), National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015–16, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, India
50	Children have experienced sexual abuse Source: MWCD (2007), "Study on Child Abuse," Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, New Delhi, India 57,432 cases are registered under POCSO Act and other sexual offences Source: NCRB (2018), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
40	Of all offences against children are sexual offences Source: NCRB (2018), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
95	Of the POCSO cases were ones where the perpetrators were known to the victims Source: NCRB (2018), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
1	Of all crimes against children were murder (NCRB 2018) 93.7% is the pendency percentage against child murder cases (NCRB 2017) Source: NCRB (2017, 2018), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
90	Is the conviction rate for cases against infanticide Source: NCRB (2017), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
34.2	Is the conviction rate for cases against child rape Source: NCRB (2017), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
25.9	Is the conviction rate for cases against kidnapping and abduction of children Source: NCRB (2017), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
14.2	Is the conviction rate for cases against procurement of minor girls Source: NCRB (2017), <i>Crime in India</i> , National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
20	Children of schoolgoing age are out of school (estimated) Sources: MHRD and NUEPA (2016), <i>UDISE-2015–16: School Education in India</i> , National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, India and "Population Projections for India and States 2001–2026," Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
32	Children finish their school education age-appropriately Source: MHRD and NUEPA (2017), <i>UDISE-2015–16: School Education in India</i> , National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, India
3.2	Schools offer complete school education from Class 1 to Class 12 Source: MHRD and NUEPA (2016), <i>UDISE-2015–16: School Education in India</i> , National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, India
1.74	Children and adolescents live with disabilities in India according to Census 2011 (78,64,636 children) Source: Census of India (2011), Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India
39	Children with disabilities (5–19 years) do not go to any educational institution and enrolment drops with every successive level of schooling Source: Census of India (2011), Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India

Economic & Political WEEKLY

available at

People's Book House

Mehar House, 15 Cawasji Patel Road

Fort, Mumbai 400 001

Ph: 022-22873768

During the COVID-19 emergency, the government has already passed an order (in line with a Supreme Court order [writ petition (c) No 1/2020]) to release children from all forms of observation and special childcare institutions and send them back to their families. Children are also at the risk of engaging or re-engaging into activities in conflict with the laws. The question that remains is, are we prepared enough to address these issues?

Budget and Planning

With many services, including classes, being delivered online, the dependence and number of hours spent on the internet has increased manifold. The question of online security and safety has become of utmost importance. Parents and caregivers need to be capacitated on better ways to protect children online and offline, including how to respond to, and report, the incidents of online abuse and misconducts.

To improve and strengthen safe online practices, the government must provide guidelines for stricter monitoring of online risks and potential harms by educational institutions and restricting “screen time,” especially for younger children. Appropriate technical measures like parental control tools, age verification, safety-by-design, age-differentiated experiences, adequate filters must be applicable for the private sectors too.

Gender discrimination is one sad reality of our country that is likely to be augmented by a pandemic of this nature. Apart from the livelihood challenges increasing the number of child marriages, adolescent girls face multiple other challenges like having to drop out of school, taking over household chores, sibling care and other activities. Financial insecurities, breakdown of social networks, safety concerns and fear of sexual abuse impact girls’ future more in terms of losing out on educational opportunities. A gender-sensitive approach must aid girls’ return to schools post lockdowns. Flexible learning opportunities, catch-up courses and accelerated learning opportunities may help, and so will meticulous tracking of school registers to check on girls who have not returned to school.

A comprehensive plan to protect the children needs adequate investment.

However, the budget for children shows a continuous decrease over the past five years. The amount that was 4.2% of the total union budget in 2014–15, has gradually decreased to 3.31% in 2018–19. Similarly, child budget as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased from 0.6% in 2014–15 to 0.4% in 2016–17 and has remained stagnant since then. Specifically under child protection, the considerable and constant rise in financial allocations over the years shows both the scope of extending the umbrella of child protection services and the constraint under which they have been operating since the ICPS was first operationalised in 2009. The changes in the scenario due to the pandemic will, however, turn the optimal usage of resources into a challenge and require an increase in the budget proportion to safeguard children effectively.

While we prepare to protect children from the indirect onslaughts of COVID-19, we must also keep in mind two other critical aspects. One, we must boost the on-ground machinery and promote civil registration as they work with children, families and communities. Civil registration

can mitigate child protection risks and birth registration is particularly essential for children’s protection. It documents children’s identity, supports access to services and verifies age to protect children from exploitation, among other benefits. And second, it is critical that the COVID-19 child protection preparedness plan be inclusive in nature ensuring gender sensitivity and including children with disabilities, children from minorities, tribal and Scheduled Caste children and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or asexual children.

An early and timely intervention, effective planning and building existing capacities will strengthen preparedness and support the physical and emotional health, dignity and well-being of children, families and communities. Prevention is always better than cure and unplanned response.

REFERENCE

Agenda for Action (2020): “8 United Nations Entities Launch Roadmap to Protect Children from Violence in Response to COVID-19,” April, <https://violenceagainstchildren.un.org/news/agenda-action-8-united-nations-entities-launch-roadmap-protect-children-violence-response-covid>.

ROBERT PARK’S APPROACH ON HUMAN SUSTAINABILITY AND DIVERSITIES OF SEVERAL INSTITUTIONS A Sociological Framework on West Bengal

KEY WORDS: “Constructed reality”, “Habitat and Species”, “logical space between biomes and human beings”, “debate over Comtean and Neo-Kantian philosophy”.

Park was concerned with inducting the logical independence of “human ecology” with the help of “neo-Kantian philosophy” and “Comtean positivism”. He discovers multifaceted relations between “humans and their social environment” which are against the goal of “human geography” and also against the knowledge of “physical environment”. I will try to discuss about some “constructed reality”; basically it is based on some-actions of our everyday lives, to re-discover those actions, Park and his colleagues come across with Darwinian “evolutionary theory”; quite similar with human and animal life competition or rather we can say, it is an controlling behaviour of higherintellectuals to sustain in the diversity of “habitat” and “species”. According to Park “plant” and “animal” - in ecology both provide us a pre-existing conceptual framework; and within that frame work, he blows the problems of creating a science of society where being an individual, we just need a “chance to change” and little “logical space”.

*For further requirement kindly visit: <httpsswawan.wordpress.com>
contact details: sunan.tfg@gmail.com/dsunanda141@gmail.com
Sunanda Das, M.Phil (Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi)

Lessons for Indian Opposition in Sanders–Corbyn Projects

SATYENDRA RANJAN

Despite their electoral defeats, the consolidation of support behind the political projects articulated by Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn underscores the relevance of mass politics with clear ideological moorings. Opposition in India can take cues from these projects for its reconfiguration.

As I write these lines, the new leadership of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom (UK) is in the process of undoing all the remnants of Corbynism (ideas and policies of former leader Jeremy Corbyn). Though Jeremy Corbyn has claimed that he is very much there to oppose all policies that he thinks are “anti-people,” but the leadership of his party is systematically discarding his policies and his supporters. In the United States (US), Bernie Sanders has suspended his presidential campaign and has endorsed Joe Biden for the presidential candidature of the Democratic Party. It is obvious that hope for the victory of the Labour left (in the UK) and democratic socialism (in the US) has been belied for now. In the recent past, the left-leaning media of both countries has been discussing the disappointments of the supporters of both leaders over their defeat. But this is only one side of the story.

The other side shows that this is not merely a story of almost similar electoral battles in two countries. But there is something in it that has long-term relevance. The larger ideological as well as political impact the story has left behind is already visible, not only in countries of Sanders and Corbyn, but also in many parts of the world. Or we may say that it is not a stand-alone story, but a part of a similar phenomenon that emerged in many parts of the Western democratic world. Wherein many new political forces have emerged, some of them ditched the hopes (like Syriza in Greece), some faded away after little sparkle (Jean-Luc Antoine Pierre Mélenchon in France), some are struggling to remain relevant (like, Unidas Podemos in Spain), and some are relatively more successful (like left parties in Portugal). The emergence of Bernie Sanders and Corbynism happened in the same period and under almost the same circumstances. Some common

origins could be traced behind the emergence of all these forces.

Crisis and Depoliticisation

It all happened in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that ravaged the developed world. As ruling elites of those countries followed the policy of austerity that further deepened inequalities, siphoned off incomes of the middle classes and weakened the social security of the common masses, a ground for political revolt began to take shape. The Occupy Wall Street movement captured the mood of the times. Along with the new left forces, many extreme right groups (or phenomena like Brexit and Donald Trump’s election) exploited this situation. At present, it looks like both these types of forces have a future as both have their own narratives. Casualties of this phenomenon are the traditional social democratic parties who bogged down themselves with the responsibility of saving the system that had failed millions of working people. They followed the same set of economic policies that had brought the disaster. As it was alleged, they kept serving their stock-exchange masters.

Among the newly emerged left groups, most remained limited to articulating and (some even) representing people’s anger against old sets of politics. Therefore, they were overtaken by far-right groups, who also found opportunity in new situations to discredit and debase the old “liberal,” “elitist” system. They had better and easier weapons to do it. Atavism and xenophobia were already there. They flared them up with the unscrupulous use of hate speeches and hurling baseless accusations against all and sundry. For this purpose, newly spreading social media was efficiently but unscrupulously exploited by them. If we keep this background in mind, we can better understand the importance of the Corbyn and Sanders projects. Both emerged at around 2015; both were (or became, in the case of Sanders) part of a mainstream political party; both believed in doing mass politics, went to directly addressing the masses in the length and breadth of their countries, and in this process, bringing in new sections of people into politics and creating broadly

Satyendra Ranjan (satyendra.ranjan@gmail.com) is a Delhi-based journalist and executive editor of Hindi News Channel *Swaraj Express*.

ideology-based new organisations at the ground level. These organisations/groups are today running their own media outlets and have been successful in creating and disseminating their own new political narratives.

Here, we must keep in mind that in Western democracies, mass politics was long forgotten. Financial capital had taken politics and parties in its clutches, public relation firms had become the guide and image-maker of political parties, and corporate media had become the main medium of political communications. Sanders and Corbyn have been successful in breaking this vicious anti-people cycle to some extent. But their most important contributions, which have long-term relevance in democratic politics, are the ideas and programmes they prepared, presented before the people, and got acceptability for them from large sections of populations. Their large following among the youth and the so-called generation Z (the generation reaching adulthood in the second decade of the 21st century) indicates that these ideas and programmes are not going to fade away with these septuagenarian leaders (*Economist* 2019).

Ideology and Mass Politics

Corbyn has been a leader of the Labour Party that has a left and (in its some phases) socialist history. It always had some prominent Marxist leaders. But, Corbyn was the first ever case when it chose a (parliamentary party) leader who openly flaunted his Marxist, internationalist and anti-establishment beliefs and tried to organise his politics around them. As a political programme these beliefs and ideas got a concrete form in the Labour Party's 2017 and 2019 election manifestos.¹ The new green industrial revolution, free university education, strengthening the National Health Service (NHS), strengthening the labour unions, bringing back public services like the British Railways under the public sector, high taxes on the super rich, addressing the issue of the widening gap of inequality, etc, became part of the Labour Party and its newly found millions of younger supporter's political narratives.

In the us, Sanders's vision of democratic socialism is now a popular ideology, especially among the youth and generation Z populations (Golshan 2019). Its contribution to us politics is the demand for the minimum wage of \$15 an hour, medicare for all, free university education, the Green New Deal,² plan for restructuring journalism (Sanders 2019), abolishing the billionaire class and imposing high taxes on rich, worker's participation in the management, restrengthening labour unions, prison reforms, protection of minority rights, etc. Now these have become mainstream, popular political programmes.

Still, both Corbyn and Sanders have lost their immediate political battles. The reasons are obvious. Both of them were up against the powers of financial capital, machinations of existing political machineries of their own parties and the powerful corporate media that became a medium of spreading falsehood and propaganda against them. They created and organised their own following among the masses, but that was not enough to surpass the organised power of the establishments.

But each and every keen follower of the us and UK's politics is well aware that legacies and influences of both leaders are going to last longer than the periods of Sanders's movement and Corbyn's leadership of the Labour Party. Both leaders have (at least for now) transformed the way politics was being done in their respective countries, or at least their own parties. They made "socialism" widely acceptable, and among younger people, a fashionable word. It is remarkable that this could be achieved right in the capitals of neo-liberal capitalism. The issues they raised and policies they offered are being copied even by their opponents in their countries. And as the COVID-19 crisis is ravaging them and other societies, even the corporate media is proclaiming that, in the time of crisis, "we are all socialists" (Harris 2020), "Bernie Sanders has won" (Abernathy 2020), and "Reality has endorsed Bernie Sanders" (Taylor 2020). This has happened only due to the strong campaigns they ran on the ground and with the clarity they launched their ideological

battles against prevailing politico-economic directions that their countries had adopted decades back. Another important factor is "authenticity" of leaderships. Both Sanders and Corbyn are considered "authentic," as they have been trading on their same political paths all over their political careers, even in the most difficult and adverse situations.

Reconfiguring the Opposition

So what are the lessons? In these times of "post-truth" politics, when the right-wing has changed the terms of the discourse, only the left/plebeian parties/politicians can hope to make an impact, have vision, message and credibility to speak to disillusioned segments of masses and have their own media to convey their message. It is noteworthy that the main support base of both Sanders and Corbyn has been among teenagers, millennials and younger sections of the population. These youths have only heard of post-war affluences of their societies. Their own experience has been of the declining welfare state, post-recession austerity policies, stagnant income and lack of opportunities. Naturally, they are rebellious against "elitist," "financial capital-controlled" politics and politicians. They could have been mobilised by a demagogue politician, but at the right time, Sanders and Corbyn emerged and presented a vision that generated hope and enthusiasm among those sections. This process has given a fresh life to the idea of democratic socialism. It should also be kept in mind that Sander's and Corbyn's hope to win the elections rested on politicising and mobilising new sets of voters. To an extent, they did it, but it was not enough to secure victory. But it was definitely enough to set the terms of debate.

Recent experience in most democracies has been that the large section of the younger and newly politicised voters have been lured by right-wing demagogue politicians. India is also a case in point. It is important to debate and discuss that why here, in India, there is no non-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) politician present on the horizon, who seems able to state a narrative that can enthuse the masses? Is this not one of the main reasons behind the continued popularity of

Narendra Modi and the ideological hegemony of BJP/Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), despite their all-round failure on the governance front? The result is that our political opposition at present looks clueless and seems suffering from a defeatist mindset. In this grim situation, the experience of Sanders–Corbyn projects presents a template that could be useful for our opposition. As the situation stands, what our opposition parties (or non-parliamentary opposition groups) lack the most is the credibility of leadership, content (that is, a well-articulated ideology), and their own media. The result is a seemingly hopeless situation for them.

For the Indian parliamentary opposition, the 2019 Lok Sabha elections threw a riddle that has not been easy to solve. How can one understand this reality where a government, whose pro-rich and pro-upper-caste inclinations are too obvious, can attract the support of such a large number of poorer, Dalit and Other Backward Class voters? Hardly anyone can deny the fact that large numbers of people from traditionally oppressed classes have positive view of Narendra Modi and BJP even today (Chibber and Verma 2020). And also, this is the reality of today's India that the BJP–RSS have established total ideological as well as administrative hegemony (Palshikar 2020).

As for combating the BJP is concerned, weaknesses of the Indian National Congress (INC), regional and other identity politics-based parties (many of whom associate themselves with Lohiaite, Ambedkarite, Adivasi and Dravidian legacies), and the left are evident. At times, it seems that the INC is forced to struggle only for its meaningful existence. Its degeneration that started during Indira Gandhi's era seems to be reaching near terminal stage (Gudavarthy 2020). The condition of identity-based parties is no better. Though it will be premature to declare that identity politics has run its course, it is hard to deny that the RSS–BJP's somewhat successful game plan to submerge caste/tribe/cultural/regional identities into a grand Hindu identity has been proving detrimental to identity-based parties. Left parties are in retreat for a decade. Though left leaders and activists are still

considered relatively honest and committed to their cause, the specific goal and programme they stand for has increasingly become hazy. So, it is not surprising that they fail to present a coherent narrative and leadership that can enthuse large sections of masses in the country.

Thus, the BJP's success story is proportionally linked to the gradual retreat of secular, left and social justice parties/organisations from the arena of mass-based ideology-driven politics. For now, all these parties/groups seem incapable or even unwilling to accept the challenge to combat the BJP. If they are willing to reinvent themselves, they will have to first come out of some misconceptions: that they can regain their earlier influence (at the national or state level) just by the normal electoral cycle of incumbency–anti-incumbency voting pattern, that they can win elections by forging caste/community-based alliances or by creating such equations on the ground level for themselves, and that in the post-Modi era (whenever it comes), everything will go back to “normal” (like the pre-Modi era).

A politics with new narratives, a credible leadership with a well-prepared message and new-media of its own can generate a new self-confidence in the rank and file of these parties/organisations. And, this also can enthuse large sections of people. Yes, it is a difficult path that demands the sacrifice of the family-based organisational structure, as well as “drawing room and Twitter politics.” But without it, the Indian opposition hardly has any future. Fortunately for them, they at least have two examples in Sanders and Corbyn to take some cues.

In Conclusion

It is undeniable that political models or templates are evolved in society-specific conditions. Mimicking or blindly following any model/template can only be useless at best or disastrous at worst. But, learning wisely from new experiences or experiments becomes useful when one is wondering in the dark.

Therefore, Indian secular political parties would be well-advised to put their energies in clearing the haze over

their ideological moorings, changing their style of doing politics, and creating their own media to converse with the masses. In this process, they may find a leadership that looks or sounds more credible and inspiring. Actually, this is the lesson the Sanders and Corbyn projects have left for all parliamentary/electoral political forces. This is their legacy that is enduring.

NOTES

- 1 The 2017 and 2019 election manifestos of the Labour Party can be found here, <https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf>, <https://labour.org.uk/manifesto-2019>.
- 2 <https://berniesanders.com/issues/green-new-deal/>.

REFERENCES

- Abernathy, Gary (2020): “The Coronavirus Shows Bernie Sanders Won,” *Washington Post*, 25 March, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/25/we-are-all-socialists-now/>.
- Chibber, Pradeep and Rahul Verma (2020): “The New Voters for Modi's BJP Are Poorer, More Majoritarian But Not as Religious,” *Print*, 18 February, <https://theprint.in/opinion/new-voters-modi-bjp-poorer-majoritarian-but-not-as-religious/367095/>.
- Economist* (2019): “The Resurgent Left—Millennial Socialism,” 14 February, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/02/14/millennial-socialism>.
- Goslan, Tara (2019): “Bernie Sanders Defines His Vision for Democratic Socialism in the United States,” *Vox*, 12 June, <https://www.vox.com/2019/6/12/18663217/bernie-sanders-democratic-socialism-speech-transcript>.
- Gudavarthy, Ajay (2020): “New Congress for a New India,” *Telegraph*, 31 March, <https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-congress-needs-a-deliverable-ideological-commitment/cid/1760879>.
- Harris, Tom (2020): “There Is No Alternative: We Are all Socialists Now in the Fight against Coronavirus,” *Telegraph*, 17 March, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/03/17/no-alternative-socialists-now-fight-against-coronavirus/>.
- Palshikar, Suhas (2020): “Politics in the Times of Hegemony,” *Seminar*, January, https://www.india-seminar.com/2020/725/725_suhas_palshikar.htm.
- Sanders, Bernie (2019): “Bernie Sanders on His Plan for Journalism,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, 26 August, <https://www.cjr.org/opinion/bernie-sanders-media-silicon-valley.php>.
- Taylor, Keeanga-Yamhmtta (2020): “Reality Has Endorsed Bernie Sanders,” *New Yorker*, 30 March, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/reality-has-endorsed-bernie-sanders>.

Economic&PoliticalWEEKLY

available at

Ideal Books

26/2082, Tutors Lane

Secretariat Statue

Thiruvananthapuram 695001, Kerala

Reviving Industrial Growth

Need to Address Demand Constraint

M SURESH BABU, P JITHIN

The Indian economy faces an uphill task of reviving industrial growth in the post-pandemic scenario. The early onset of domestic slowdown and global disruptions have affected the industrial sector, both in terms of demand and supply factors. What is required at this juncture is not a set of scattered short-term policies, but a coherent heavy lifting of the sector through demand injection and stimulation, because the slowdown started much earlier and is structural in nature.

As the economy is going through an unprecedented crises due to the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown, strategies to revive growth in a phased manner are attracting attention. While the current debate on the projected rate of growth for the fiscal year 2020–21 has some merits, these can only be viewed, at best, as a set of scenarios. The more important issue, however, irrespective of the precise rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP), is to outline an approach to put the economy back on track. It is here that a deeper understanding of the current crisis is necessary as the economy had started to slow down much earlier. The consequences of the present crisis are reflected, at best, at the sectoral level, as aggregation masks the enormity of the problem. Hence, a departure from the conventional analysis of the supply-side factors that hinder growth could enhance the possibility of formulating more realistic policies towards growth revival. A structural analysis could provide useful insights as it emphasises on the sectoral features of the economy, that need to be taken into account in designing policy responses. This can be done by assigning an important role for the state in facilitating changes in the existing structure at the sectoral level.

An economy's structure of factor endowments, defined as the relative composition of natural resources, labour, human and physical capital, is given at each stage of development and differs from one stage to another. Hence, the optimal industrial structure of the economy will differ at different stages of development. Different industrial structures imply, in addition to differences in capital intensity of industries, differences in optimal firm size, scale of production, and complexities in transactions. However, each industrial structure requires corresponding soft and hard


infrastructures to facilitate production and exchange. Post-COVID-19, the structure of factor endowments would change, driven by changes in physical capital as private investment growth, which is already sluggish, is likely to slow down even further. This warrants a revitalising of the industrial structure in light of the current developments. This is accentuated by the trends in industrial growth, which suggest that the fluctuations and decline in growth had started much earlier. Thus, in a sense, the post-crisis industrial growth trajectory had already started to take shape earlier. This makes the task of reviving growth even more daunting as the policy responses have to factor in the structural issues along with the cyclical problems.

The slowdown started much earlier:


In Figure 1 (p 17), the growth rate of the index of industrial production (IIP) with base year 2011–12, since 2012, is presented. The component wise break-up shows that the growth rate of electricity is increasing in the initial period up to 14.8% in 2014–15 and decreases sharply to 5.7% in 2015–16. After this fluctuation, it is more or less stable across the years. The growth rate of mining also increased over the period, while the growth rate of manufacturing did change substantially over the years, hovering between 3.5% and 5%. Any change in the growth of manufacturing industries will have a significant impact on the aggregate industrial growth as it has 77.63% weight in the overall IIP.

Focusing on the manufacturing sector, in Table 1 (p 17), we map out the pattern of growth at the industry level from April 2012 to August 2019, that is, for a period of 89 months. This detailed analysis is intended to provide a temporal perspective. It should be noted that we do not adjust the IIP in terms of seasonal effects. We classify industries in terms of their monthly growth rates of IIP into four intervals; (i) less than 2%, (ii) 2% to 5%, (iii) 5% to 8%, and (iv) more than 8% to identify the growth dampeners and growth drivers. It is evident from the table that there exist significant variations in growth rates across industries. We draw the following inferences:

M Suresh Babu (sureshbabum@iitm.ac.in) is professor and P Jithin (jithinphand21@gmail.com) is doctoral fellow, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai.

Figure 1: Growth of Index of Industrial Production

Source: Authors' calculations.

Figure 2: Growth Rates of the Growth Dampening Industries

Source: Authors' calculations.

(i) Industries such as manufacture of paper and paper products, printing and reproduction of recorded media, manufacture of rubber and plastics products, manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment, manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and other manufacturing can be classified as less growth-inducing industries, as the growth rate of these industries was less than 2% in more than 50 out of 89 months considered. Out of these, the manufacture of paper and paper products is a major growth-dampening industry registering less than 2% growth in 55 out of 89 months.

(ii) Industries such as the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical

and botanical products, manufacture of basic metals, manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products are growth-inducing industries since the growth rate of industries fall below 2% in only for less than 30 months during the period considered. Among these, manufacture of basic metals is a leading industry registering higher growth rates for most of the months.

(iii) Industries with growth rates exceeding 8% are considerably less. Industries such as the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products, manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products have growth rates higher than 8% in more than 38 months out of 89 months.

Industries such as manufacture of beverages, manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture, manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials, manufacture of paper and paper products, manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, printing and reproduction of recorded media, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, manufacture of machinery and equipment, and manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers have recorded more than 8% growth in less than 20 out of 89 months.

The overall growth rate of Indian manufacturing industries is skewed towards the low growth region as all industries, except the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products, and manufacture of furniture, have less than 5% growth rate in more than 40 out of 89 months.

The analysis of growth rates has not taken into account the individual industry's weight in IIP to decipher the overall impact on industrial growth. Considering the weights of industries in the IIP, the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products has a weight of 11.775%, and it has registered more than 8% growth in only 16 months. The major contributors to the IIP all have registered modest growth rates since they have less than 5% growth in 47 months and more than 5% growth for only 42 of 89 months considered. To summarise, we identified the growth drivers and dampeners within the manufacturing sector, based on growth rates of industries and their contribution to the IIP. The growth-dampening industries are manufacturers of textiles, chemicals and chemical products,

Table 1: Monthly Growth Rate of Manufacturing Industries

NIC Code	Weight	Growth Rate Range (No of Months)				Growth Rate Range (Percentage of Months)			
		<2	2to5	5to8	>8	<2	2to5	5to8	>8
10	5.30247	40	12	10	27	44.9438	13.4831	11.2359	30.3370
11	1.03543	49	8	14	18	55.0561	8.98876	15.7303	20.2247
12	0.79845	38	11	7	33	42.6966	12.3595	7.86517	37.0786
13	3.29131	40	26	13	10	44.9438	29.2135	14.6067	11.2359
14	1.3225	37	6	4	42	41.5730	6.74157	4.49438	47.1910
15	0.50208	42	17	9	21	47.1910	19.1011	10.1123	23.5955
16	0.19301	48	15	10	16	53.9326	16.8539	11.2359	17.9775
17	0.87238	55	12	10	12	61.7977	13.4831	11.2359	13.4831
18	0.67981	52	12	11	14	58.427	13.4831	12.3595	15.7303
19	11.7749	38	20	15	16	42.6966	22.4719	16.8539	17.9775
20	7.87304	41	23	20	5	46.0672	25.8427	22.4719	5.61797
21	4.98100	23	10	11	45	25.8427	11.2359	12.3595	50.5618
22	2.42215	52	10	10	17	58.4269	11.2359	11.2359	19.1011
23	4.08533	41	17	9	22	46.0674	19.1011	10.1123	24.7191
24	12.8043	21	26	12	30	23.5955	29.2135	13.4831	33.7078
25	2.65493	50	8	5	26	56.1798	8.98876	5.61797	29.2134
26	1.57038	27	15	8	39	30.3371	16.8539	8.98876	43.8202
27	2.99826	48	8	5	28	53.9326	8.98876	5.61797	31.4606
28	4.76530	47	12	10	20	52.809	13.4831	11.2359	22.4719
29	4.8573	52	9	7	21	58.4268	10.1123	7.86516	23.5955
30	1.77626	34	10	11	34	38.2022	11.2359	12.3595	38.2022
31	0.13107	32	2	7	48	35.9550	2.24719	7.86516	53.9325
32	0.9415	52	4	3	30	58.4269	4.49438	3.37078	33.7078

Source: Authors' calculations. Industry categories corresponding to the codes are given in the appendix.


rubber and plastics products and machinery and equipment. The growth drivers identified are manufactures of wearing apparel, pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products, basic metals, computer, electronic and optical products as it has less than 2% growth rate in fewer months and more than 5% in more months than other industries.

We take up the growth dampeners and drivers for further scrutiny. Figure 2 (p 17) portrays the annual growth rates of growth dampening industries for 2012–13 to 2018–19. It reveals that the growth rates decline continuously after 2013. Growth of manufacture of rubber and plastic products declined drastically from 11.3% in 2013–14 to -8.2% in 2017–18. These dampening industries registered a further decrease in growth in 2017–18 as the growth rates of industries such as manufacture of chemical and chemical products decreased from 2.5% in 2016–17 to -0.3% in 2017–18, manufacture of rubber and plastic products declined from 1.9% to -8.2%, and the manufacture of machinery and equipment decreased from 7.7% to 5.6%. The policy shock due to demonetisation could be one of the reasons for the decline in the growth rates in 2017–18. This is corroborated by the fact that the *Economic Survey, 2016–17* acknowledges that demonetisation could have resulted in a quarter to 1 percentage point loss of GDP. Interestingly, the dampening industries revived as it recorded favourable growth rates after 2017–18.

Figure 3 presents the annual growth rates of growth drivers for the period 2012–13 to 2018–19. It is evident that the industry group—manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products—is the leading growth driver till 2017–18 as this group registered a tremendous increase in the growth rates from 8.1% in 2012–13 to 23.1% in 2017–18. Surprisingly, we find a declining trend in the growth rates of all growth-inducing industries, except the manufacture of wearing apparel in 2018–19, which points to an overall slowdown in the manufacturing sector.

Viewed from a different perspective, in Table 2, we present the monthly growth rates in terms of use-based classification of industries for 89 months.

Figure 3: Growth Rates of Growth Driving Industries



Source: Authors' calculations.

Table 2: Growth Rates of Use-based Categories of Indian Industries

Use-based Category	Growth Values				Growth Percentage			
	<=2	2 to 5	5 to 8	>8	<=2	2 to 5	5 to 8	>8
Primary goods	24	37	20	8	26.967	41.574	22.472	8.989
Capital goods	54	11	6	18	60.674	12.359	6.7416	20.225
Intermediate goods	29	32	16	12	32.584	35.955	17.977	13.483
Infrastructure/construction goods	28	21	16	24	31.461	23.595	17.977	26.966
Consumer durables	31	22	20	16	34.831	24.719	22.4719	17.977
Consumer non-durables	25	20	16	28	28.089	22.472	17.9775	31.460

Source: Authors' calculations.

We find that primary goods, capital goods, and intermediate goods are not growth-inducing as it has less than 5% growth in more than 60 out of the 89 months considered. The growth rates of primary goods and that of intermediate goods are less than 5% in 61 months, which together contribute 51.27% weight in the IIP. These three industries are thus less growth-inducing. The growth rate of infrastructure/construction goods, consumer durables, consumer non-durables are less than 5% in 54 months out of the 89 months. Concurrently, the growth rates of consumer durables and consumer

non-durables are more than 5% in 36 months and 44 months, respectively. The growth rate of infrastructure is more than 5% in 40 months out of 89 months. It indicates that industries such as infrastructure/construction goods, consumer durables, and consumer non-durables have been the main growth drivers during this period.

The issue of demand constraints: Analyses of the earlier episodes of industrial growth slowdown identify the factors constraining growth mainly in terms of “supply constraints” and shortages in

EPW E-books

Select EPW books are now available as e-books in Kindle and iBook (Apple) formats.

The titles are

- Village Society** (ED. SURINDER JODHKA)
(<http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00CS62AAW> ;
<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/village-society/id640486715?mt=11>)
- Environment, Technology and Development** (ED. ROHAN D'SOUZA)
(<http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00CS624E4> ;
<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/environment-technology-development/id641419331?mt=11>)
- Windows of Opportunity: Memoirs of an Economic Adviser** (BY KS KRISHNASWAMY)
(<http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00CS622GY> ;
<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/windows-of-opportunity/id640490173?mt=11>)

Please visit the respective sites for prices of the e-books. More titles will be added gradually.

savings as the binding constraints. Supply constraints were attributed to the inadequacy in the production of capital goods. For the subsequent episodes, “infrastructural bottlenecks” had been identified as an important factor limiting industrial growth. However, in bulk of these earlier discussions, the question as to “whether there is not some role for ‘demand’ as a factor constraining growth, even in a low income economy such as India” has remained as an unsettled issue, often overlooked by the policy practitioners as well (Chakravarty 1983). The question of demand has surfaced again as it connects to the current debates on growth slowdown, and especially whether the present tepid growth is because of supply inflexibilities or the lack of aggregate demand.

The Reserve Bank of India’s results of the 48th round of the Order Books, Inventories and Capacity Utilisation Survey (OBICUS) for the quarter October–December 2019 covering 704 manufacturing companies provides a snapshot of demand conditions in the manufacturing

sector. According to the survey, capacity utilisation at the aggregate level declined to 68.6% in Q3: 2019–20 from 69.1% in the previous quarter. It should be noted that capacity utilisation in Q4 2018–19 was 76.1%, and since then, there has been a steady decline in the successive quarters. This decline in capacity utilisation is reflected in the growth of new orders for firms during the corresponding period. This measure of capacity utilisation broadly tracks the detrended IIP. The continuous decline and the current low levels of capacity utilisation are clearly a reflection of low levels of demand in the economy.

A low level of aggregate demand is the end result of a combination of factors. First, it happens as a result of the decline in GDP growth. In January 2020, before the budget, data released by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI) predicted that India’s GDP will grow by just 5% in the current financial year (2019–20), the lowest since the 2008 economic crisis. For the financial year 2018–19, the economy

grew at 6.8%. India’s GDP growth in the July–September quarter of 2019 slowed sharply to 4.5%, the weakest pace in more than six years. Citing a sharp economic slowdown in India and other emerging markets, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lowered the growth estimate for the world economy to 2.9% for 2019. Besides, the IMF also trimmed India’s growth estimate to 4.8% for 2019, citing stress in the non-banking financial sector and weak rural income growth.

Second, rural wages, which are critical for the overall demand in the economy, barely rose during 2018–19. This has fuelled a slowdown in both consumption and corporate earnings. Real agricultural wages have not grown substantially for several months. For example, real wages grew 2% back in February 2019, compared to a 1.5% rise in January 2019. Similarly, growth in real non-farm wages has been weak as they grew 1.4% in February 2019, compared to 2% in the previous month. According to data from the Labour Bureau, neither of these measures of wages has risen above 4% in the

WORK at EPW

Assistant Editor

The *Economic & Political Weekly* intends appointing an Assistant Editor.

The position offers an opportunity to engage with a range of writing and research on economics, politics and the social sciences.

The responsibilities will involve writing editorials, reviewing and editing submissions, and tracking news and research. The selected candidate will commission commentaries and articles for publication, interact with writers who seek to publish in the journal, and collaborate in organising special issues. They will also have opportunities to write articles and review books.

We are looking for a candidate with research and/or journalistic experience of at least three years, and publications (research writing/reportage). A PhD/MPhil in the above-mentioned subjects will be preferable.

Since editing will be an important part of the editorial work, a strong command over English is essential. An awareness of current affairs and contemporary debates in the social sciences will be useful. A familiarity with digital publishing will be welcome.

The *EPW* tries to, but cannot, match the salary of those in comparable positions in educational and research institutions. It makes up by offering an opportunity to work in a unique institution, which encourages its staffers to develop their skills and interests.

This is a contractual position based in Mumbai.

Interested candidates should send in their curriculum vitae along with a covering letter addressed to the editor at edit@epw.in. The last date for submission of applications is **14th August 2020**. The selection will be made on the basis of a videoconference call. The selected candidate should be in a position to join at the earliest.

We will give preference to candidates from marginalised backgrounds who meet our requirements.

nine months of 2019. In fact, the decline in rural wages started earlier; rural wages actually declined during several months. For instance, real growth in agricultural wages remained in the negative territory for each of the four months between April and July 2018. Thus, the two measures combined, that is, agricultural wages and non-farm wages, convey a picture of depressed rural earnings, which has affected the aggregate demand.

Third, the weakening external sector has put additional pressure on the demand for manufacturing sector's output. Merchandise exports fell by 1.1% back in October 2019 itself, contracting for the third consecutive month, while imports fell for the fifth month in a row by 16.3%, leading to a trade deficit of \$11 billion. Out of the 30 major items each in India's export and import baskets, 18 export items and 22 imported goods witnessed contraction in the third quarter of 2019–20. Ready-made garment exports, for instance, fell by -2.1%, and petroleum products by -14.6%. Among major importing items, coal fell -28.7%, petroleum -31.7%, chemicals -24.4%, plastic material -10.5%, precious stones -17.6%, iron and steel -14.3%, and electronic goods shrank by -8.5%. During the first seven months of the fiscal 2019–20 (April–October), exports have contracted 2.2%, while imports shrank 8.4%. Thus, we find that manufacturing sector is constrained by both domestic as well as external demand.

Concluding Observations

Stimulating industrial growth in India in the post-COVID-19 crisis era presents an enormous challenge for policymakers.

Appendix

NIC 2008		Description
10 Manufacture of food products	21	Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products
11 Manufacture of beverages	22	Manufacture of rubber and plastics products
12 Manufacture of tobacco products	23	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
13 Manufacture of textiles	24	Manufacture of basic metals
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel	25	Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
15 Manufacture of leather and related products	26	Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
16 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials	27	Manufacture of electrical equipment
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products	28	Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media	29	Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products	30	Manufacture of other transport equipment
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	31	Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing		

A comprehensive analysis of the factors that drive industrial growth is needed to address this. Early responses during the crisis have considered only a part of the problem, that is, the supply-side issues. This has led to the usual set of policies, such as easing the access to credit and improving the investment climate. The latter has attracted attention as there is an optimism that, in the post-crisis period, firms might leave China in search of new destinations. To attract these firms, states are creating land banks and competing to ease labour laws. Such policies are intended to attract foreign direct investments and the associated "spillover" effects. Ironically, the expectation of increased flows in foreign investments is at a time when domestic private investments are not growing. Currently, after going through successive quarters of slowdown in industrial growth, and with the prospects of it continuing for more time, we are back to the old question, that is: Is the slowdown cyclical or structural? If we are to reckon with the cyclical nature of slowdown, just as a series of bad quarters, then the sector will correct the imbalances with an adequate dose of monetary and credit stimulus. However, if it is more serious in terms of structural problems, then the policy interventions will have to go beyond the current practice of monetary interferences, especially that of tinkering with the repo rates.

Viewed from a broader perspective, despite the large doses of reforms to transform into a market economy, the Indian economy still exhibits symptoms of continuous disequilibrium in markets. Interestingly, these imbalances are similar

to the demand deficiency problem, that are more typical of free-market economies and the issue of supply bottlenecks are more often manifested in the centrally-planned economies. The coexistence of both of these problems constrain the role of price mechanism in the economy, leading to the questioning of the standard assumptions implicit in price behaviour that all markets are continuously in equilibrium prices and respond quickly to clear any imbalance between demand and supply. Hence, there exists a need to explore alternate frameworks, departing from neoclassical macro models to explain the working of markets, that is, there exists a need to take into account the fact that markets are not cleared by movements in price. Explorations in this direction yields important insights on the role of structural factors that hamper growth (Babu 2018). Our argument underscores the need for such an analysis, as the current sluggish industrial growth is not cyclical, but more structural in nature. The manifestations of a downward growth spiral started to surface early and has now resulted in an overall growth slowdown, which, if not addressed in a more realistic way, would last for a longer spell.

REFERENCES

- Chakravarty, Sukhamoy (1983): "Some Reflections on Indian Development Strategy" (Inaugural address to the Eighth Indian Social Science Congress held at Hyderabad on 9 July 1983), *Eastern Economist*, Vol 1, No 2, July–September, pp 29–32.
- Babu, Suresh (2018): *Hastening Slowly: India's Industrial Growth in the Era of Economic Reforms*, Orient Blackswan India.
- Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Index of Industrial Production data.

Did Public Investment Crowd Out Private Investment in India?

HONEY KARUN, HRISHIKESH VINOD, LEKHA S CHAKRABORTY

The maximum entropy bootstrap method is applied to overcome the econometric constraints of using a short time series after the publication of a new macroeconomic series in India. A short time series (quarterly data) of stationary and non-stationary variables between 2011 and 2016 is used to confirm the positive role of public infrastructure investment. The significant result has policy implications in terms of the current debate, whether public investment “crowds in” rather than “crowds out” private corporate investment in India.

Private investment in India has averaged around 25% of the gross domestic product (GDP) during 2004–05 to 2015–16, wherein both the corporate and household sectors consistently contributed more than 10%. Public sector contributed an average of 8%–8.5% of GDP during the same period.

Successive economic surveys in India (for instance, 2012–13, 2013–14, and 2014–15) have highlighted several factors causing the decline in private investment over time. *The Economic Survey 2013–14* stressed the severity of challenges in financing private investment. It also argued that high and persistent inflation, along with lower real interest rates, are reducing private savings, thus reducing the supply of funds. Accordingly, the survey urged policy measures aimed at reducing the fiscal burden (through fiscal consolidation), stabilising inflation, and reduction in resource pre-emption, thereby allowing more financial space for private investment (or reduced “crowding out”).

The Central Statistics Office (CSO) of India introduced a new series of national accounts, with certain revisions in the methodology for estimating gross value added (GVA) and GDP, which provides data at 2011–12 prices.¹ Thus, a limited number of observations available posed challenges to perform meaningful time series analysis.

This article hence uses the maximum entropy bootstrap method to overcome the econometric constraints of using a short time series after the publication of the new macroeconomic series in India. The results reinforce the crowding-in properties of public investment in India.

Literature Review

In the Indian context, Chakraborty (2007, 2016) attempted to explore both real and financial aspects of the crowding-out

argument and found no evidence for either. In recent years, Bahal et al (2015) observed crowding-out effects on private investment during 1950–2012, whereas the opposite results were highlighted for the post-1980 period. Dash (2016) found evidence for crowding-out of private investment for the period 1970–2013, which was subdued during the post-liberalisation period and a positive impact of public infrastructure investment on private investment in the short run.

Mallick (2016) attributed the crowding-out effects of public investment during 1970–2013 to non-infrastructure government investment. Chhibber and Kalloor (2016) argued for crowding-in effects of public investment on aggregate and sector-wise (corporate and non-corporate) private investment for 1980–2014.

The empirical literature reviewed here relies on autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and vector autoregressive (VAR) models. The ARDL and VAR models often involve differencing or de-trending of variables to deal with the problems associated with the ubiquitous non-stationarity of underlying macroeconomic time series. Moreover, these models often yield insignificant results when the time series is short.


In this article, maximum entropy bootstrap (“meboot”) is considered based on Efron (1979) for exploring determinants of private investment in India.

The “meboot” algorithm is a seven-step procedure that allows one to generate replicates or “reincarnations” of the original series, as termed by Vinod (2004), to be used for statistical inferences. The meboot resamples allow overcoming the unit root and structural change pretest problems, while avoiding any differencing-type transformations of original time series simply for ensuring the stationarity assumption.² In addition, the constructed ensembles have the property of retaining the overall shapes of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the original time series data, without imposing parametric constraints.

Figure 1 (p 22) shows the actual data on private investment and a sample of three replicas generated from the meboot algorithm. It shows that the basic shape of the non-stationary I(1) series is retained

Honey Karun (honeykarun@gmail.com) is with Senior Resident Representative Office, International Monetary Fund, New Delhi, India. Hrishikesh Vinod (vinod@fordham.edu) is with Fordham University, New York, United States. Lekha S Chakraborty (lekha.chakraborty@nipfp.org.in) is with the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, India.

Figure 1: Actual and Generated Ensembles of Private Investment (in ₹ Billion) Used for Confidence Intervals



in each replica as the resamples are strongly dependent on it.

Interpreting Data and Model

The determinants of private investment are explored following Chakraborty (2007, 2016) by incorporating interest rates (both short and long term) in the model equation as below to gauge the impact of interest rates on private corporate investment:³

$$I_{pvt} = \alpha + \beta_1 I_{pub} + \beta_2 i_r + \beta_3 C_{pvt} + \beta_4 K_{forgrn} + \beta_5 Y^* + e_t \quad \dots (1)$$

where I_{pvt} = private investment, I_{pub} = public investment, i_r = real interest rate (using two versions: short- or long-term

rate), C_{pvt} = credit to the private sector, K_{forgrn} = foreign investment capital flows, and Y^* = output gap. Both the price and quantity of credit variables are added in the model to test the McKinnon hypothesis, whether the cost of the credit or quantity matters for private investment.

Investment: The public investment is categorised into infrastructure and non-infrastructure, as suggested in Parker (1995). The sector-wise quarterly data on investment is estimated by maintaining the annual relative shares of private corporate and public investment in each quarter.

Interest rates: The 91-day treasury bills and the 10-year yield on government securities rate for short- and long-term interest rates are considered. The *ex post* real interest rate (backward looking retail inflation adjusted) is used for our estimation.

Output gap: Many studies have compared the results of the output gap estimation by using different models in the Indian context. However, despite all the criticisms, this article estimates potential

output using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter due to its simplicity.

The simple correlation shown in Figure 2 (p 23) between private and public investment is very high and positive (even with public infrastructure and non-infrastructure), which signals that public investment may not be crowding out the private investment during this period. Non-food credit also indicates a similar picture. The direction of causality, however, may be debated, as some may argue that the decline in non-food credit is independent of a lack of demand for investment and not vice versa. Interest rates, whether short or long term, highlight a significant positive relationship, suggesting that interest rates matter.

Finally, foreign portfolio capital flows show a low negative relationship with retail inflation dynamics and output gap while a low positive relationship with non-food credit, public and private investment.

Estimation and Results

Our specification Equation (1) incorporates both fiscal policy and monetary policy instruments relevant for encouraging private investment. We consider three

Table 1: Regression Coefficient Estimates Using Short-term Interest Rates

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Real T-bills rate	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.002)
Output gap	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Foreign investment	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.017)
Non-food credit	-0.271* (0.149)	0.572*** (0.114)	0.559** (0.247)
Public investment	1.084*** (0.121)		
Public investment, Lag2	0.394*** (0.100)		
Public infrastructure investment		0.351*** (0.100)	
Public infrastructure investment, Lag2		0.268*** (0.093)	
Public non-infrastructure investment			0.575*** (0.184)
Public non-infrastructure investment, Lag2			0.004 (0.167)
Constant	-0.016 (0.252)	-0.846** (0.303)	-0.910 (0.527)
Observations	22	22	22
R ²	0.994	0.987	0.972
Adjusted R ²	0.992	0.981	0.961
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	-145.435	-126.616	-110.590
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)	-136.707	-117.888	-101.862
Residual standard error (df=15)	0.007	0.011	0.016

*P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. Figures in parenthesis are t-values.


Table 2: Regression Coefficient Estimates Using Long-term Interest Rates

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Real long term yield rate	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Output gap	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Foreign investment	-0.026** (0.009)	-0.051*** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.019)
Non-food credit	-0.326* (0.184)	0.537*** (0.112)	0.506* (0.265)
Public investment	1.134*** (0.152)		
Public investment, Lag2	0.436*** (0.123)		
Public infrastructure investment		0.451*** (0.108)	
Public infrastructure investment, Lag2		0.265*** (0.091)	
Public non-infrastructure investment			0.600*** (0.194)
Public non-infrastructure investment, Lag2			0.013 (0.177)
Constant	-0.050 (0.312)	-0.947*** (0.303)	-0.763 (0.591)
Observations	22	22	22
R ²	0.991	0.987	0.969
Adjusted R ²	0.988	0.982	0.957
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	-136.388	-127.497	-108.123
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)	-127.659	-118.769	-99.394
Residual standard error (df=15)	0.009	0.011	0.017

*P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. Figures in parenthesis are t-values.

ECONOMIC & POLITICAL WEEKLY

Figure 2: Correlation Matrices of the Variables



The distribution of each variable is shown on the diagonal. On the bottom of the diagonal: the bivariate scatter plots with a fitted line are displayed. On the top of the diagonal: the correlation plus the significance level as stars. Each significance level is associated to a symbol: p-values (0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 1) have respective symbols (****, ***, **, *,). "Ogap" = output gap; "lnfc" = log values of non-food credit; "lpin" = log values of private investment; "lpuin" = log values of public investment; "lfinv" = log values of foreign investment; "lpinfr" = log values of public infrastructure investment; "lpuinfr" = log values of public non-infrastructure investment; "rtbcpi" = cpi-based real treasury bills rate; "rtycpi" = cpi-based real long-term yield rate; "cpynfl" = cpi-based inflation.

models of fiscal instruments (I_{pub}) as total public investment, public investment in infrastructure, and non-infrastructure separately. We also consider two versions of these three models with monetary policy variable real interest rates (i_r) based on short- and long-run interest rates. Since public investment takes time to materialise, our models incorporate regressors for investments made two quarters before the current.

Tables 1 and 2 report our results for models when our i_r is the short- and long-term interest rate, respectively. Table 3 provides the confidence intervals under the “meboot” procedure for the first model specifications reported in Table 1.

Table 3: Confidence Intervals for ‘Model 1’ Defined in Table 1

Variable	OLS		Meboot							
			Simple Percentile		Boot Percentile		Boot Norm		Boot Basic	
	2.5%	97.5%	2.5%	97.5%	2.5%	97.5%	2.5%	97.5%	2.5%	97.5%
Real T-bill rate	-0.10	0.006	-0.16	0.005	-0.16	0.005	-0.21	0.000	-0.21	0.000
Output gap	-0.03	0.000	-0.03	0.002	-0.03	0.002	-0.04	0.001	-0.04	0.001
Foreign investment	-0.39	0.006	-0.74	0.006	-0.74	0.006	-0.56	0.024	-0.51	0.028
Non-food credit	-588	0.045	-373	1.284	-376	1.286	-1.159	0.468	-1.174	0.487
Public investment	-826	1.342	-309	1.220	-313	1.230	0.725	2.188	0.674	2.216
Public investment, Lag2	-181	0.608	-228	0.925	-228	0.927	-422	0.751	-447	0.709

Our confidence intervals continue to support “crowding-in” of private investment through public investment for

2011–16. The findings are, thus, consistent with the recent literature using Indian data, which does not find crowding-out effects of public investment on private investment.

We find a significantly positive impact of credit cost reductions on corporate investment, albeit of a comparatively smaller magnitude than that of increases in public investment.

The direct crowding-in effects of public infrastructure investment on corporate investment evident in the lagged models (see Model 2 results in Tables 1 and 2) signify the spillover or second-round effects of infrastructure investments on economic activity. The instantaneous effect of public infrastructure investment

on corporate investment implies a net reduction in project costs of private investment, given the public infrastructure.

A negative coefficient of the output gap indicates a negative impact of macro-economic uncertainties on private corporate investment. The other finding of the study is that the interest rate, that is, cost of credit matters—both short- and long-term. However, the magnitude of the impact is smaller than that of the public investment variable.

During our time period, private investment may have galvanised to attain a larger share of resources, but did not essentially get crowded-out by the mere presence of public sector investment. The significant but opposite signs of non-food credit indicate that a mere quantity of credit may not be enough for enhancing private investment. The direct intervention of the state through focused infrastructure investment, coupled with the availability of credit, can have a stronger impact on interest rate sensitive private investment. Only by allocating resources for infrastructure, the government encourages private investment.

The negative coefficient of foreign investment (which ideally could be argued to be positive to boost private investment in such equations of investment relations) confirms that the uncertainty

PREPARING FOR THE CIVIL SERVICES EXAMINATION THIS YEAR?

Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) is a must-read for those who aspire to join the civil services. Every week *EPW* provides informed commentaries on the current affairs not covered by the mainstream media. In addition, it gives detailed analysis of contemporary trends in India and the world. Reading *EPW* will give you that edge in all stages of your preparation.

As part of the **EPW Translation Project**, *EPW* editorials are translated into seven regional languages and these translated editorials are available on the *EPW* website.

SUBSCRIBE NOW
to avail special concession
for aspirants

₹1,800
for 1 Year
Print Edition

₹3,068
for 1 Year
Print + Digital Archives

**How to
Subscribe**



Pay by either sending a demand draft/cheque in favour of Economic and Political Weekly or by making online payment with a credit card/net banking on our secure site at www.epw.in.



Along with the payment send in a photocopy/scan of your ICard, complete postal address and email address.

Economic & Political WEEKLY

320–322, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai, India 400 013
Phone: +91-22-40638282 | www.epw.in | circulation@epw.in

engage
EPW's Digital Initiative

towards the stability in the flows of foreign capital had a negative bearing on the scale of private investment.

The initial correlation boxes indicated a high and positive correlation between the two investments. Since we also want to assess the causal directions, we use an exogeneity test statistic (or unanimity index) suggested by Vinod (2017) to determine the direction and strength of causal and exogenous variables.⁴

Causal paths between variables paired with the private investment are reported in Table 4.

Table 4: Causal Paths between Selected Variables

Cause	Response	Strength	Corr	p-value
1 PvtInv	RTbill	100	-0.672	0.00032
2 RLYield	PvtInv	31.496	-0.6862	0.00021
3 Ogap	PvtInv	100	0.0118	0.95626
4 PvtInv	PubInv	100	0.9868	0
5 PvtInv	PubInfr	100	0.9595	0
6 PvtInv	PbNlnf	100	0.9733	0
7 PvtInv	RLYield	31.496	0.6745	0
8 PvtInv	FornInv	31.496	0.4027	0.05103
9 PvtInv	CPI	31.496	0.5854	0.00265

The numbers in the column entitled “corr” of Table 4 are Pearson correlation coefficients. Since all p-values are near zero except for the output gap along line 3 of Table 4, all relations in the table have statistically significantly non-zero Pearson correlation coefficients. However, the symmetry of the matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients means that they cannot suggest anything about the underlying causal directions.

When the value in the “strength” column of Table 4 exceeds 15, the causal direction determination is strong enough to be believed as a preliminary indicator of the true causal direction.

It stands to reason that all variables except LongYld and Ogap along lines 2 and 3 of Table 4 show that long-term yield and output gap influence private investment (PvtInv), but all other variables are sensitive to independent variation in PvtInv data generating process (DGP).

Conclusions

In this article, we used a meboot methodology that allows overcoming the unit root and structural change pretests while ruling out the need for any transformations of original time series.

Our causal path analysis using the R package “general Corr” shows that

private investment as a DGP has an independent variation that drives the variation in public infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments and the variation in long-term government bond rates. It highlights the importance of private investment as a driving force for the growth of the Indian economy and difficulties in choosing policies to influence it.

Our meboot results indicate evidence in support of “crowding-in” of private investment through public investment. We find that public infrastructure investment is significant in determining private investment, and that a low-interest rate encourages private corporate investment.

Private corporate investment is often cyclical, whereby investment booms are followed by recessions, reflecting among other issues the fact that firm-level capacity utilisation or capacity addition are often bulky, expensive, and uncertain. Our time period covers mostly a recessionary phase of the investment cycle following a modest expansion. In the absence of data to cover many business cycles, we capture some aspects of cyclical behaviour by including the “output gap” variable in the model. The public policy implication of our chapter is that the government should remove the infrastructure and bureaucratic bottlenecks in the economy by enhancing “ease of doing business” in India.

NOTES

- http://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/press_release/nad_press_release_30jan15.pdf.
- For further detailed on the seven-step algorithm, see Vinod and Lopez-de-Lacalle (2009); Vinod (2013).

- See Chakraborty (2007) for detailed derivation of the equation.
- See Vinod et al (2020) for more details on the application.

REFERENCES

- Bahal, G, M Raissi and V Tulini (2015): “Crowding-out or Crowding-in? Public and Private Investment in India,” IMF Working Paper 264.
- Chakraborty, Lekha (2007): “Fiscal Deficit, Capital Formation, and Crowding Out in India: Evidence from an Asymmetric VAR Model,” Economics Working Paper Archive, The Levy Economics Institute, New York, WP 518.
- (2016): *Fiscal Consolidation, Budget Deficit and Macroeconomy*, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Chhibber, A and A Kallor (2016): “Reviving Private Investment in India: Determinants and Policy Levers,” NIPFP Working paper series, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, WP 181.
- Dash, P (2016): “The Impact of Public Investment on Private Investment: Evidence from India,” *Journal for Decision Makers*, Vol 41, No 4, pp 288–307.
- Efron, B (1979): “Bootstrap Methods: Another Look at Jackknife,” *Annals of Statistics*, Vol 7, pp 1–26.
- Mallick, J (2016): “Effects of Government Investment Shocks on Private Investment and Income in India,” Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, WP 315.
- Parker, K (1995): “The Behaviour of Private Investment,” IMF Occasional Paper 134, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Vinod, H D (2004): “Ranking mutual funds using unconventional utility theory and stochastic dominance,” *Journal of Empirical Finance*, Elsevier, Vol 11, No 3, June, pp 353–77.
- (2013): *Maximum Entropy Bootstrap Algorithm Enhancements*, SSRN eLibrary, <http://ssrn.com/paper=2285041>.
- (2017): *Causal Paths and Exogeneity Tests in GeneralCorr Package for Air Pollution and Monetary Policy*, SSRN eLibrary, <http://ssrn.com/paper=2982128>.
- Vinod, H D and Javier Lopez-de-Lacalle (2009): “Maximum Entropy Bootstrap for Time Series: The Meboot R Package,” *Journal of Statistical Software*, Vol 29, No 5, pp 1–19, <http://www.jstatsoft.org/v29/ios/>.
- Vinod, H D, H Karun and L Chakraborty (2020): “Encouraging Private Corporate Investment in India,” *Handbook of Statistics*, V Hrishikesh and C R Rao (eds), chapter 5, Financial, Macro and Micro Econometrics Using R, Vol 42, North Holland: Elsevier, pp 155–83.

EPW E-books

Select EPW books are now available as e-books in Kindle and iBook (Apple) formats.

The titles are

- Village Society** (ED. SURINDER JODHKA)
(<http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00CS62AAW> ;
<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/village-society/id640486715?mt=11>)
- Environment, Technology and Development** (ED. ROHAN D’SOUZA)
(<http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00CS624E4> ;
<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/environment-technology-development/id641419331?mt=11>)
- Windows of Opportunity: Memoirs of an Economic Adviser** (BY K S KRISHNASWAMY)
(<http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00CS622GY> ;
<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/windows-of-opportunity/id640490173?mt=11>)

Please visit the respective sites for prices of the e-books. More titles will be added gradually.

The Special States of India

A Composite Index for Study

AKASH SOLANKI

With the objective of inclusive development, the 11 economically backward hill states in India were granted the status of “Special Category” States (scs) by the National Development Council on the recommendation of the Planning Commission. These states suffer from many drawbacks that arise from their remoteness, geographical isolation, and topography, historical circumstances and demographic peculiarities. Govind Bhattacharjee’s book is an attempt to understand the historical background, institutional framework and policies of these states, and provides an analytical account in terms of a composite index for evaluating the socio-economic and public finances of the states. The author has drawn heavily from his professional experiences of serving the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. The book is divided into nine chapters, ending with a summary, discussions and road map for future initiatives.

Asymmetrical Federalism

Bhattacharjee has initiated the discussion by outlining the broad features of the scs, especially in the context of asymmetric federation, wherein different subnational entities are given different constitutional status.

The author points towards the fact that in the case of scs such as Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and those in North East India, the inadequacy resulting from their spatial position has been further exacerbated by short-sighted policies. A mechanism of financial devolution through higher plan assistance had an adverse impact by centrally sponsored schemes, which have not been ideally suited for these states. The socio-economic scenarios of Assam, Nagaland and J&K have been examined. All the

BOOK REVIEWS

Special Category States of India by Govind Bhattacharjee, *Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2016; pp xxiii + 506, ₹1,195.*

three states face lack of capacity and infrastructure, and simultaneously no or low resources to create or build these. Moreover, political problems have impeded development and also threatened the cohesiveness of the Indian federation. In the course of the discussion the author underlined a peculiar dilemma of these states. On the one hand, the development bottlenecks cannot be addressed only by injecting central government funds, while on the other, it is also true that without additional support, these states would (have) cease(d) to be states.

Thirty percent of the centre’s gross budgetary support is available to the scs in the form for plan expenditures, of which 90% is as grants and 10% as loans. However, the discussions reveal that no specific institutional framework is available to coordinate and monitor the developmental activities with such funding. For the north-eastern region, both the North Eastern Council and the Ministry of the Development of North Eastern Region, have insufficient powers as regulators. Further, the central government’s flagship “Look East Policy” is articulated more by the policymakers based in Delhi than by the developmental needs of the north-eastern states themselves.

It is evident from the book’s account that in case of the north-eastern states, the central support is not only essential for their survival as states but also for their all-round socio-economic growth. All these states, except Mizoram, share certain common traits such as these states are agrarian and are dependent on subsistence type agriculture. Special

category status was awarded to them in order to address these weaknesses. But, in the absence of clear-cut objectives and strategy, the development potential of these states has not been realised.

Weakness in Categorisation

Bhattacharjee has deliberated that the reason for creation of special category states was as much political as economic. The political compulsions arose out of the need to strengthen the fledgling Indian federation, by addressing the varied ethnic, linguistic and socio-religious diversities. Constitutional protection was granted by Articles 370 and 371, besides the Fifth and Sixth schedules of the Indian Constitution. But the statutory protection can only be successful if it is backed by empowerment. In case of the scs the model of autonomy instituted has been top-down, even though the emergence of coalition politics had yielded more political bargaining power to the states.

An important point articulated in the discussion brings forth that for formulating a strategy for the economic turnaround of the scs, funding alone is not a panacea. Rather, a comprehensive strategy is required to address issues such as poor capital formation, absence of adequate skill set among the workforce, lack of entrepreneurial and managerial talent and consequent lack of industrial development. Over the years a malignant dependency on the central government funding has developed among the scs. During 2010–11, central transfers constituted more than 50% of gross state domestic product (GSDP) for six scs. It has been observed that for running their day-to-day administration, the expenses incurred exceed their tax and non-tax revenues by manifold.

Socio-economic Performance

It has been mentioned that in order to compare the socio-economic development performance of the states, a composite development index has been developed which comprises of 10 important indicators which are further grouped into three groups, each carrying equal

weight such as income, employment and poverty indicators; socio-economic development indicators and state intervention indicators. Income, employment and poverty indicators comprised of parameters such as per capita income, share of primary sector in total state income and percentage of main workers in total population, etc. Socio-economic development indicators comprised of parameters such as literacy rate, infant mortality ratio and percentage of villages electrified, etc. The state intervention indicators comprised of parameters such as per capita income, per capita revenue expenditure on education and per capita revenue expenditure on health. The parameters within each group have been given equal weights. The values of these indicators have been normalised using the denominator (maximum value-minimum value), whereas numerator would be (actual value-minimum value) for the positively related indicators and (maximum value-actual value) for the negatively correlated indicators.

As per the ranking of the scs based upon the composite development index, it was observed that five states, namely Mizoram, Himachal Pradesh (HP), Sikkim, Manipur and J&K had outstripped the national averages with reference to the socio-economic indicators. Interestingly, while Sikkim had topped the list, followed by HP and Mizoram, Manipur slipped from its earlier fourth position in 2001 to eighth position in 2011. The reason for the improvement of Mizoram's position was on account of resolution of its insurgency problem. On account of similar issue of insurgency, J&K's position had slipped from fifth to ninth position. This underlines the importance of internal security and stability in the country for continued and sustained economic development.

Socio-economic Indicators

The scs had missed the proverbial bus of the economic reforms launched across the country in the 1990s. Due to weak infrastructure, they were not able to attract foreign investment like the other states. According to the author, the most important obstacle in this regard is the lack of governance in general, and corruption per se, which has blunted the

impact of the special development funds allocated to these states for their infrastructure development. In this context, the author has analysed the performance of the state public finance in terms of the three parameters of sustainability, flexibility and vulnerability.

Sustainability indicators taken are: Buoyancy of state's own tax receipts with respect to green skill development programme, growth in outstanding debt/growth in total revenue and growth of outstanding debt/growth of GSDP. Flexibility indicators include capital outlay/capital borrowings and interest ratio.

Finally, the vulnerability indicator consists of outstanding guarantees/revenue receipts. In terms of all sustainability indicators, it was found that finances of all special category states are sustainable as on 2010-11, tax receipts were quite buoyant except Mizoram, revenue receipts and GSDP were growing faster than outstanding debt. With reference to flexibility of public finances, except for J&K, capital repayments have not consumed large percentages of capital receipts of most states and interest ratios were also kept in reasonable limits. In terms of vulnerability indicators, it was observed that outstanding guarantees constituted significant percentage of revenue receipts only for HP and Meghalaya.

Eventually, the author has compared the public finance performance of states with their socio-economic development. The index for public finance performance, as created by the author comprises of four indices—resource management index, expenditure management index, debt management index and deficit management index. It was also observed that Sikkim had topped with reference to performance rankings in respect of public finances and also with reference to socio-economic parameters, even though the total index of Sikkim with reference to public finance performance had declined from 8.91 to 7.01 for 2000-01 and 2010-11. Interestingly, except Sikkim, Manipur, J&K and Uttarakhand, none of the states show correlation between socio-economic development and public finance performances. This may be due to factors such as low base of development, issues related to governance, and

improper use of public funds. However, an important premise has been empirically proved that higher growth rate can translate into better public financial performance, as has been evidenced in case of Sikkim, Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh.

Road Map

The author has outlined a road map for the turnaround of the special category states. In this regard, he has drawn the attention of readers to certain important elements of vision 2020 document of the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, which he finds equally applicable in case of special category states, such as increase in agriculture productivity by immediate replacement of traditional cropping patterns by short-duration high-yielding varieties of foodgrains, increase in productivity of agro-horticulture crops, promotion of all types of animal husbandry and conservation of nature. Development can never occur in silo, hence it is necessary that increase in agro-productivity should be complemented with development of market and monetisation of rural economy. Tourism also has immense potential with reference to attracting investments and being an employment provider in these states, since most of the special category states are endowed with natural beauty. This would require development of infrastructure in the form of all-weather roads for tourists to reach such scenic places. Author has advocated gradual industrialisation through development of existing small-scale industries such as mining and quarrying, tea, food processing, etc. The development cannot realise its fullest potential without the development of human resources. In this regard inadequate access to centres of technical training, skill development in

Economic&PoliticalWEEKLY

available at

Gyan Deep

Near Firayalal Chowk,
Ranchi 834 001,
Jharkhand
Ph: 09470564686

information technology, engineering and medical can prove to be a major obstacle. These centres also suffer from want of quality faculty members in these fields in these states.

Conclusions

India is the fastest growing economy today in the world with abundant foreign exchange reserves and buoyant foreign capital inflows. In this scenario, the famous proverb that a chain is as

strong as its weakest link comes to the mind while going through this thoughtful treatise by the author on scs. The book is not only a commentary on the socio-economic conditions of scs, but also attempts an analytical, empirical ranking of scs and develops a composite index regarding the financial performance of scs. The prescription suggested by the author is also rooted within the socio-economic fabric of these states such as development of agriculture,

gradual industrialisation, development of tourism, etc. It is notable to mention in this regard, that the Fourteenth Finance Commission has increased devolution of taxes from centre to states from 32% to 42%.

The views expressed in the article are those of the author and not of RBI.

Akash Solanki (solankiakashi1978@gmail.com) is a Deputy General Manager in Reserve Bank of India, Nagpur.

The RMG Industry Jeopardising Lives of Workers

ANU MUHAMMAD

This book is a compilation of studies/research papers from three countries: Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. The editors have acknowledged that this book builds upon Ellen Rosen's work (*Making Sweatshops: The Globalization of the US Apparel Industry*, 2002). The objective of this compilation was to give "visibility to the health concerns of ready-made garment (RMG) workers across the globe and by placing the whole spectrum of work-related health and well-being issues at the centre of analysis." However, this volume has done more.

The book is divided into three parts. Every part is enriched with a number of well-researched papers. Part I deals with "The Rise and Fall of Labor Standards," Part II is on "From Structures to Actors and Back," and lastly, Part III is on "Rethinking Health as Well-being at Work and Home."

From New York to Savar

In the first article in Part I, Jennifer Bair, Mark Anner and Jeremy Blasi have focused on the deadly factory disaster in New York in 1911, the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, and made an attempt to draw parallels with the deadliest contemporary disaster in Rana Plaza, Savar, Dhaka in 2013. In the case of Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in 1911, the authors

Unmaking the Global Sweatshop: Health and Safety of the World's Garment Workers edited by Rebecca Prentice and Geert De Neve, *Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017; pp viii + 291, ₹7,652.*

have identified two outcomes: one, "the government responded to the 1911 fire with far reaching efforts to strengthen worker protection laws;" and two, "the apparel industry union succeeded in securing binding agreements (known as 'jobbers agreements') with the lead firms that ultimately set the terms and conditions for the workers employed in New York's sewing shops." Actually, nothing comparable to these happened in post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh. It was certainly expected that the government would be active in changing the flawed legal structure, ineffective monitoring system, and would take strong measures against this corporate genocide. That did not come true. On the contrary, international bodies like the International Labour Organization took initiative for compensation. Accord and Alliance were formed to take safety measures in response to a global protest. Their limitations are discussed in another chapter. Even public outrage appears as much less in Dhaka than in New York as the authors found that "the fire provoked a massive response. More than a quarter million people attended a public funeral for unidentified

victims on 5 April" (p 36); and also "membership in the ILGWU (International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union) increased its upward swing, following the uprising of 20,000; by 1913 the union had more than a quarter of a million members making it the largest union in New York" (p 38). On the contrary, the formal and informal obstructions, fear and threat against workers to become union members remain intact in Bangladesh. It is found that most of the unions allowed to form since the Rana Plaza incident were actually pocket organisations of the owners/government.¹

Initiatives to Make a Change

Florence Palpacuer, in the next article, examines "European Anti-sweatshop Movement" which "gathered a variety of civil society groups including feminist, fair trade, consumer, and development organisations, as well as labor unions" (p 64). In analysing the movement, the author identifies a trade-off for movements between "retaining a capacity to engage with a broad audience including consumers, global buyers, intergovernmental institutions, and NGO partners in the global south" and "targeting the 'root causes' of labor abuses by challenging the global mobility of investment and trade activities, at the risk of becoming marginalised" (p 80).

In this context, in another article, Caitrin Lynch and Ingrid Hagen-Keith investigated attempts for ethical garment production and marketing. In particular, this chapter explored the challenges that an entrepreneur faced when creating a clothing brand that would "simultaneously be fashionable for the consumers

and good for workers' and its five-year efforts to create a line of ethical clothing" (p 89). That company "drew up a code of conduct for suppliers to sign on to, based on information from nonprofit groups, members of labor unions, and workers-and modeled on one widely used by the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC)" (p 95). This is not surprising that the attempt could not continue and had to suspend its activities in five years' time to prove that the hegemony of global brands is still absolute.

The case of the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC) was also discussed in detail as an important initiative to build counter-hegemonic power in the global market. It developed from an organisation called "Students against Sweatshop" that was formed in 1997 at Duke University. In the process, multiple university student labour rights groups joined, and the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) was formed in 1998. In 2000, "USAS joined with others to form the WRC." By July 2016, WRC's membership included "more than 180 universities in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom" (p 111). We know that this WRC remain active in many countries including Bangladesh, India and Pakistan till date and are regularly producing investigative reports on the situation of workers.

Export Processing Zones

Part II of the book begins with investigations on export processing zones (EPZs) by Patrick Neveling. In this article, the term "export processing zone" is used as the umbrella term for special economic zones (SEZ), free trade zones (FTZ), foreign trade zones (FTZ), free enterprise zones (FEZ), bonded warehouses and alike. It is true that "EPZ regimes emerged much earlier from neoliberal states" (p 135) and began in Puerto Rico in 1947. It started with nearly 4,000 workers there, now has reached to more than 70 million workers worldwide. Encouraged by the World Bank and similar organisations, several measures were taken by the governments in different peripheral countries to facilitate this zonal approach. In this article, six of these measures are identified: (i) tax havens,

(ii) ready-made infrastructures prepared by the state, (iii) favourable exchange rate, (iv) no trade union, lower wage, (v) subsidised export, and (vi) global arrangement (pp 126–27).

India is officially the first Asian country to have an EPZ; the "Kandla Foreign Trade Zone" (KFTZ) opened in 1965. It is not surprising but interesting that in Bangladesh, establishing of an EPZ was first recommended by World Bank president Robert McNamara in 1976 (p 136).

Sponsored Activism

The next article is dedicated to analyse the "discourse of compensation" and its "normalisation of negligence" based on the experience of the Tazreen Factory fire in Bangladesh in 2012. The authors Mahmudul H Sumon, Nazneen Shifa and Saydia Gulrukh themselves have experienced the process of compensation and legal procedures as not only active participants but also actors to challenge the course. They formed a group of activists–anthropologists immediately after the Tazreen fire and "after months of inaction by the government," they "filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the High Court of Bangladesh to charge the factory owners with negligence" (p 147). In this article the group of activists–anthropologists explored the process how, since the Spectrum garment factory collapse, different activist discourses have come to echo the "issue of compensation" to the neglect of broader "structural issues and criminal negligence." They questioned the "narrowing and depoliticisation of health and safety issues" and listed several international and local organisations and argued that "both these global and local voices redirected attention away from questions of structural inequality and responsibility" to compensation only. They also feared that "exclusive focus on compensation evades questions of responsibility and criminality" (p 160).

The authors are also highly critical of "a new kind of unionism" that emerged in Bangladesh. Before 2013, only two trade unions (TUs) were registered; in 2013, 96 TUs were registered; as of 2014, a total of 222 unions were listed as registered

with the Bangladesh Department of Labor (p 161). But, these unions are far from a body that represent workers' rights as mentioned earlier. On the contrary, "new trade unions operate much like NGOs" that are "run by foreign donations," and "they accept any international labor-related campaigns and donor prescriptions uncritically, and they take up the role of local implementers of these campaigns." And also, these organisations "often receive funding from the CSR offices of international brands" (p 161). The authors also find the working patterns of these so-called unions highly problematic where they spend money and pay workers for attending programmes. Actually, "in the absence of a standardised compensation process, medical and other rehabilitation services are made available as charitable donations" through different projects (p 166). Certainly, this form of work makes politically motivated garment organisations difficult to work and "political solidarity is replaced with economic transactions between the organisers and ordinary workers" (p 167).

Prison or Factory

Alessandra Mezzadri focused her article on the Indian garment sector and argued that poor health and safety issues were closely linked with dominant labour relations and "in the context of declining welfare state provisions, processes of labor informalisation further limit access to health services" (p 177). She correctly observed that health outcomes were not isolated disastrous events, but the "systemic result of processes of accumulation and their correspondent labor relations."

The Indian garment industry is, as the paper points out, "characterised by high degrees of informal and informalised labor" and "India also stands out as the country with the highest rates of informal labor" (p 179). The majority of the garment workers under this study were from Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The authors also find that the industry relied heavily on contract labour arrangements, and the rates of unionisation among garment workers were extremely low (p 181). Caste and class

become interlinked to ensure the hegemony of capital.

For the living arrangements of the workers, “more than five workers share tiny rooms,” where “access to water is an issue and workers share filthy common toilets, and these are ‘generally managed’ by the many local housing contractors and landlords who thrive in the slum economy” (p 182). On the issue of occupational health, it was found that a third of all workers report back pain and 39% reported eye strain, by the age of 30; workers bodies are hugely affected by the intensity of work (pp 184–85). Subcontracting is found as a regular practice. The study also reveals “waves of fainting” as a result of malnutrition and hard work. The author agrees with Julia Wallace (2014) in using the new slogan “workers of the world, faint!” to express the seriousness of workers’ vulnerability.

In Part III, Kanchana N Ruwanpura and Sandya Hewamanne bring the Sri Lankan experience in garment industry in two articles respectively. The first one is based on fieldwork for more than seven months in two factories along with visiting experience in other factories and interviews with relevant people. It is evident that Sri Lanka is in a much better condition in overall public healthcare, security, wage and gross domestic product (GDP) compared to India and Bangladesh. Sri Lanka also provides better legal protection and facilities compared to many other countries. Therefore, it is not unusual to find that “Sri Lanka’s commendable human development achievements gave apparel industrialists an educated and healthy workforce” (p 221). Despite this comparative achievement, primary investigations confirm that everyday health and well-being of the workers are still facing serious problems.

The second article on Sri Lanka is based on long-term ethnographic research at Katunayake Free Trade Zone (FTZ). The research findings proved that despite its growth and employment generation, “garment girl” is still suffering a lowered social status. Female workers’ area is called as “love zone,” “whore zone” (p 238) As female workers reported, “as the cart follows the bull, FTZ

stigma follows us” (p 240). It is clear that the FTZ stigma is like caste in Sri Lanka. The authors found relevance of the idea of disposability for the garment women who become a “form of industrial waste that can be discarded and replaced easily” (p 227).

The study also finds that the barbed-wire fenced FTZ area with “well-maintained roads, flowering bushes, and street lights” did not reflect the conditions of the workers. Because the area where workers lived had “poorly lit streets and lacked adequate public transportation,” and after long work, “they face many dangers on the streets outside: thefts, sexual assaults, abductions, and rape” (p 238).

The last article by Hasan Ashraf is based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldworks in Dhaka between 2010 and 2013, and a later period of fieldwork (May–June 2014) that was “devoted to interviewing owners of factory buildings under Accord and Alliance inspections as well as garment workers, garment merchandisers, and trade union leaders.” For the sake of this research, Ashraf took up a job in a garment factory for six months as a shopfloor worker.

As Ashraf found, workers of the factory link their everyday work experience with a widely shared notion of a “depreciating body.” As workers mentioned, “if you cut open the stomach you might get a couple of kilograms of fabric dust inside us. It is not just cotton but cotton with harmful chemicals. We will die before our lifetime” (p 259).

The factory was also perceived as a prison by the workers, where two factors are common: *Chap* (pressure) and *Bhoy* (fear), that always drive workers. This constant fear arises from not only factory staff’s “various disciplining techniques to speed up production on the assembly lines,” but also, after work, “fear of sexual harassment beyond the workplace” haunts female workers (p 263). Moreover, many always fear “sudden announcement of overtime” (p 262).

Within the factory, “highly gendered and male controlled shop floor environment” is very common, “while most of the workers were female, almost all of the supervisory staff were male in Asha

garments.” One supervisor made it clear, “if you cannot be a real bad person, you cannot work in a garment factory to extract highest output from the workers as *malik* (owner) wants. It does not let a human being remain human” (p 264). The managers themselves were subjected to a dehumanisation process while carrying out their responsibilities.

He focused on the limitations of technocratic approach for building safety by Accord and Alliance and argued that,

a narrow and technocratic focus on buildings and building safety in Bangladesh ignores and conceals the actual processes and relationships that produce shop floor risks, ill health, and the systemic exhaustion of the body, and that routinely undermine the overall well-being of workers in the garment industry.

He insisted that

the technocratic regime embodied by the Accord and the Alliance depoliticises health and safety by removing it from the global dynamics of outsourcing and capitalist labor regimes, which comprise highly uneven relations of power and leverage,

that also produced top-down solutions (p 251).

Growth with Modern Slavery

Since the early 1990s, the rise of ready-made garments as a global industry has been very fast, but still remains highly toxic for workers. For example, because of many factors Bangladesh found favourable conditions to become a growing garment exporting country in the 1980s. Since the early 1990s, its growth has been spectacular; now the country has become the second largest RMG exporting country after China, and this sector becomes the largest export earning source employing nearly four million people mostly women (Muhammad 2011). Certainly, the expansion of this sector has an important role behind the high GDP growth in the last decade. Despite the feel-good numbers of economic growth, the Rana Plaza collapse that killed more than 1,100 workers, shows the fragility of the sector. In this book, Dina Siddiqi correctly points out that “this horrific event certainly punctured the idea of the brave new borderless world promised by globalization” (p 276).

It is quite clear that, in the garments sector, the high rate of capital accumulation is ensured where there are many parties to get a pie from surplus value extraction, and that is happening not only in the economic sphere, but also at the cost of shame, disposability, fainting, ill health, constant insecurity and fear. As a global industry, RMG reveal globalised capital labour relations under a neo-liberal global (dis)order. A neo-liberal regime is characterised by informalised, part-time non-unionised labour with outsourcing and sub-contracting production systems. The unequal relationships between organised capital and disorganised labour are being reproduced by direct coercive measures from the state in favour of capital. Different studies show how the brands, local owners and ruling elites buying houses are maximising their profits by keeping inhuman conditions in this high-growth industry (Muhammad 2015).

Facts regarding this sector reveal the system of capitalist high growth with completely unprotected workers, who work in a new form of slavery.

The struggles of the workers in the RMG sector around the world are, therefore, in essence, struggles to get the status of workers instead of modern slaves or hard labour prisoners. But, despite various initiatives, workers' organisations still remain very weak. The global neo-liberal fascist environment along with national authoritarian rule directly work against the workers' solidarity and mobilisation. In the absence of that or because of its weakness, fear and inhuman working conditions remain, as it is shown in different chapters of this book.

Nevertheless, since the global chain of garments is carrying a global chain of injustice and deprivation, there is no alternative to committed local and global solidarity and organisations of workers to change the scenario, to give a human

environment to human lives. This book also confirms that.

Anu Muhammad (anu@juniv.edu) teaches economics at Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

NOTE

- 1 Research showed how the state-business nexus on the one hand blocked attempts to form really representative trade unions, while it encouraged the formation of their pocket organisation on the other. Maha Mirza listed applications and analysed the registration process in her article "garments shilpe rashtra-byabsha antat" (state-business nexus in garments industry) in *Sarbojonkotha*, Dhaka, May 2015.

REFERENCES

- Muhammad, Anu (2011): "Wealth and Deprivation: Readymade Garments Industry in Bangladesh," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 46, No 34, 20 August, https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2011_46/34/Wealth_and_Deprivation_Readymade_Garments_Industry_in_Bangladesh.pdf.
- (2015): "Workers' Lives, Walmart's Pocket: Garment's Global Chain, from Savar to New York," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 50, No 25, 20 June, https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2015_50/25/Workers_Lives_Walmarts_Pocket.pdf.

No Limits to 'Jugaad'

RATNAKAR TRIPATHY

The word "jugaad" evokes images of improvised contraptions and their varied quixotic and unforeseen usages, such as a very basic washing machine that is used to make lassi in Punjab, or a bicycle commonly used for the mechanised sharpening of knives in the city lanes by full-time professionals. But, this small book is devoted to the hi-tech version of jugaad in the electronic and digital realms, often considered as less open to the wily manoeuvrings of the innovative folk. The jugaad practitioners find new ways of mastering and wielding new technologies generally thought to be rather unyielding to the lay users. The work may well be the first attempt at a systematic ethnography in the field covering a number of cities and sites in the country, such as Delhi and Mumbai. Unlike the business and management-oriented works on the subject that are based on synoptic case studies, the work tries to seek insights into the very life-world of jugaad

Jugaad Time: Ecologies of Everyday Hacking in India by Amit S Rai, *Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2019; pp xix + 208, US \$24.95/UK £19.99 (pb); \$94.95/£79.00 (library cloth).*

by "entering the minds" of its practitioners through the "ecologies of everyday hacking," rather than providing a flat description of the vast range of jugaad practices as a mere technical inventory of micro and macro innovations. It does that chapter to chapter turning from one kind of terrain to another.

To quote the author from his preface,

While contemporary neo-liberal discourse has focused on *jugaad* as an innovation, *Jugaad Time* seeks to develop a political philosophy of jugaad as an embodied ethics of becoming in India's caste- and gender-stratified smart cities.

Stretching jugaad into a virtual world-view is indeed a tall order and places a near impossible target for the book. To take an example, the author discusses

"missed calls" as a jugaad trick used by both the telephone company Airtel as well as the consumer. Even with near zero balance, a user is able to remain a part of the enormous communicative network that could have been rather unaffordable otherwise. The fact, however, is that the value of a missed call depends on the willingness of the recipient to respond with sufficient eagerness instead of ignoring the call. A lot of village romance and misdemeanours (according to the elders or the Khap) in rural India operate through missed calls not simply to save money but to also convey an appropriate ambiguity since a missed call could always be disowned as an inadvertent error when the caller gets into trouble. There is thus, on the one hand, a "jugaad" of a business model put in place by Airtel, the company case studied by the author as well as the consumer who proves fully complicit through his own jugaad strategies of usage behaviour.

Jugaad Behaviour

The volume makes an attempt to go beyond the user to examine the pervading ethos that leads to jugaad behaviour in response to technologies meant to

dictate the manner of their usage. How human beings refuse to be dictated and instead domesticate the often-awesome powers of new technologies require due attention to what may even be termed as “technological culture” with a great deal of variation despite the globally standardised nature of technologies.

The book is based on open-ended interviews conducted in Mumbai and Delhi during 2009–17, bang in the middle of the period when we witnessed the digital technologies in their fulsome impact. The chapters carry case studies, semiotic analysis of advertisements and promotional and other audio-visual material in order to make the points that nevertheless rarely emerge with sufficient sharpness. Lavishly peppered with citations and references from a wide variety of fields ranging between philosophy, science and anthropology, the volume succeeds rather partially in integrating its often unwieldy theoretical reflections with the ethnographic and empirical material. The result can be bewildering for a student of technology and culture who may fail to grasp the theoretical moorings or the basic thrust of the book altogether.

Admittedly, the variety within the realm of jugaad can be overwhelming for a researcher. For example, in some cases, a phone may predominantly work as a source of music or FM entertainment or even as a leash used by an employer to keep a tab on the employee’s activities. The widespread use of smartphones by the state government in India has lately turned the least savvy employees into experts who must find innovative ways to avoid surveillance and detection. In this case, the state and the employee become complicit in a gigantic exercise of record keeping through snapshots, videos and excel sheets stored in smartphones provided by the government. There is thus a “sarkari panopticon” version of jugaad as well that has acquired great prevalence in low technology contexts like local governance set-ups in India.

In a chapter titled “Neoliberal Assemblages of Perception and Digital Media,” the author discusses two different professionals, one of whom performs the “immaterial” or profitless labour of photographing nature through his phone

camera. Another female professional, on the other hand, handles her meetings and conferences through the smartphone, scans documents, listens to music, and of course, uses the phone as a torch when necessary. None of these seem outlandish enough to be termed jugaad till you reach a list where the phone image is used for combing hair, the desktop to keep the coffee warm and the procuring of a medical certificate through the internet. But as you walk deeper into the thicket of uses of digital technologies, the difference between “normal” and jugaad seems to blur. It seems very tempting to term every startling use an instance of jugaad and often rightly so. Consider for example the details of the NDTV–Samsung collaboration with the following claim:

We collaborated with NDTV, ... to create a revolution in media centring around content engagement. Inseparably embedding Samsung into NDTV’s content and creating talk-ability around 4K Camera technology, became our primary task.

This comes very close to “official” jugaad talk, if jugaad can at all be defined with any rigour. The purpose here, do not forget, is to emphasise not the convenience alone, but also the technical sophistication of the good old phone. It is near impossible to determine what is primary here: the ease of use or the high professional quality of the mundane phone images.

Utility of Phones

In a section “Hacking Ecologies of Social Reproduction in Delhi,” the author discusses how vitally the housemaids depend on their phones. The dependence may be of two divergent sorts—for their essential daily work and their professional networks but also for “timepass,” a way of whiling away time pleasurably or painlessly. In fact, those familiar with

the lives of watchmen, night guards and drivers will vouch for the value of this phone timepass without which these service providers may have breakdowns due to boredom and prolonged inactivity. There is a need to mention how the element of piracy forms an integral part of the universe for those who depend on their improvisatory abilities in a state of precarity. Piracy when understood in narrow legal terms can be quite limiting but when placed in the lively existential context, it acquires a richer meaning, bringing us closer to how it permeates the daily lives of those who depend on it and whose innovative abilities constantly draw on its resources. Towards the end of the volume however, the author tries to relate jugaad to misogyny and rape in an attempt that brings home the underlying slipperiness of jugaad. At some point, it becomes impossible to distinguish between technology and the all-pervading jugaad around it. There is, thus, a great contrast between the prescribed technological recipes that appear to be fairly standardised and its actual uses observed on the ground. There is this realm widely open to jugaad where the technologies are wielded for reasons and purposes unforeseen and often quite invisible despite their prevalence. If successful in its arguments and illustrations, this volume should motivate a student to disinter this invisible realm lying right under her nose with the myriad technological usages, practices, innovations and improvisations. So much so that you may begin to wonder if there is any technology without hacking!

Ratnakar Tripathy (tripathy.ratnakar@gmail.com) is with Asian Development Research Institute, Patna.

Licensing by EPW

EPW has licensed its material for non-exclusive use to only the following content aggregators—Contify, Factiva, Jstor and Magzter.

Contify currently disseminates EPW content to LexisNexis, Thomson Reuters, Securities.com, Gale Cengage, Acquiremedia News Bank and ProQuest.

Factiva and Jstor have EPW content on their databases for their registered users, Magzter on its subscriber-based portal.

EPW does not have licensing arrangements with any other aggregators.

EPW requests readers to let it know if they see EPW material on any unlicensed aggregator. EPW needs the support of its readers to remain financially viable.

Relocation from Tiger Reserves under the NTCA Guidelines

UJJAL KUMAR SARMA, INDRANI BARPUJARI

Relocation under the National Tiger Conservation Authority Guidelines for Voluntary Village Relocation in Notified Core/Critical Tiger Habitats of 2011, represents a paradigmatic shift from the previous history of displacement from protected areas. About a decade later, this article attempts an overview of the state of relocation under the Guidelines and seeks to throw light on the implementation challenges faced so far.

The “protected area” network based on the logic of creating inviolate spaces for nature and wildlife free from human interference has often been at great cost to communities residing in and around these areas with a traditional dependence on forests. It is estimated that globally, the overlap between protected areas and the lands of indigenous people¹ is about 50%–80% creating a “near constant state of confrontation and ongoing potential for conflict and violence” with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples noting that conservation measures have resulted in forced evictions, disrupted links with spiritual sites and denial of access to justice and remedy (Tauli-Corpuz et al 2018: 6). Conservation induced displacement has engendered profound social costs particularly among the poorest and most marginalised (Borinni-Feyeraband et al 2004; Brockington 2002) subjecting them to what Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006: 1824) refer to as the impoverishment risks of landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased mortality, loss of access to common property, and social disarticulation in the absence of “equitable planning for sustainable resettlement, compensation, and recovery.”

In India, conservation induced displacement has a long history dating back to pre-independence days. It gained momentum, as Lasgorceix and Kothari (2009) observe, during the 1970s with the enactment of the Wildlife (Protection) Act (WPA), 1972 and the launch of project tiger in 1973 leading to the creation of 50 tiger reserves till date. In their review of 28 cases of displacement from protected areas, they found that majority of the relocations have been forcible or induced and done in a non-transparent, conflictual, mismanaged and

non-participatory manner. Relocation plans for the most part have been faulty owing to the lack of adequate provision of technical and financial inputs required for successful creation of agricultural livelihoods in the new setting (Rangarajan and Shahabuddin 2006).

A legal and policy vacuum has in large part been responsible for this state of affairs. As Shahabuddin and Bhamidipati (2014) observe, till 2006, there was no legal requirement in India for ensuring effective rehabilitation and there was only the largely inadequate Beneficiary-Oriented Tribal Development (BOTD) scheme for resettling people. The Protocol/Guidelines for Voluntary Village Relocation in Notified Core/Critical Tiger Habitats (CTH) of Tiger Reserves issued by the National Tiger Conservation Authority (NTCA) in 2011 positioned itself as a game changer in many ways. The Protocol/Guidelines consolidate the earlier Revised NTCA Guidelines of 2008 for implementing the centrally-sponsored scheme of project tiger (which also included a format for preparation of village relocation plan from core/CTH) along with further guidelines issued. Self-evident from the name itself, these guidelines mandate the voluntariness of the relocations from identified core/CTH of a tiger reserve, thereby, representing a paradigmatic shift from the previous history of displacement to which the use of force is typically critical (Agrawal and Redford 2009).

With the avowed objective of ensuring that “in the process of conservation and protection of tigers and their habitats, the rights of forest dwellers are respected, and the process of recognition and determination of rights is complete,” the guidelines are based on a rights approach seeking to give effect to the provisions of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 also commonly known as the Forest Rights Act (FRA) and the WPA, 1972 as amended in 2006. These Guidelines also go beyond the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 which while seeking to ensure the adequateness of the rehabilitation and the active participation of the affected is

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the anonymous reviewer whose comments helped in enhancing the rigour of the article.

Ujjal Kumar Sarma (uksarma.iifm@gmail.com) teaches at the Indian Institute of Forest Management, Bhopal. Indrani Barpujari (indranib22@gmail.com) works with the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Institute of Good Governance and Policy Analysis, Bhopal.

based on the premise that provision of public facilities or infrastructure may cause involuntary displacement.

With these guiding principles in place, a new strategy for relocation from tiger reserves based on what Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006) term as double sustainability approach (ensuring protection of biodiversity and peoples interests at the same time) was initiated. About a decade later, this article seeks to throw light on the implementation challenges faced so far in the various stages of relocation so as to circumvent the same through incremental changes to the guidelines and necessary policy interventions. As of 2017, 12,327 families in 173 villages from within tiger reserves have been relocated (NTCA 2017). There is, however, a dearth of literature on relocation in tiger reserves post the NTCA Guidelines though there are some isolated studies, documentation by advocacy groups and media reports. While deriving insights from existing literature, the present article draws primarily upon the first author's observations and learnings gleaned from visits to relocated villages in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Odisha and the second author's insights based on her policy study of the implementation of the FRA in MP.

Rights Approach

The NTCA Guidelines strongly articulate the language of rights which is in tune with India's international and national commitments.

Though silent with respect to conservation-induced displacement, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (2001), particularly Principle 6 which prohibits arbitrary displacement in cases of large-scale development projects which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests, may be amenable to a broad interpretation. Particularly relevant is Article 10 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) adopted in 2007 (to which India is a signatory) which expressly lays down that

indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous

people concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.

Here, it may also be mentioned that along with UNDRIP, India is also a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; and the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, all of which necessitate recognition of the rights of those to be displaced, particularly indigenous and tribal people.

Though not "a norm-making agency building general international law," the World Bank has also been acknowledged to have "a special role in formulating a transnational epistemic culture on policies of displacement and relocation" (Lustig and Kingsbury 2006: 411) with its policies imposing certain obligations on borrowers (including national governments). The World Bank's Operational Policy 4.12 (2001 revised in April 2013) extending to people displaced from protected areas recognises the need to address and mitigate the impoverishment risks arising out of displacement as defined by Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006) and the need to meaningfully consult displaced people and assist them in their efforts to improve their livelihoods and standards of living or at least restore them, in real terms to pre-displacement levels.

In addition, the NTCA Guidelines also reflect the shifts in the international conservation discourse with a new paradigm for protected areas focusing on benefits to local people and their increased role having evolved largely through the initiative of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). In particular, the recommendations of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress held in Durban in 2003 gave a great fillip to the rights-based approach which were adopted by the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in its Programme of Work on Protected Areas (Goal 2.2.5) in 2004. Parties are expected to "ensure that any resettlement of indigenous communities as a consequence of the establishment or management of protected areas will only take place with their prior informed consent."

The NTCA Guidelines seek to give effect to legal commitments under two

national laws—the FRA and the WPA. Section 4(1) of the FRA, 2006 recognises and vests a host of individual and community forest rights in Scheduled Tribes (STs) and other traditional forest dwellers (OTFDs). Section 4(2) states that the said recognised forest rights in critical wildlife habitats (CWH) of national parks and sanctuaries may subsequently be modified or resettled outside subject to the satisfaction of a host of conditions, namely that the process of recognition and vesting of rights is complete in the areas under consideration; that it has been established by the concerned agencies of the state government, in exercise of their powers under the WPA, 1972 that the activities or impact of the presence of holders of rights upon wild animals is sufficient to cause irreversible damage and threaten the existence of said species and their habitat; the state government has concluded that other reasonable options, such as coexistence are not available; a resettlement or alternatives package has been prepared and communicated that provides a secure livelihood for the affected individuals and communities and fulfils the requirements of such affected individuals and communities given in the relevant laws and the policy of the central government; the free informed consent of the gram sabhas in the areas concerned to the proposed resettlement and to the package has been obtained in writing; and that no resettlement shall take place until facilities and land allocation at the resettlement location are complete as per the promised package.

An amendment to the WPA, 1972 in 2006 incorporated Chapter IVB, which provides the legal basis for the constitution of the NTCA and for the notification of a tiger reserve by the state government

Economic&PoliticalWEEKLY

available at

Life Book House

Shop No 7, Masjid Betul
Mukarram Subji Mandi Road
Bhopal 462 001
Madhya Pradesh
Ph: 2740705

on the recommendation of the former. The state government is to prepare a tiger conservation plan for the proper management of each tiger reserve and this has to be done taking into account the agricultural, livelihood, developmental and other interests of the people living in tiger bearing forests or a tiger reserve (Section 38V(4)). Explanation (i) to Section 38V(4) defines a tiger reserve as including core or CTH areas of national parks and sanctuaries (notified as such by the state government in consultation with an expert committee constituted for the purpose), identified on the basis of scientific and objective criteria to be kept inviolate for the purpose of tiger conservation without affecting the rights of STs or such other forest dwellers.

Tiger reserve also includes, as per Explanation (ii), the concept of buffer/peripheral area where a lesser degree of habitat protection is required to ensure the integrity of the critical tiger habitat, providing habitat supplement for dispersing tigers, besides offering scope for coexistence with human activity.

The limits of the buffer/peripheral areas are to be determined in consultation with the concerned gram sabha and an expert committee. Section 38(V)(5) expressly lays down that save for voluntary relocation on mutually agreed terms and conditions, no ST or other forest dwellers shall be resettled or their rights adversely affected for the purpose of creating inviolate areas for tiger conservation. It further lays down a stringent set of conditions which such voluntary relocation has to comply with; chief among them being the completion of the process of recognition and determinations of rights of STs and other forest dwellers and acquisition; their consent to the process of declaring an area inviolate; informed consent of the gram sabha and those affected to the resettlement programme; and the provision of facilities and land allocation at resettlement location before existing rights are interfered with.

Despite some preliminary confusion on the compatibility of the concept of critical wildlife habitat (in the FRA) and core or critical tiger habitat (in the WPA), the guidelines have adopted the position, based on deliberations with

experts and simulation results from scientific data that a minimum inviolate area of 800–1,200 sq km is required to sustain a viable population of tigers (20 breeding females). As such, the NTCA Guidelines lay down that identification/notification of the core/CTH is to be done under Section 38V(4)(i) of the WPA while establishment of the core/CTH for creating inviolate area for tiger involving relocation of families/villages from such areas is to be done as per Sections 4 and 6 of the FRA and Section 38V(5) of the WPA.

Preparation for the Relocation

Following the notification of the core/CTH as per process laid down in the WPA, as per the Guidelines (6.1.2.1), the field director of a tiger reserve must identify the village/villages situated with such area and a prioritisation of villages to be relocated on the basis of human–tiger conflicts, presence of tiger den sites, grazing areas of wild ungulates and other attributes. A meeting of the concerned gram sabha should be convened with the active participation of the villagers to be relocated where they are to be informed about the necessity for relocation, the relocation/rehabilitation options available to them and grievance redressal system, following which it is obligatory to take free informed consent of the gram sabha and affected villagers in writing regarding the proposed resettlement package/option.

At the same time, the process of recognition/settlement of rights of those to be resettled must be initiated under Section 6(i) of the FRA with the gram sabha initiating the process of determining rights (community and individual) by receiving claims, consolidating and verifying them and forwarding them to the Sub-Divisional Level Committee (SDLC). This is further scrutinised by the SDLC which then forwards the list to the final authority—the District Level Committee for approval. It is noteworthy to mention here that in case of rejection of claims, there is also a mechanism for appeal under the FRA for a specific period of time.

The guidelines expressly lay down that no relocation can be effected before the process of recognition and settlement of rights (including appeal) under the FRA is complete. Though meriting an

independent discussion altogether, it may be mentioned that forest dwellers may find many of their claims rejected owing to inability to provide the requisite or adequate evidence/documents in support of their claims and many failing to assert their right to appeal against the rejections owing to illiteracy and ignorance about the process as well as their rights (Barpujari 2019).

While the basis for providing the resettlement options is the settlement (or surrender) of individual rights, there is another category of rights—community rights provided in the FRA. These have usually been enjoyed customarily by a group of villagers as a whole such as *nistar* rights, rights to minor forest produce, uses or entitlements over fish, waterbodies, grazing, etc, which are central to the sustenance and well-being of forest dependent communities. Such rights also need to be recognised and settled; however, as the experience bears out, the percentage of community rights recognised across the country has been quite low (mere 3.8% of total rights recognised as per the Ministry of Tribal Affairs 2018).

There have been a number of reports (largely from advocacy groups) stating that there have been many instances across the country where forest dwellers have been displaced out of tiger reserves without settling their rights (Equations 2010; Vasundhara 2016). Further, what has created considerable consternation among rights-based groups is a relatively recent letter of the NTCA dated 28 March 2017 to tiger range states asking them not to confer forest rights in CTHs in the absence of guidelines for notification of CWHs as envisaged in the FRA (Agarwal and Shrivastava 2017). The legal tenability of such an order as well as the jurisdiction of the NTCA to issue such an order with a bearing on forest rights is being questioned and being perceived as a “surreptitious move” amounting to “a denial of rights” to tribals and other forest dwellers (Hindu 2017).

Along with the settlement of rights under the FRA, free informed consent of the gram sabha and the affected villagers is required to the relocation/rehabilitation package, with the NTCA Revised Guidelines of 2008 providing a new package²

(in line with the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007) with the following two options:

Option A: Payment of the entire package amount (₹10 lakh per family) to the family in case the family opts so, without involving any rehabilitation/relocation process by the forest department.

A monitoring process involving the collector of concerned district(s) is provided for to ensure that the villagers rehabilitate themselves with the package money provided to them.

Option B: Carrying out relocation/rehabilitation of village by the forest department.

In the case of Option B, the following package is offered at the rate of ₹10 lakh per family (Table 1).

Table 1: Components of Option B Package

Agricultural land procurement (2 ha) and development	35% of the total package
Settlement of rights	30% of the total package
Homestead land and house construction	20% of the package
Incentive	5% of the total package
Community facilities (access road, irrigation, drinking water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunication, community centre, cremation ground)	10% of the total package

Source: NTCA (2008).

Where the value of the assets (as per valuation done by the collector) is much higher (exceeding 30% in the case of Option B) as well as in Option A, the balance amount is compensated through funding support from the state government.

Though technically, the eligible families have free choice between the two options, procuring land for relocation has become a major constraint for the forest department in providing Option B. While the standard practice has been to resettle the eligible families in degraded forestland (after being cleared), this has been a limiting factor too as these forest compartments will have to be sooner or later denotified and transferred to the revenue department. Thus, while the two options should be available as a matter of fact to every eligible family, it may not always be possible to go forward with Option B.

Though Option A appears to present an efficient solution, it may not always be so as the package may no longer be adequate to buy two hectares of agricultural land at market price. Thus, the only solution could be to increase the monetary component and make it at par with the market rate or link it with the collectorate rate with an inbuilt mechanism for self-correction. Then again, the golden handshake like Option A which expects the eligible families to be, in Foucauldian terms “autonomous entrepreneurs” with full responsibility for their own investment decisions (Lemke 2001) may not be able to have the desired objective for vulnerable forest dwellers with low levels of literacy. The guidelines (6.3.3.3) seek to ensure, at a minimum, that the amount is used only for the creation of fixed assets; however, there is need for greater hand-holding and expert support, especially in the purchase of new land. There are examples where relocated families have not got the best deal while trying to purchase land on their own near towns and they have been subject to “exploitation by touts, fixers and crooks of the vicinity” (Vasundhara 2016).

At the epicentre of the relocation package is the definition of family; the guidelines of 2011 through a clarification (as per order No 3-1/2003-PT) have defined family as including a person, his or her spouse, minor sons, unmarried daughters, minor brothers, unmarried sisters, father, mother and other relatives residing with him or her and dependent on him or her for their livelihood; includes nuclear family consisting of a person, his or her spouse and minor children. This definition (same as the definition of family in the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007), thus, makes every adult male above the age of 18 years eligible for the package and this has led to a situation in many relocated villages where every adult son of a family has been provided with agricultural land, homestead and pucca house (as part of Option B) with the latter's houses lying unused as they prefer to stay as part of their extended joint families. This is but to be expected considering that despite considerable

changes, rural family structures in India continue to remain largely of joint/extended nature characterised by strong kinship bonds reinforced further by the demands of agriculture as a profession with its requirement for more resources and manpower (Saggurti and Nair 2005). In such a context, some flexibility in combining the two options within a joint/extended family may contribute to the enhanced well-being of the relocated families as seen in the case of relocations from Satpura Tiger Reserve, MP (field observation in New Khakrapura, New Bori, New Ratibandar and other relocated villages). There have been instances here where two–three eligible families (usually adult brothers or father and son/sons) have tried to pool in the individual packages received. For example, where one adult male member of the family has opted for Option A and invested the money in a monthly income scheme, thus, ensuring a steady income for the whole family, the other two adult male members have opted for Option B respectively and have been able to build a relatively larger house with the aggregate amount of ₹4 lakh and have received 4 hectares of agricultural land in total. Such aggregation of resources, largely typical of rural and agrarian family structures seem to provide an ideal solution for relocated villagers (if they do so desire) and the guidelines and the implementing agencies should be flexible enough to accommodate this.

Further, the accepted definition of family is problematic for not being in consonance with the principle of gender equity considering that an unmarried daughter over 18 years of age is not eligible for the package. There are also instances where members of extended family stake a claim even though they have not stayed in the reserve. Another contentious issue is the cut-off date for ascertaining who can be considered as an eligible family particularly compounded when proof of birth is not available. Also, when there is a time lag between the cut-off date and the actual date of relocation (the process of relocation may take years), it leads to an unfair situation where many individuals who

have attained 18 years of age during this period are left out.

Relocation

Voluntary relocation of villages from tiger reserves can be effected only after the proposal for relocation of a village is submitted to the NTCA and approved by it. The assessment, vetting and transfer of money from NTCA may take a few months or even more if the proposal is incomplete or some clarifications are sought from the tiger reserve.

Where the eligible families have chosen Option B, a group of villagers are usually taken by the department to a few locations where land is available for de-notification (usually degraded forest compartments) for site selection. The villagers consider various factors in making this choice, often guided by their aspirations as well as proximity to a village or community with whom they share close ties. For instance, the people of villages like Khakrapura, Bori, Sakot, Sirdhana, Churna within Satpura Tiger Reserve chose to relocate to sites which were closer to villages inhabited by their own community (Gond/Korku/Yadav). Likewise, a number of families from Jami village of Kanha Tiger Reserve who opted for Option A (cash) bought land in Chhattisgarh near their extended family members who got separated when Chhattisgarh was carved out of MP (field observation). As Cernea (2000) observes, the risk of marginalisation is better addressed when the new neighbours of the relocated people speak a similar language or belong to the same ethnic group.

Once the site is selected and the money has been sanctioned by the NTCA, the process of relocation begins. A date for relocation is determined by the state forest department in consultation with the villagers. Relocation is usually not planned during the monsoon, harvest season, etc, as it is a humongous and complex exercise. The process is carried out not by any certified/trained personnel but by some committed hardworking front-line staff of the forest department who are not formally trained to carry out such exercises, but have learned from their past successes and mistakes. In the

absence of any direct tangible incentive, leadership skills of the senior officials play a huge role in keeping them motivated in this back-breaking exercise. The atmosphere is always charged during relocation with a build-up of stress, anxiety and sadness at the prospect of leaving behind one's roots and the familiar for the unknown though evidently tinged with hopes for the future. The prospect of better access to education for their children as well as to job opportunities, healthcare; proximity to markets and towns; freedom from the endless crop depredations by wild animals are some reasons motivating people from inside tiger reserves to relocate, as also attested to by other studies (Ghate and Beazley 2007).

Both the FRA and the WPA lay down that no relocation can take place until provision of facilities and land allocation at the site is complete. While ideally the pucca houses and the agricultural fields should be ready before relocation, this has often not been the case leading to a really trying period ahead for the relocated people, particularly the old and infirm, children and women. The incentive amount of ₹50,000 is usually released at this time to enable the relocated people to tide through this phase. While the pucca houses are being constructed (mostly by the villagers themselves in villages relocated from Satpura Tiger Reserve like New Khakrapura), families go about the task of building a temporary shelter using materials from their old house which also acts as a storehouse for their last harvest on which their next few months precariously depend. The general health support is minimal, children are out of school, and it is usually a chaotic time for everyone. In the initial phase of relocations, there have been some terrible mistakes when entire families were temporarily housed in tiny compartments made of corrugated tin sheets in the blistering hot summer in an eastern Indian state (Vasundhara 2016; Bera 2015).

Another important aspect of the relocation process is the preparation of a community development plan (CDP) for each relocated village (to be prepared in consultation with the district collector

while ensuring integration of other ongoing district-level schemes, as per point 6.2.1.10 of the guidelines).

Though only 10% of the package is earmarked for community facilities, namely access road, irrigation, drinking water, sanitation, electrification, places of worship, community centre, etc, in practice, almost 70% of the total package is channelised into this (after deducting the 5% incentive and 25% for construction of house). This plan is very critical for the future of the village as a whole and it is imperative to exercise prudence in its preparation and execution as once budget outlay for it is exhausted, the relocated families are largely on their own. Roads, levelling agricultural fields, street lights, drinking water, irrigation, school building, village electrification, community hall and many other community facilities usually find place in this plan. Thus, it is critical to make the plan preparation broad-based, involving all the relocated families (including women) and in consultation with specialists and experts. Then again, options must be explored for shifting the burden of many of these activities from the newly relocated families and the package they have received—the CDP budget can be separated from the package amount or the package amount can be increased overall.

Convergence with existing government schemes while finding mention in the guidelines is not resorted to in many cases; doing so would ensure that money from the package is not being spent on electrification, village roads, anganwadi building, school building, solar pumps, etc. Arguing further, it has been observed that there are some families in village New Dhai relocated from Satpura Tiger Reserve in the pre-NTCA guidelines era (that is, whose package amount was ₹1 lakh) who are doing better than many relocated later (with the enhanced package) because they could take advantage of other schemes due to support from some far-sighted officials.

Rebuilding Livelihoods

According to Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006), people displaced from parks are not only vulnerable but very poor across

the world as displacement from protected areas deprive them of access to forests on which they have traditionally depended on for catering to a major part of their livelihood and sustenance needs *prima facie*, communities relocated from tiger reserves under the NTCA guidelines appear to hold robust net-worth post the settlement of rights and package; however, in reality, the communities are highly vulnerable owing to absence of secure and sustainable livelihoods, financial illiteracy, lack of access to other government schemes, breakdown of sociocultural cohesiveness, redundancy of traditional skill-sets, etc (Shah and Kumar 2015). Thus, while the risks of landlessness and homelessness are effectively mitigated (people in relocated villages take great pride in now residing in pucca houses and being owners of land), the risks of joblessness (loss of productive work, income and subsistence), food security, marginalisation, social disarticulation need to be effectively addressed in more imaginative ways to ensure overall well-being of the relocated families. The guidelines (6.3.7) provide that the collector must provide each beneficiary a certificate indicating their eligibility for all schemes applicable to relocated people. This should be provided prior to the relocation; in addition, the families should be facilitated to obtain Pan card, Aadhaar, ration card, voter ID, etc, so that they can stake claim to all their entitlements under food security legislation as well avail benefits under various schemes and assert their citizenship rights in the new setting.

Rebuilding livelihoods is a challenge; the families immediately after relocation have to address themselves to the almost herculean task of transforming the two hectares of agricultural land provided to them respectively (which is usually degraded forestland) and making the land yield a harvest adequate for their sustenance. Such land has to be developed adequately (including levelling, provision for irrigation, enhancing soil fertility) for it to sustain agriculture which usually takes a few years. As a result, the relocated people go through a very difficult time in the first years after relocation as observed in many relocated

villages which can be circumvented if this process could be initiated much before the actual relocation takes place. While the amount earmarked for procurement of agricultural land and its development (excluding irrigation covered under community facilities) is 35% of the total package, in most cases, the agricultural land is available free of cost-degraded forestland. As such, in most instances, the standard practice, also supported by the guidelines (6.2.1.9) has been to use the 35% earmarked for the same along with the stipulated 10% of the package for community facilities. A case may be made for delinking the agriculture component of the package from community facilities and utilising the same strictly for levelling, soil testing, purchase of agricultural inputs and implements and other activities for enhancing the productivity of the land which would go a long way in securing the livelihoods of the affected families both in the short and long run.

The guidelines are sensitive to the fact that livelihood support and handholding are crucial for the success of the relocation process and form part of the village relocation proposal format and also provide that the assistance of competent civil society organisations having the domain expertise may be obtained (6.3.8). This can be best achieved by involving trained specialists, civil society actors and partnering with other government agencies like the State Rural Livelihood Missions which are already making positive impacts in rural India in ameliorating rural poverty as found in a joint study involving the first author (Tambe et al 2017). CSR initiatives like that of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) Foundation (and other players like

Reliance Foundation, Indian Grameen Services) in supporting resettlement and rehabilitation activities in a number of villages relocated from tiger reserves across the country targeted at building a community governance mechanism, providing a livelihood portfolio with capacity building and linkages, enhancing financial literacy, and provision of access to government programmes and public utilities have yielded reach dividends (Shah and Kumar 2015).

Securing livelihoods, creation of robust community governance mechanisms and building capabilities of the relocated people would go a long way in ensuring long-term sustainability and community takeover (Rogers and Macías 2004). This also requires, at the implementation level, enhanced record maintenance and documentation of the entire relocation process, establishment of the baseline for various critical parameters as well as defining criteria and benchmarks for successful disengagement and fixing time frame and stakeholder responsibilities. An exit-strategy (with a separate budget head) should be part of the initial proposal to NTCA and there should be effective monitoring and midterm evaluation designed to assess progress towards the criteria for exit (thus, strengthening the monitoring mechanism provided for in the guidelines).

The Way Ahead

In about a decade of implementation, the NTCA guidelines have tried to achieve a balance in the imperatives of conservation and protected area management with social justice to achieve double sustainability and has ensured voluntary relocation in a manner that takes cognisance of the rights of the relocated in tune with

Permission for Reproduction of Articles Published in EPW

No article published in *EPW* or part thereof should be reproduced in any form without prior permission of the author(s).

A soft/hard copy of the author(s)'s approval should be sent to *EPW*.

In cases where the email address of the author has not been published along with the articles, *EPW* can be contacted for help.

commitments under international and national laws and policies. Relocation should aim, in the words of Patrick Geddes, the renowned Scottish sociologist, geographer, and town planner, to give people in fact the same care that we give when transplanting flowers instead of harsh evictions (cited in Balasubrahmanyam 1993). To ensure that the relocated people from the tiger reserves get the requisite measure of care which enables them to cope with the impoverishment risks arising out of displacement and realise their aspirations and capabilities in the new setting, a number of incremental changes to the guidelines and policy interventions have been discussed. Chief among them are enhancing the overall package amount (taking due account of inflation); combining options where feasible; delinking the agriculture component of the package from community facilities; preparation of agricultural lands before relocation; greater handholding on livelihood, financial literacy, investment decisions (purchase of land); dovetailing with existing government schemes to provide community facilities; involvement of livelihood experts, CSR, civil society among others. At the same time, a broad interpretation of the existing laws and guidelines in the interest of the relocated communities is necessary; attempts at curtailment of legally endowed rights may prove counterproductive to the cause of conservation and violative of the principles of social justice and equity.

NOTES

- 1 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 uses the terms indigenous and tribal peoples as a common denominator for more than 370 million people found in more than 70 countries worldwide and in an inclusive fashion recognising that they are often known by national terms such as Adivasis, mountain dwellers, hill tribes, hunters-gatherers, etc (ILO 2013). The ILO uses a set of subjective and objective criteria to identify these people in a country. In India, there is no official recognition of "indigenous" people as a legal category; Article 342 of the Constitution of India lays down that the President may "by public notification specify the tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purpose deemed to be Scheduled Tribes ..." At present, there are 705 notified STs in India constituting 8.6% of the total population of the country (Ministry of Tribal Affairs 2013). The Forest Rights Act, 2006 recognises the rights of forest dwelling STs and OTFDs, with the latter defined under Section 2(o) of the act as "any member or community who has for atleast three generations prior to the 13th day of December 2005 primarily resided in and who depend on the forest or forests land for bonafide livelihood needs." The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 as amended in 2006 recognises the rights of STs and "other forest dwellers."
- 2 The new package provided by the revised NTCA Guidelines of 2008 reflects a marked increase from ₹1 lakh (under the previous beneficiary-oriented scheme for tribal development) to ₹10 lakh as compensation.

REFERENCES

- Agarwal, Shruti and Soujanya Shrivatava (2017): "Community Forest Rights in Critical Tiger Habitat under Threat," *Down to Earth*, 17 April, <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/forests/community-forest-rights-in-critical-habitats-face-hurdle-due-to-lack-of-legal-road-map-57602>.
- Agrawal, Arun and Kent Redford (2009): "Conservation and Displacement: An Overview," *Conservation and Society*, Vol 7, No 1, pp 1–10.
- Balasubrahmanyam, Vimal (1993): "Through a Textbook, Darkly," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 28, No 17, p 834.
- Barnabas, Sylvanus Gbendazhi (2017): "The Legal Status of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) in Contemporary International Human Rights Law," *International Human Rights Law Review*, Vol 6, No 2, pp 242–61.
- Barpujari, Indrani (2019): *Taking Stock and Identifying Challenges in the Implementation of the Forest Rights Act in Madhya Pradesh*, Bhopal: Atal Bihari Vajpayee Institute of Good Governance and Policy Analysis.
- Bera, Sayantan (2015): "Remaining Tribals in Simlipal Tiger Reserve to be Displaced," *Down to Earth*, 4 July, <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/remaining-tribals-in-simlipal-tiger-reserve-to-be-displaced-44475>.
- Borrini-Feyaraband, Grazia, Ashish Kothari and Gonzalo Oviedo (2004): *Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation*, Gland and Cambridge: IUCN.
- Brockington, Dan D (2002): *Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania*, Oxford: James Currey.
- Cernea, Michael M (2000): "Risks, Safeguards and Reconstruction: A Model for Population Displacement and Resettlement," *Risks and Reconstruction: Experience of Resettlers and Refugees*, Michael M Cernea and Christopher McDowell (eds), World Bank, Washington, DC, pp 11–55.
- Cernea, Michael M and Kai Schmidt-Soltan (2006): "Poverty Risks and National Parks: Policy Issues in Conservation and Resettlement," *World Development*, Vol 34, No 10, pp 1808–30.
- Convention on Biological Diversity (2004): "Programme of Work on Protected Areas," Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal.
- Equations (2010): "Land Rights Violations at Achanakmar Wildlife Sanctuary, Chhattisgarh: A Fact Finding Report by Baiga Mahapanchayat, Nadi Ghati Morcha and EQUATIONS," 31 December, Bangalore.
- Ghate, Rucha and Kim Beazley (2007): "Aversion to Relocation: A Myth?," *Conservation and Society*, Vol 5, No 3, pp 331–34.
- Hindu (2017): "Order Staying FRA in Tiger Reserves Violates Tribal Rights: Brinda," 13 April, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/order-staying-fra-in-tiger-reserves-violates-tribal-rights-brinda/article17994085.ece>.
- ILO (1989): "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No 169)," International Labour Organization, Geneva.
- (2003): "ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989 (No 169): A Manual," International Labour Organization, Geneva.
- Lasgorceix, Antoine and Ashish Kothari (2009): "Displacement and Relocation of Protected Areas: A Synthesis and Analysis of Case Studies," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 44, No 49, pp 37–47.
- LeMke, Thomas (2001): "The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michel Foucaults Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality," *Economy & Society*, Vol 30, No 2, pp 190–207.
- Lastig, Doreen and Benedict Kingsbury (2006): "Displacement and Relocation from Protected Areas: International Law Perspectives on Rights, Risks and Resistance," *Conservation and Society*, Vol 4, No 3, pp 404–18.
- Ministry of Scheduled Tribes in India, (2013): "Statistical Profile of Scheduled Tribes in India," Government of India, New Delhi.
- (2018): "Status Report on Implementation of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights Act, 2006 (For the Period ending 30.04.2018)," Government of India, New Delhi.
- NTCA (2008): "Revised Guidelines for the Ongoing Centrally Sponsored Scheme of Project Tiger," National Tiger Conservation Authority, New Delhi.
- (2011): "Protocol/Guidelines for Voluntary Village Relocation in Notified Core/Critical Tiger Habitats (CTH) of Tiger Reserves," National Tiger Conservation Authority, New Delhi.
- Rangarajan, Mahesh and Ghazala Shahabuddin (2006): "Displacement and Relocation from Protected Areas: Towards a Biological and Historical Synthesis," *Conservation and Society*, Vol 4, No 3, pp 359–78.
- Rogers, Beatrice Lorge and Kathy E Macías (2004): "Program Graduation and Exit Strategies: Title II Program Experiences and Related Research," TUFTS Nutrition, Discussion Paper No 25.
- Saggurti, Niranjan and Saritha Nair (2005): "A Socio-Demographic Analysis of the Size and Structure of the Family in India," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, Vol 36, No 4, pp 623–51.
- Shah, Dhruvi and N Sunil Kumar (2015): "Socio Economic Rehabilitation Post Relocation from Critical Tiger Habitats," Forum for Law, Environment, Development and Governance, Chennai.
- Shahabuddin, Ghazala and Padmasai Lakshmi Bhamidipati (2014): "Conservation-induced Displacement: Recent Perspectives from India," *Environmental Justice*, Vol 7, No 5, pp 122–29.
- Tambe, Sandeep, Suprava Patnaik, Jigyasa Bisaria, Amitabh Pandey, Ujjal Kumar Sarma and G Ananda Vadivelu (2017): "How Does Government Microfinance Impact the Rural Poor: Evidence from Madhya Pradesh," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 52, No 52, pp 81–87.
- Tauli-Corpus, Victoria, Janis Alcorn and Augusta Molnar (2018): "Cornered by Protected Areas: Replacing Fortress Conservation with Rights-Based Approaches Helps Bring Justice for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, Reduces Conflict and Enables Cost-Effective Conservation and Climate Action," Rights and Resources Group, Washington, DC.
- Vasundhara (2016): "The Forest Rights Act and the Issues of Displacement in Odisha: A Report by Vasundhara," Bhubaneswar.
- World Bank (2001): "OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement," Revised 2013, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Caste and Class in Higher Education Enrolments

Challenges in Conceptualising Social Inequality

AMMAN MADAN

The National Sample Survey 2014 data is used to explore the character of class inequality, over and beyond that of caste. The caste break-up of various social classes suggests that caste inequalities are greater amongst the more educated classes. Enrolments in higher education show greater social inequalities than in elementary education. The differences amongst various classes suggest that while caste is a strong factor in educational inequality, it is not a sufficient one. There is much less caste variation within the lower classes than the higher classes. Caste and class need to be seen as generative processes, and sub-jati networks are to be conceptualised and empirically examined to understand the actual roles of caste and class in educational and social inequality.

The way in which we theorise social life has played a key role in understanding and addressing the challenges to human dignity and freedom. The theorising of social inequality has made important contributions to the struggle to create an open education system by conceptually guiding our interventions, ranging from caste-based reservations to the development of inclusive forms of teaching, amongst others. This paper will examine two out of the several ways of conceptualising social inequality—caste and class—which are well known for their limiting and corrupting influences on meritocracy and the education system.

In the popular and public culture, we are seeing a broad shift from a time when class used to dominate discussions of inequality to a situation where class has mostly disappeared from the conceptual armoury. Gender and caste are the issues most prominent in our imagination these days, particularly amongst anti-caste voices. This shift is, in part, an important corrective to the study of social inequality, which was earlier dominated by the discourse of class and redistribution. The importance of identity and culture in shaping social structures and the injustices inbuilt within them is now better recognised. On the other hand, there is the danger of ignoring social structures and processes that lie at a deeper level and are not part of the self-identity of mobilised or oppressed groups. There are many kinds of relations of exploitation and oppression between labour, political organisation and capital, which may or may not be part of the consciously articulated categories of the people involved.

Karl Marx had distinguished between class-in-itself and class-for-itself as structural and ideological entities. The very notion of ideology suggests that our knowledges and cultures are politically charged, and certain articulations may get suppressed at the cost of others. There may be structural inequalities that are present but do get clearly articulated, given the power relations of a historical moment. The search for social structures, which are not part of our contemporary theoretical apparatus but do lead to social inequality, is thus a struggle to overcome hegemonic ideologies. This makes an important contribution to the struggle for a more open and free society. Such structures must be deliberately searched for and analytically exhumed since our cultures and the ideologies we live in may not fully recognise them. Evidence must then be looked at with new lenses to see if it supports the reworked concepts.

This paper was presented in seminars at the School of Education, Azim Premji University and School of Education, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Comments and questions received are gratefully acknowledged.

Amman Madan (ammanm@gmail.com) teaches at the Azim Premji University, Bengaluru.

There may be many structures that escape our current ideologies and which the terms of class, caste, and gender only inadequately represent. The term “intersectionality” has become a common way of flagging that there are many kinds of social inequality and they interact with each other in complicated ways. These may reinforce or sometimes even neutralise each other. We are increasingly aware that we need to conceptualise class, caste, gender, etc, not just individually but in terms of their interaction with each other. A system of social inequality may be said to be a unique and discernible system to the extent that its elements are integrated in a way that is different from other possible systems. The idea of intersectionality asks us to question that purportedly separate and watertight existence of systems of inequality. It emphasises that even when systems appear to be distinct, there may be elements that are shared across them, and the systems themselves may collide and collude in complicated ways.

While there is a good amount of work nowadays on the interweaving of caste and patriarchy (for example, Dube 1996; Devika et al 2013; Guru 1995; Rege 1998), this paper wants to draw attention to the ways in which class and caste are connected, and yet represent two distinct social processes. There is considerable scholarly work on this connectedness (for example, Beteille 2007; Ghurye 1957; Mukherjee 1999; Sharma 1984). This paper aims to spell out certain empirical dimensions that often go unnoticed and unmentioned upon. Apart from their intrinsic value, they may also help us see in perspective recent moves for quotas for the poor amongst “upper” castes. Demands for reservations for economically weaker sections appear to eschew questions of evidence and understanding. This paper may help us to see better the complex and intersectional character of social inequality in India.

Secondary data available in the 71st round of the National Sample Survey (NSS), conducted in 2014, which had education as one of its specific focus areas, is examined so as to estimate the connections between educational inequality and contending

ways of theorising systems of social inequality. Enrolments provide a simple, though thin, way of measuring educational inequality. The distribution of households and enrolments has been studied across various caste groupings on which data was gathered by the NSS. Due to limitations of space, the patterns to be seen in the expenditure made on education and enrolments in English-medium institutions will not be discussed here, but they show a similar pattern as that of overall enrolments.

The data has been examined through the statutory caste categories as defined by the Constitution and through class categories that have been operationalised in terms of monthly per capita consumption expenditure groups and as occupational groups, drawing from the work of Erik Olin Wright (1996) and John Goldthorpe (2000). Through such an analysis, a nuanced answer is sought to be given to the question of whether and how we need to think beyond caste when we try to understand and engage with educational inequality. This paper will argue eventually that we must take class inequality seriously, since caste is unable to explain a substantial part of the social inequality in society and education in India. It will also argue for combining the varna-jati model of caste with a model of caste as smaller kinship networks, which operate nested within a large system of secular economic, cultural and political inequality.

Caste Composition of Classes

We should acknowledge right at the outset the difficulties with data sets that use categories like Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and forward castes. These do not correspond closely with either the varna scheme or the pattern of dominant castes of a specific region. Within each category, there is a wide range of jatis, particularly so in the OBCs and the forward castes. Yet, if we want to look at the large-scale data sets, this is the kind of data that is available in most of them. It is with caution that we must interpret what they tell us about the caste system.

Table 1: Over-under-representation of Particular Categories in Different Economic Classes

Class	% of STs in Class	Over/Under-representation	% of SCs in Class	Over/Under-representation	% of OBCs in Class	Over/Under-representation	% of Forward Castes in Class	Over/Under-representation
Total Population	9.5		19.0		42.7		28.8	
I Owners, chief executives	4.8	0.5	10.4	0.5	42.5	1.0	42.3	1.5
II Managers, elected representatives, professionals, professors	4.4	0.5	10.1	0.5	33.9	0.8	51.6	1.8
III Lower ranking educated workers, school teachers, clerks, nurses, technical assistants, astrologers	6.4	0.7	14.3	0.8	36.7	0.9	42.6	1.5
IV Unskilled workers: Shop assistants, housekeeping, restaurant workers, protective services, street vendors, domestic workers, messengers, porters	9.2	1.0	23.3	1.2	40.4	0.9	27.1	0.9
V Farmers	14.2	1.5	13.2	0.7	44.2	1.0	28.4	1.0
VI Animal husbandry and farming	8.9	0.9	10.8	0.6	57.7	1.4	22.6	0.8
VII Forestry workers, fishing, hunting, agricultural workers	13.4	1.4	32.7	1.7	41.1	1.0	12.7	0.4
VIII Skilled workers, crafts, machinery operators, vehicle drivers	6.7	0.7	22.2	1.2	46.1	1.1	25.0	0.9
IX Unemployed, unknown	7.9	0.8	20.9	1.1	52.7	1.2	18.5	0.6

Source: Calculated using data from NSS, 2014.

The problems with class information are a little less, but still considerable. Here, only broad-brush conclusions are being drawn from them and they appear to be valid for such kind of data.

The STs make up 9.5% of the households included in the survey, while the SCs are 19.0%. The OBCs are the largest single category with 42.7% of all the households. The forward castes are a little more than a quarter, that is, 28.8% of the surveyed households. The impact of caste identity as a process of social inequality can be seen from Table 1 (p 41), which depicts the over- or under-representation of particular categories in different economic classes. That caste has an impact on social inequality is supported by this table. Perhaps, the most powerful occupational group as extracted from the data may be said to be Class I, the owners and chief executives of businesses, and Class II who are elected representatives and upper white-collar workers, including managers, professionals, academics, and so on.

The owners and chief executives make up a somewhat heterogeneous group, since the data does not permit easy separation of the owners of tiny one-person businesses from those of large businesses. However, even with this heterogeneity, just 4.8% of the households reporting the ownership or control of businesses as their main occupation are from the STs, which is 0.5 times the number that should have been there if there were no systemic inequality (that is, instead of 4.8%, they should have been the same as the proportion of ST in the population, that is, 9.5%). The SCs are 10.4%, which is 0.5 times the number that should have been there without any systemic inequality. Meanwhile, the OBCs are 42.5% of the group, which is almost the same number that should be seen without systemic inequality. The forward castes are present in this class in a disproportionately large number. They make up 42.3% of this group, which means they are over-represented 1.5 times compared to their number in the population. Caste clearly continues to have an impact upon who is the most wealthy and powerful in this country, though it would not be accurate to say that it is the only determinant at work.

The poorest and the least powerful occupational group is arguably the Class VII (Table 1) households of landless agricultural labourers, forestry workers, fisherpeople, and so on. The STs are 13.4% of these households and are over-represented 1.4 times compared to what we would have expected if there were no systemic inequalities. The SCs are 32.7% of these households and are over-represented slightly more than even the STs, being 1.7 times of what we would have expected if there were no systemic inequality. The OBCs interestingly are a little under-represented, being 41.1% of these households. The forward castes are 12.7% of these households and are strongly under-represented, being only 0.4 times what we would have expected if there were no systemic inequality. Caste seems to have a substantial impact even upon who is at the bottom of the class structure.

Another social class, which may be considered one of the most powerful in the country, is that of the upper educated

workers. This includes managers, professionals, senior government employees, professors, and so on. It shows a distribution pattern similar to that of owners but is a little more skewed in favour of the forward castes. While amongst owners, the forward castes were over-represented by 1.5 times, amongst the upper educated workers, they are 1.8 times to their number in the population. A little over half of all households reporting this class (51.6%) come from the forward castes. In other words, caste skews who gets into the upper classes and being from an "upper" caste shows the greatest impact upon the membership of that particular class which is directly shaped by education.

Interestingly, caste seems to be showing the least impact (though it is discernible there as well) upon those who are only slightly above the bottom, namely the unskilled workers in occupations that are typically urban and do not require much schooling (Class IV). The ratio of over/under-representation for the STs/SCs/OBCs/forward castes is 1.0, 1.2, 0.9, 0.9, respectively in this class. A slightly greater impact of the caste system may be seen in the membership of skilled urban workers (Class VIII in Table 1).

So it is amongst the most powerful and the most powerless that caste seems to speak the loudest. Amongst classes that are formed by hereditary economic capital, like those of owners and farmers, it does not surprise us that caste inequality has a pronounced impact. After all, caste is about inheriting privilege. But education has often been pitched as a way of equalising society, as a way of creating human capital where economic capital cannot be redistributed. That caste inequalities amongst the educated classes appear to be even more than the proper-tied classes raises difficult questions.

Caste and Educational Enrolments

This connection between caste and the educated classes leads us to look at the relation between caste and educational enrolments. Unfortunately, the NSS data does not differentiate between enrolments in better or worse kind of institutions, where intensive and stimulative teaching takes place versus where there is only mechanical teaching and where learning occurs on paper alone. We may expect that the more advantaged will be present in larger numbers in the better kind of educational institutions. Be that as it may, with all their limitations, the NSS data tells us that the gap between different caste categories is rather low in elementary school enrolments (Table 2). The separation between the STs and the forward castes is just 6.4 percentage points. This is no doubt the result of concerted efforts by governments around India to improve school enrolments. However, we cannot say from

Table 2: Caste-wise Enrolment amongst Different Age Groups (%)

	STs	SCs	OBCs	Forward Castes	All
School enrolment amongst 6–14-year-old	88.4	90.9	92.0	94.7	92.08
School enrolment amongst 15–17-year-old	62.5	66.7	71.7	80.4	62.5
Tertiary education enrolment amongst 18–21-year-old	15.7	20.8	28	39.5	28.5

Source: NSS, 2014.

this table whether the gap is the same in the better schools or is larger there. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that the gap begins to widen as one move to schools with better teaching and learning.

When we look at progressively higher kinds of education, the gap begins to further widen. 39.5% of the forward castes in the age group of 18–21 are enrolled in some kind of tertiary education, while only 28% of the oBCs are enrolled. The enrolment rate drops even more drastically with the sCs (20.8%) and the STs (15.7%). Thus, disparity amongst the caste groups is much sharper in tertiary education than elementary. Again, we cannot say from this data what is happening in elite institutions; we do not know if the differences are greater there than in humbler colleges and polytechnics.


We should connect this observation of the sharpest caste disparities being in higher education with the previous observation that the inequalities of caste are expressed the most in non-agrarian occupations that recruit on the basis of higher education degrees. This is quite an important thing to note. Caste inequality is greater in higher education than in other sectors, in spite of many years of efforts to make education a site for the equalisation of castes. This frustrating observation reminds us of the importance of questions regarding the nature of the caste system: how is it practised, and why is it that it shows such a strong impact upon education in spite of all the years of reservations?

Caste and Inequality

The discussion so far has been in line with what is already well known, that, caste patterns substantially reinforce class inequality. However, this data can also be read to show that there is a considerable divergence between class and caste locations. To begin with, it should be pointed out that only a small number (a little over a third) of the forward castes are enrolled in tertiary education. It is not as if the forward castes are a group of castes that is completely saturated with higher education. The fact that almost two-thirds of the forward castes are not enrolling or are dropping out of tertiary education is striking. It suggests that while caste matters for enrolments, again there is something else that is at play, which is generating a pattern of dropouts and enrolments. The presence of a relatively small number of forward-caste enrolments does not fit very well into a “caste directly leads to educational inequality” kind of view.

There is undoubtedly a dwindling proportion of STs, sCs, and oBCs within the upper levels of the Indian population, and these caste groups are present in increasing proportions as we look at the lower classes. But the story is more than this. The overall class structure and the presence of different caste groups within each class is better understood by looking at the data presented in terms of its proportions within the entire population and not just as percentages within a particular class. It nudges us to rethink the role of class and other social processes in the structure of social stratification and their roles in the challenge of building a meritocracy. Table 3 shows the relative numbers of different caste groups within

Figure 1: Caste Specific Numbers within Each Class



Source: NSS, 2014.

each class, calculated as a weighted percentage of the entire sample (also in Figure 1). This is a better mapping and representation of different castes and classes in India. Again, we can see that caste undoubtedly seems to influence class inequality. But what also comes out clearly is that a substantial number of the poor cannot be said to be from the lower ranking castes.

A significant aspect of the Indian class structure is that the owners and the higher and lower educated workers, all together make up less than a fifth of the total population. As the preferred destination for upward mobility, this is a rather small platform onto which vast numbers are seeking to climb. The ladder to get here goes partially through education, ranging from elementary to tertiary levels. Those who wish to get into these classes find that the odds are stacked strongly against them. The window into this platform is rather small and getting through it calls for a lot of agility. As can be seen through the preceding discussion, the castes of one's ancestors are clearly one factor that seems to aid or hinder that movement.

However, it is difficult to say that caste alone is at play. The proportions of various caste groups in the poorest classes, unskilled non-agrarian workers (Class iv) and agrarian, fishery, forestry workers (Class vii) tell an interesting story (Table 3).

Table 3: Relative Numbers of Different Caste Groups within Each Class

Class	STs	sCs	oBCs	Forward Castes	Class Total
I Owners, chief executives	0.3	0.7	3.1	3.0	7.2
II Managers, elected representatives, professionals, professors	0.3	0.6	2.1	3.2	6.3
III Lower ranking educated workers, school teachers, clerks, nurses, technical assistants, astrologers	0.3	0.8	1.9	2.2	5.3
IV Unskilled workers: Shop assistants, housekeeping, restaurant workers, protective services, street vendors, domestic workers, messengers, porters	1.6	4.1	7.1	4.8	17.6
V Farmers	3.9	3.6	12.0	7.7	27.2
VI Animal husbandry and farming	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.9
VII Forestry workers, fishing, hunting, agricultural workers	2.0	4.9	6.1	1.9	14.9
VIII Skilled workers, crafts, machinery operators, vehicle drivers	1.3	4.5	9.3	5.0	20.2
IX Unemployed, unknown	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.5
Caste total	9.5	19.0	42.7	28.8	

Source: Calculated using data from NSS, 2014.

The numbers of the STs and SCs are disproportionately large, of course. But the numbers of the OBCs and even the forward castes are quite large amongst these poorest classes. The SCs in Classes III and VIII (the majority of uneducated manual workers) is 9% of all Indian households. This, of course, is a disproportionately high representation of them in these classes. On the other hand, the forward castes who are in these classes are not a tiny number either, being 6.7% of all Indian households. The number is so large that we cannot accept a simple equation of caste with class. A more complicated statement is called for.

The numbers of households of the forward castes from the upper and lower educated classes (Classes II and III) at 5.4% of the total households are actually lower than their numbers of households from the uneducated manual workers (Classes IV and VII), which are 6.7% of the total. In other words, there are more forward castes in the poorest classes than in the educated classes. If caste alone were responsible for the class location, we would not have seen such a pattern.

Dropouts

It is hardly surprising if the inequalities within a social structure also carry on to influence its education system. The reverse is also true; efforts within the education system to increase access and to create more inclusive curricula and pedagogies may have a balancing influence on the stratification system. There are limits to what can be achieved through education alone, of course. But it is important to acknowledge that the education system has a relative autonomy and deserves attention in itself, and not just as a mirror image of the rest of the social structure.

Enrolments provide a thin though still a useful way of examining stratification. I have examined the differences within enrolments in tertiary education institutions elsewhere using the 66th NSS survey and will not go into great detail of that again (Madan 2020). It will suffice to recall from it that there are strong caste as well as class patterns in enrolments into tertiary education. In certain streams like engineering, the ratio of forward castes to SC students is of the order of 11:1. In streams like medicine, commerce, and arts, it is closer to 3:1 (Madan 2020). Within each stream and caste group, there is a further influence of class. For instance, amongst SC engineering undergraduates, more than half are from the educated and owner classes.

In this section, I look not at who is enrolled, but at who is left out. Overall enrolments have improved tremendously in India. In 2014, the year of the 71st survey, 60.5% of all individuals between the ages of 18–21 were enrolled in some kind of school or college. Out of these, 28.5% were enrolled in tertiary education. A study of who dropped out or never enrolled, however, will give us a clearer picture of how social stratification operates to obstruct the functioning of a meritocracy. Table 4 shows the individuals between the age group of 15–17 who have been reported as having dropped out or never enrolled. Here, we will use “dropout” as a shorthand for dropout and never enrolled. When we look

at the dropouts as a whole, there is a visible gradient between the forward castes, with a dropout rate of 19.63%, and the other caste groups. There is a substantial gap between the forward castes and the OBC, with the latter at a dropout rate of 28.33%. There is a slightly narrower gap between the OBCs and the SCs (33.3%) and STs (37.54%). The STs have a dropout rate of nearly twice as that of the forward castes. Caste clearly has a role to play in who drops out in secondary school.

Table 4: Dropouts as Percent of Total 15–17-year-old in Each Caste Group

MPCE (₹)	STs	SCs	OBCs	Forward Castes
0–1,000	48.3	43.12	41.39	42.59
1,000–2,000	32.85	30.86	28.05	20.61
2,000–3,000	13.35	19.84	14.16	9.16
3,000–4,000	0.02	6.41	4.4	5.03
Total	37.54	33.3	28.33	19.63

Source: Calculated using data from NSS, 2014.

Looking at the data by clustering it around the family's monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE), however, puts things in a somewhat different light. We now begin to see the relation of dropouts and non-enrolments with class as well as caste. Among 15–17-years-old, the forward castes in the poorest MPCE band of less than ₹1,000 have a dropout rate (42.59%), which is hardly distinguishable from the OBCs (41.39%) and the SCs (43.12%). Only the STs are significantly worse off with a dropout rate of 48.3%. But, the overall difference amongst the poorest in terms of consumption is much less than the average overall difference across different MPCE bands. The different caste groups are much closer amongst the poor than amongst those slightly better off. The dropout rate declines sharply with an increase in the family's ability to consume. Unfortunately, the figures reported in the survey are too small to draw any reliable conclusion on the comparison across castes in the higher consumption bands. But the gap does seem to reduce with decreasing family income. Overall, it can be safely said that low family incomes are a very strong contributor to dropouts and non-enrolments across each and every caste group.


The impact of caste amongst the poorest classes is seen to strengthen as we go up the ladder of education. The difference between the forward castes and the SCs was not tangible in the 15–17-years-old, who may be in and about the secondary education level, amongst those with an MPCE of less than ₹1,000, but is quite clear in dropouts and non-enrolments amongst 18–21-years-old (tertiary education levels) (Table 5).

However, when we go up the class ladder, there is a dramatic decline in dropouts amongst all caste groups. Being poor makes a big difference to tertiary education enrolment of not

Table 5: Dropouts as Percent of Total 18–21-years-old in Each Caste Group

MPCE (₹)	STs	SCs	OBCs	Forward Castes
0–1,000	84.2	79.17	75.32	73.13
1,000–2,000	68.09	67.63	65.19	59.86
2,000–3,000	45.59	47.89	44.83	41.71
3,000–4,000	17.69	41.43	30.57	25.16
Total	70.61	67.3	60.98	50.1

Source: NSS, 2014.

Figure 2: Number of Dropouts and Non-enrolments in 18–21-year-old

Source: NSS, 2014.

only the SCs and the STs, but also makes quite a large difference to the forward castes. Figure 2 shows the absolute numbers of dropouts and non-enrolments amongst 18–21-years-old in different MPCE bands. It gives a way of comparing the absolute numbers of dropouts from different caste groups and classes. It may be seen that the absolute numbers of forward-caste students who do not enter the tertiary education system are not insignificant. While the dropouts of the ST and SC are still disproportionately larger, the dropouts amongst the forward castes are also quite substantial. There is clear evidence of the influence of caste in educational inequality, but it is not possible to sustain that caste is the only factor at work.

Regional Variations

Another way of examining the relation between class and caste could be to take up a comparison of less and more developed regions and study the dropouts there. In this paper, the most and least developed regions of Karnataka are compared. The Bengaluru region is a place where rapid growth has taken place in recent years. We define this region as made up of Bengaluru urban, Bengaluru rural, and the adjacent Ramanagara districts. For comparison, the most economically backward region in Karnataka was chosen, which is widely considered to be Kalyana Karnataka, comprising of the districts of Bidar, Kalaburgi, Yadgir, Raichur, and Koppal.

A marked difference can be seen between the Bengaluru and Kalyana Karnataka regions. The dropout levels in Bengaluru vary sharply from the STs to the SCs, OBCs, and forward castes among 15–21 year old. The STs have drastically high dropouts here (70.64%), and the SCs (61.47%) too are dropping out in much larger numbers than the OBCs (38.58%) and forward castes (31.85%). Interestingly, in the Kalyana Karnataka region, quite a different picture emerges. While the differences between the different caste groups are comparable to the differences seen in Bengaluru, the forward castes have a much higher dropout rate in Kalyana Karnataka (55.37%) (Table 6).

The considerable difference in the dropout and non-enrolment patterns between Bengaluru and the Kalyana Karnataka

Table 6: Dropouts and Non-enrolments in 15–21-years-old (%)

	STs	SCs	OBCs	Forward Castes
Bengaluru region	70.64	61.47	38.58	31.85
Kalyana Karnataka region	83.9	84.93	62.42	55.37

Source: NSS, 2014.

regions again tells us that we need to complement the analysis of caste with some other factors too. The history of a region, its pattern of development, and the processes shaping the class structure there have a considerable impact upon how caste operates in education and society. Perhaps, the way the state and various institutions providing education operate also influences the patterns here. The way we understand social inequality and its relation to education has to face the challenge of explaining all these variations.

Alternative Models

A clear caste-based pattern can be seen of inequality in access to wealth and resources and also in educational enrolments, particularly those of tertiary education. However, there are vast disparities within the caste categories themselves and not just across them. This forces us to pay attention once again at class, gender, regional and other kinds of disparities as sources of educational inequality. We have focused here for reasons of space on class, since the patterns created by patriarchy and historically specific forms of development while interconnected with class need an elaborate discussion that may be too much to take on in this paper.

The wide range of variation within each caste group makes one wonder if we are looking at the right kind of unit of caste. A widespread understanding of the caste system has been to see it as made up of four varnas plus the excluded *antyaja*. These are said to have been generated through the consolidation of different class strata: (i) priests, (ii) warriors, (iii) farmers and merchants, (iv) artisans and labourers, and (v) the marginalised and conquered people, who are also sometimes fused with artisans and labourers. This has been compared with the estates of medieval Europe, though there are also significant differences between the two. The divergence between this model and the reality of caste in recent years has been remarked upon by many scholars (for example, Cohn 1987; Dirks 2001; Ghurye 1957; Srinivas 1976). While the varna model may have corresponded to the reality of social inequality, in some parts of the South Asian region in ancient times, migrations and movements of people into different territory over the centuries, coupled with social and economic upheavals and conquest of groups by one another, have led to an emergence of a very different social structure. Scholars like S C Dube (1990), M N Srinivas (1976), and G S Ghurye (1957) amongst many others have argued that a smaller group, which they called the *jati* or the sub-caste, has become the functional unit of caste. The *jati* is defined by being the theoretical population within which marriage is permitted, or the endogamous unit of this social structure.

The patterns of wide class disparities within caste categories reinforce our rejection of the varna theory of caste. It cannot explain why, for instance, half of the forward castes are not getting into tertiary education. A *jati* theory of caste, which uses varna only to legitimise itself in a changing and dynamic way, is much more plausible. The patterns to be seen are consistent with the presence of a large number of *jatils*, which may or may not have a close connection with

varna, but act to support their internal members in a competitive manner. Some of those jati collectives may be placed higher in the class and political structure and some placed lower. This is consistent with how the above-mentioned scholars and many others have documented the way caste works in different regions. The most powerful group is the dominant jati, and this may not conform to the varna scheme of hierarchy. To give just one illustration, in Punjab, the dominant jatis a hundred years ago were the Aroras and Khatri (erstwhile traders and merchants, technically of the Vaishya varna), and now are the Jats (erstwhile farmers, technically again of the Vaishya varna). The hold of the varna image of caste is partially because dominant groups everywhere find it a convenient ideology to claim a higher varna status for themselves. So, nowadays, voices insisting that the Khatri and the Jats are “actually” Kshatriyas are getting louder. Since there are hardly any Rajputs in Punjab, there is no strong resistance to this claim.

A third model of how caste operates is that of a smaller kinship network within the jati. This is also consistent with the NSS data, and may actually better explain the wide variations within each caste grouping than the jati model alone. The government’s classification of SCs, STs, OBCs, forward castes, etc, is done on the basis of jatis and not varnas. The marked differences to be seen within each of these categories suggest that the jati too is more heterogeneous than what was earlier thought. Unfortunately, the granularity of the data available does not allow us to examine kinship networks in greater detail. The kinship network model was mentioned by scholars like the prescient Ghurye (1957) and Bernard Cohn (1987). According to this, the functional unit of caste where support is offered, cultures are shared and reproduced, and marriages are actually contracted is smaller than the theoretical boundary of the jati. A jati, for instance, may have been spread across a large geographical area due to historical migrations. Marriages and kinship relations may be maintained only within a smaller circle. It is this which then shares the most immediate advantages and disadvantages of caste identity, not the jati or the varna.

It is such a network of kinship that Claude Meillassoux had in mind when he spoke of many countries of the world being run by a lineage-based mode of production (Meillassoux 1973, 1981). Such a model is quite consistent with the wide range of economic disparities that the NSS is reporting within each caste category. The variations of the fortunes of smaller networks seem actually more plausible than the variations in the fortunes of entire jatis altogether. There may also be a combination of the jati and the kinship-network model at work, with the balance tilting towards the latter as inequalities grow between regions. Conversely, as access to technology makes communication more possible, we may expect that larger units like jatis may become more cohesive. This may explain the relatively greater homogeneity within endogamous groups, like those amongst the Tamil Brahmins (Fuller and Narsimhan 2010). In contrast, where communication is less easy, the better economic and political conditions of some

families will not translate easily into an improvement of others who share the jati name.

Theories of Inequality

The way we are able to theorise social inequality guides the way we may struggle against it. Quite clearly, we need to take class inequality very seriously, since without theorising and identifying its dynamics, we will not be able to work upon it. At the same time, closed kinship networks of the advantaged, which sometimes escape the way we commonly label caste, are a very real problem for meritocracy. Understanding how they work and trying to get closed systems to open up is an important challenge.

It may be better to look at caste and class as generative mechanisms rather than to visualise them as frozen categories and social morphologies. Such generative mechanisms or codes make up the environment within which individuals and groups struggle and negotiate through discursive practices. The approach of looking for generative codes has been developed upon by several social theorists and philosophers of science, including Pierre Bourdieu (1990), Mary Douglas (2001), and Roy Bhaskar (1998). These can be thought of as basic underlying principles that unfold into the many surface patterns of social inequality. While inquiring into the generative codes, one must also try to understand social inequality in its unique everyday character, and pay attention to the narratives and meanings constructed by actors through which they make sense of and combat and negotiate with social structure.

People are not puppets in the hands of generative codes; they also reflect and create ideas and practices that may challenge or reinforce them. To understand the challenges inherent in trying to create a meritocracy, we need to look at both structure and agency together, not just one of the two. This is not a positivistic search for timeless universal laws. Instead, it is a search for structural processes that help us understand how historical trends move. This is the sense in which some people have interpreted Marxist and Weberian traditions and have sought to use concepts like capitalism and rationalisation



Through *EPW Engage*, our new digital initiative, we seek to explore new and exciting possibilities of communicating research in a creative and accessible manner to a wider audience.

www.epw.in/engage

as historical generative processes to understand growing patterns and contradictions of our times.

The work of Meillasoux (1973, 1981) and Anand Chakravarti (2001) can be seen as standing within this approach of seeing caste and class as generative processes. They argue that caste operates as a form of social reproduction that can be alive within larger systems, like those of capitalism. Anthropologists like Maurice Godelier (1986) argue that kinship systems are a way of organising a society. As Meillasoux put it, they may form a lineage mode of production that is organised around lines of descent and marriage. The networks of descent and marriage operate as a core organisational component of production. Caste networks can thus be seen as one way of reproducing the organisational bases of production. In many parts of India, today educational strategies and institutions play a key role in this social reproduction and also contribute to changing the ways in which the larger system seeks to reproduce itself. They therefore become an important site for struggles by various social groups to enhance their power and prestige.

Caste and sub-caste networks operate to gather status, power, and wealth, within historically changing and specific environments. The character of these environments has, in recent years, been shaped by the Indian state, by capitalism and universalising processes of rationalisation and differentiation. Endogamous networks give advantages for economic and educational activities, but those are no longer the only way to gain advantages for individuals and families. Caste identities have become only one out of several resources within the larger system being constituted by specific state-capitalist formations. It is important to try and understand the broader character of social inequality. It is contributed to but not completely shaped by caste. It should also be kept in mind that there is a great deal of regional specificity in social inequality, and we need to see the way kinship networks play out in different situations.

REFERENCES

- Beteille, Andre (2007): "Classes and Communities," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 42, No 11, pp 945–52.
- Bhaskar, Roy (1998): *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of Contemporary Human Sciences*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1990): *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Chakravarti, Anand (2001): "Caste and Agrarian Class: A View from Bihar," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 36, No 17, pp 1449–62.
- Cohn, Bernard S (1987): "Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture," *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*, Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, pp 136–37.
- Dirks, Nicholas B (2001): *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Douglas, Mary (2001): *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*, 1966, London and New York: Routledge.
- Dube, Leela (1996): "Caste and Women," *Caste: Its Twentieth Century Avatar*, M N Srinivas (ed), New Delhi: Viking, Penguin India, pp 1–27.
- Devika, J, Kalpana Kannabiran, Mary E John, Padmini Swaminathan, Samita Sen and Sharmila Rege (2013): "Intersections of Gender and Caste," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 48, No 18, pp 35–36.
- Dube, S C (1990): *Indian Society*, New Delhi: National Book Trust.
- Fuller, C J and Haripriya Narasimhan (2010): "Traditional Vocations and Modern Professions among Tamil Brahmins in Colonial and Post-colonial South India," *Indian Economic & Social History Review*, Vol 47, No 4, pp 473–96.
- Godelier, Maurice (1986): *The Mental and the Material: Thought, Economy and Society*, London: Verso.
- Ghurye, G S (1957): *Caste and Class in India*, 1950, 2nd ed, Bombay: Popular Book Depot.
- Goldthorpe, John H (2000): "Social Class and the Differentiation of Employment Contracts," *On Sociology: Numbers, Narratives and the Integration of Research and Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 207–29.
- Guru, Gopal (1995): "Dalit Women Talk Differently," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 30, Nos 41 and 42, pp 2548–50.
- Madan, Amman (2020): "Unpacking Intersectionality: Conceptual Explorations of Convergences and Divergences of Class, Caste and Gender in Education," *Knowledge, Politics and Education: Proceedings of International Conferences of Philosophy of Education (2013–2017) Volume II*, Prakash Iyer (ed), Goa: CinnamonTeal, pp 136–73.
- Meillasoux, Claude (1973): "Are There Castes in India?" *Economy & Society*, Vol 2, No 1, pp 89–111.
- (1981): *Maidens, Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Community*, 1975, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mukherjee, Ramakrishna (1999): "Caste in Itself, Caste and Class, or Caste in Class," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 34, No 27, pp 1759–61.
- Rege, Sharmila (1998): "Dalit Women Talk Differently: A Critique of 'Difference' and Toward a Dalit Feminist Standpoint Position," *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 33, No 44, pp WS39–46.
- Srinivas, M N (1976): *Remembered Village*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Sharma, K L (1984): "Caste and Class in India: Some Conceptual Problems," *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol 33, Nos 1/2, pp 1–28.
- Wright, Erik Olin (1996): *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adivasis and Land

The Story of Postcolonial Development in Kerala

SURESH M

This paper attempts to frame an understanding of the land question of Adivasis to show the limitations of the dominant developmental historiography. It tries to locate the Adivasi in the developmental history of postcolonial Kerala by specifically discussing land reforms celebrated as “radical” but which exclude tribes from ownership of land. This contradiction is explained through the history of colonial rule, which converted land into private property. Categories like “tiller” and “tenant,” though they did drive the postcolonial process forward, drew from the colonial legal order. This, ironically, resulted in the exclusion of the tribes.

Postcolonial development follows from colonial history due to the continuity of natural and human-made territories and the populations that occupy them. Thus, any enquiry that tries to find breaks between them might prove to be difficult. Similarly, development policies and strategies rely on inherited institutions and knowledge, even if only to oppose and reject them. This has historically affected how people and places are categorised, and how development plans are implemented in India, though there have been attempts to challenge the domination of the colonial state and the dependence on its structure. Indian independence, at the same time, signalled various discontinuities in Indian history. Democracy signalled the legitimacy of the independent Indian state and helped link nationalist passion with the promise of development (Bose and Jalal 1997). The nationalist charge of non-representation of natives in the colonial state was met with the introduction of democratic rights in independent India. Another sign of discontinuity with the colonial state was the inclusion of fundamental rights for all Indian citizens in the Constitution. The directive principles strove to promote the welfare of all citizens, and universal adult suffrage was established. All this made the postcolonial Indian state formally just and representative, and thus discontinuous from the colonial state.

Sudipta Kaviraj conceptualises the postcolonial Indian state as an “inheritor of [the] British colonial state” and, at the same time, a successor of “Indian nationalism” (2010: 222). During British rule, “the extension of bureaucracy was mainly sanctioned by [the] rhetoric of state efficiency,” but nationalist leaders who dominated the postcolonial state replaced this discourse with “the rhetoric of development” (2010: 223). Kaviraj also states that Jawaharlal Nehru “imbued this state” with his vision of the government “as the primary instrument of development, with extensive responsibilities in the direct management of production and distribution” (2010: 223). Kaviraj also points out that radical nationalist groups attacked two proprietary controls under colonialism: “landlord property” created by colonial permanent settlement, and “direct British industrial and commercial interests” (2011: 128). According to Frankel (1978), there was massive political mobilisation against colonial land ownership after independence, so it was legally abolished quickly. Indeed, in the Indian Constitution, “a special case was made for the abolition of Zamindari,” though it “contained a pre-commitment to the preservation of unequal property.” (Kaviraj 2011: 128)

This paper is part of a research project, “Development in Post-colonial India: Practices and Experiences of a ‘Tribal’ Region,” sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), Delhi. A previous version of this paper was presented at the “Anthropological Histories and Tribal Worlds in India” conference (27–29 March 2017) at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

The author would like to thank Kunhaman, S Raju Bindu K C, and Suresh Shanmugham for their comments and discussions.

Suresh M (suresh.madhavan@tiss.edu) teaches at the School of Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.

Land reforms in Kerala, initiated by the first state government of a unified Kerala in 1957,¹ “followed the recommendations of the 1949 Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee Report as well as Central directives on land reform” (Herring 1980: 59). Though many Congress governments in other parts of India were reluctant to formulate any land reform laws, the communist government in Kerala passed a land reform act within a decade after independence—the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1959. Though it was not implemented because of the dismissal of the state government² and a court ruling (Radhakrishnan 1989: 141),³ it remained a platform for major political mobilisation in Kerala. The act was finally legislated in 1969 and implemented on 1 January 1970 (Herring 1980).⁴

The Communist Party’s approach towards land reform in Kerala needs to be looked at in the context of the party’s political base. Uniting farmers and agricultural workers against the landlord was the primary motivation that drove the party’s mobilisation. Indeed, Adivasis were part of this mobilisation. Janu, an Adivasi leader of Kerala, in her life history, narrated her experience of participating in the anti-landlord struggle (Bhaskaran 2004). The question, then, is Did Adivasis get land ownership after the land reforms? Studies show that most of them did not (Mathur 1977; Kunhaman 1981; Bijoy 1999).

How did this happen? Was it a deliberate denial? Why should Adivasis be denied when the primary objective of land reforms was the redistribution of land? Moreover, we know that Adivasis participated in the political movement for land reform, which had the slogan: “land for the tillers.” One argument is that the tribes were mostly settled in government forest areas, and forests were not included in legal and political discourses on land reform (Kjosavik and Shanmugaratnam 2004).

Though this argument is valid in the context of government forest areas, it does not explain how those lands that were cultivated or possessed by Adivasis came to be owned by migrant farmers as a result of the land reforms. This study suggests that to understand this reality, we need to consider the context of the tenurial structure that the colonial state created in Kerala (Kjosavik and Shanmugaratnam 2004). Though the system itself varied across the state, certain broad similarities were evident. The system of private property was introduced during the colonial rule, including in the Malayalam-speaking region. In Malabar, through colonial state regulation, landlords got absolute ownership of land. But, in the princely state of Travancore, through tenancy legislations, *kutiyans* (tenants) got ownership of land (Varghese 1970).

This paper argues that neither the postcolonial state that implemented the land reform, nor the Communist Party that mobilised farmers and labourers against landlordism, reconceptualised colonial legal categories. They never tried to develop an alternative register to frame land relationships but simply followed the colonial legal system (Moorkoth 2012), which was based on the idea of private property. The paper argues that despite the significant role it played in the disappearance of landlords, land reform failed to understand the

complexity of the land relationship and, in turn, the specific location of Adivasis in the system.

This paper discusses this by reviewing the literature on agrarian relations and land reforms. Along with the literature review, the paper is also based on the written and oral repertoire of a tribal region, Attappady, in the Palakkad district in Kerala. Based on fieldwork (conducted in many stages from 2011 to 2014, by the researcher and assistants)⁵ and archival research, the study covers histories, memories, and cultural ideas. This study also relies on newspaper reports (especially from one newspaper, *Mathrubhumi*) for information about the responses from political and civil society. Both the ethnography and the archival examination were undertaken keeping in mind the following questions: Why did land reforms have an unintended effect on Adivasis, despite their purported objective being to distribute land to the tillers? What are the factors that influenced these unintended effects?

The next section discusses the production of land. In particular, it deals with the production of agricultural land as private property and the production of forestland as state property in colonial times. This is done to see the resulting effects of this categorisation of land on Adivasis. Thus, the larger theme concerns remaking land into property. The challenge is also in tracing the effects of this remaking into the present.

Colonial Production of Land as Property

Landlords as owners and tribes as tenants-at-will: The land policies of the British were aimed at extracting revenue flows from the land. They believed that the land use of the natives was “unproductive” because of the lack of a proper ownership system and the use of labour. In order to make the land productive and extract revenue, the state wanted to formalise land rights.⁶ The land relationship in Malabar in the precolonial period was based on customary relationships, where various levels of landholders had rights to land, such as kings (*rajas*), landlords (*janmis*), tenants (*kanamkars*), and sub-tenants (*verumpattakars*).⁷ The exchange relationship between these various actors was based on products and services and not land (Varghese 1970). The rent that the *rajas* or *janmis* got from subordinate landholders was based on the produce from the land and not the value of the land itself. Before colonial rule, an early attempt to extract revenue from land was made by the Mysore regime (1766–1792) (Rejikumar 2010). They introduced a land revenue assessment system and tried to extract land revenue directly from cultivators and exclude landlords (Innes 1908). This disrupted the customary framework and made it possible for the British to interpret the rights and interests connected with land in their own way when they conquered Malabar in 1792 AD (Varghese 1970).

Early colonial commissions and administrative procedures interpreted the prevalent customary practices according to the system that existed in Europe and thus formalised the land relationship. According to the new interpretation, landlords

possessed birthrights (*janman*) to the land, and different land tenures were interpreted as follows: *kanam* was a mortgage and *verumpattam* was mere tenancy-at-will. There was no notion of property in the precolonial period. The land relationship was based on differential rights for the janmis, kutiyans, and verumpattakars to hold land and use the products from it. No one had absolute ownership, which included the right to exchange land (Ganesh 2016).

In the new system of land relationships, janmis had ownership rights by birth over land (Rejikumar 2010). In this context, English terms like “rent” and “lease” were imposed over native practices that had a “superficial resemblance” to them (Kjosavik and Shanmugaratnam 2007: 1203). This system made it convenient for the government to establish and regulate land revenue extraction (Innes 1908). In the new system, vast areas of land like in Attappady, which had customarily been held by landlords but were cultivated and used by the Adivasis, were now individually owned by the landlord family. Adivasis who were cultivating the land almost with no external regulations became legal verumpattakars with no security of tenure (Innes 1908). Later, they had to pay annual rent and renewal fees to the landowner for allocating land to them for cultivation. While formalising land relations, the colonial state consolidated their superior status by holding onto their power as a “super landlord.” The colonial state in Malabar claimed the government’s right over the janman right of janmis. Thus, a new form of holding land, government janman, was formed (Varghese 1970). This was visible more in the context of creating and administering forests.

Adivasis as recipients of government concessions: Another important land regulation in British India was formulated by creating a space called the “forest.” It was initially created by closing off a space to the locals by officially naming it so in a memorandum issued in 1855. It was administratively formulated through the Indian Forest Act, 1865, which was later amended in 1878. Environmental historians have interpreted the act as being part of the state’s strategy to control forest areas (Guha 1983: 1941). Following the Indian Forest Act, large tracts of forest were brought under the control of the British government.

In Malabar, and specifically in Attappady, larger tracts of land were notified as “reserved forests” and were either purchased or leased from local landlords, such as Mannarkkad Moopil Nair (Iyer 1935). The first Working Plan of 1935 states: “In 1887 a detailed survey was conducted in Attappady valley, describing the flora, fauna, the nature of the forest and even the settlement of people in the forest areas” (Iyer 1935). Although the Madras government tried to get more forest area under its control, the janmis contested this move legally. Recognising their janman right to the land, the colonial court returned the ownership of some of the forestland to the landlords (Iyer 1935). So, vast areas of forest owned by landlords were designated as “private forests.” This notification of forest reserves and the transfer of ownership to landlords led to the regulation of the Adivasis’ use of the forests.

Shifting cultivation, a common practice among Adivasis, was banned by the Government of Madras in 1860; however, as the government order to that effect was unsuccessful and unpopular, it was soon withdrawn (Philip 2004: 60). The Madras Forest Act, 1882 and then the first Forest Policy, 1894 prescribed that the reserved forest would be placed under state control, and once notified, was the property of the state (Guha 1983: 1941). Thus, access to the forest and the rights of local people to its resources were determined by the concessions given by the local forest department.

In the process of formalising legal rights to land and forest, janmis and the state acquired ownership of them. In the new system, Adivasis became tenants-at-will and were subject to various regulations regarding their use of the forestland. Adivasis’ access to land was now reduced to a lease, which could be cancelled by the state. The British were interested in “managing” the forest so that its resources can be extracted and the land could be converted into a “productive asset.” They imagined both production and conservation in terms of utility—production for present consumption and the conservation for future consumption. The new system transformed the land use pattern, human relationships with the land, and relationships between human beings.

Land thus became individual property, with ownership rights that were distinct from the right to use the land. Earlier, no one had exclusive ownership of land, so others could cultivate it and use its products, even if the custodian was a janmi.⁸ Through the colonial legal system, landlords got exclusive property rights to land, that is, the right to exchange it. In the previous system, the right to exchange land was caught in a matrix of various levels of control and use. Later, the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 gave “fixity” tenure for *kanamkars* and reduced their threat of eviction (Menon 1992: 2705). The Matriliny Bill of 1931 (Marumakkathayam Bill of V P Narayanan Nambiar 1931), which later became a law in 1933, led to individual members claiming their share of the *tharavadu* (joint Nair family) property, as it allowed for the partitioning of the *tharavadu*. The Matrilineal Act of 1933 enhanced land transactions in Malabar (Menon 1992: 2706).

The Land Rush

Migration to the highlands of Malabar (where the Adivasis reside) started in the 1850s. It was primarily the Europeans who moved to the highlands of Wayanad to start plantations. They took leases on land by influencing the colonial government or the landlords through the colonial government (Raman 1997). There was no competition in land acquisition, as land was not exposed to the market until the first quarter of the 20th century.

In Attappady, a few farmers and traders from nearby Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu started cultivating the land by leasing it from landlords, especially Moopil Nair. Most were absentee cultivators who migrated seasonally to the Attappady valley along with labourers (Sankar and Muraleedharan 1990). The selling and buying of land started in the 1930s.⁹ These migrant farmers and traders, who later reshaped the

land use and demographic composition of the Malabar region, were mostly from the princely state of Travancore. During the first half of the 1930s, an average of two to three families per week moved to different locations in Malabar. Between 1940 and 1950, nearly 50 new settlements of Travancore migrants were established. In the following decade, there was an increase in new settlements, either as off-shoots of earlier settlements or as independent ones (Velluva 2006: 48). According to Tharakan (1976), an economic historian on migration, Travancoreans migrated between 1930 and 1960 because of the increasing population and resultant pressure on cultivable land in Travancore. Also, their familiarity with the land market and cash crops encouraged them to move and accumulate land. They moved to wherever land was cheap and available in the Malabar region.

The Travancore migrants moved to Attappady in large numbers only after the 1950s. This migration reached its peak during 1960–70. Although several families had bought land in the lowlands in the Mannarkkad region before 1950 (Velluva 2006: 52), the inaccessibility of the Attappady valley due to the absence of a cart road, and the threat of malaria, prevented them from exploring the hills and settling in the valley. The malaria eradication programme and the construction of a cart road in the 1950s opened up the path to the valley. This changed the demographic composition of Attappady; Adivasis, who had been the majority (more than 64% of the population) in 1961, became a minority (40%) in 1971 (Kunhaman 1981: 53).

There was an official system through which landlords leased out land to the needy. The *karyasthan* (or manager of property), who had previously collected rent from the Adivasis for cultivating the land, was transformed into an officer who distributed land; the *kolkaran*, who had previously measured the area to be distributed, became the functionary. A “money receipt” (MR) was given for the amount charged for the leased land (Mathrubhumi 1965). Although the *kolkaran* was supposed to measure the area distributed, neither the location nor the size of the land was specified in the MR; this led to migrants appropriating land without any limits. The size of the land area appropriated varies. A few early migrants became big farmers. However, most were small farmers and labourers who migrated and became workers on big farmers’ lands (Velluva 2006: 38). Migrants bought land from earlier migrants or encroached on forestland or the land that the Adivasis were cultivating. The farmers who migrated primarily to Attappady and other parts of the Malabar region were largely Christian. Their labourers were mainly from the Ezhava and other untouchable castes (Mathur 1977). There were also big farmers, small farmers, and labourers from the Muslim community (GoI 1981). An organisation representing the upper-caste Nairs, the Nair Service Society (NSS), also leased a 2,000-acre plot of land in Attappady (GoI 1961b; Mathrubhumi 1965).

The influx of migrants and their acquisition of land put pressure on the Adivasi practice of shifting cultivation. The ambiguity regarding the location of the land and its size in official papers issued by the landlord’s office led to migrants

encroaching on the land that the Adivasis were cultivating. On many occasions, the Adivasis moved closer towards the forest—away from the more fertile land and river basins (Kunhaman 1981: 52). The *karyasthan* preferred to give land to migrants rather than to Adivasis because the former could pay cash. Apart from this, migrants also got land directly from the Adivasis. This was a peculiar kind of dispossession due to the unequal power dynamic between Adivasis and *vanthavasis* (the local term used to refer to migrants).¹⁰

In the 1950s, most Adivasis in Attappady practised shifting cultivation by leasing land from landlords. They cultivated each area for one to three years, then they would change their location and pay rent to a new landlord. Once they shifted to a new piece of land, the previous plot would become covered in undergrowth and remained uncultivated for years. During a field visit, many elders mentioned that they did not return to the same land again. They also reported that some of them gave up the land to the *vanthavasis*. “Anyway we were not cultivating it,” and “they offered us money for it, even though it was not much” (personal interview with Kunchan, 24 August 2011, Attappady). Migrants then continued to cultivate that land. Finally, the migrant would get an MR from the *adhikari* (local revenue officer). The migrants could pay for the MR in cash, which gave them an advantage, unlike the Adivasis (Mathrubhumi 1965).

The next part of this paper deals with the exclusion of Adivasis from the land reform procedure.

A Legal and Political History

Ownership, either of land or any object, is a legal right. Innumerable administrative procedures establish this legal right. Elaborating on this point, one can argue that legal right is created through administrative procedures. For instance, land reform bills defined “landlord” and “tenant,” and on that basis, the state apparatus acquired, distributed, and gave ownership of the land. A historian of peasant struggles writes that broadening the definition of “cultivating tenant” was mainly done by expanding the category of “deemed tenants” to accommodate those “honestly believing to be tenants,” those occupying land under a lease granted by “incompetent persons” (such as minors), those who had paid for the occupation of land, and those occupying private forests or unsurveyed lands (Radhakrishnan 1989: 154).

Under this broad and loose categorisation of tenants, migrant farmers, who had got the land on lease, became tenants. Tenants had the right to absolute ownership of land, according to the land reform bills of 1960, 1963, and 1964. Thus, many migrant farmers in Attappady became the owners of the lands they were cultivating on lease. Many Adivasis also became owners of the land through the land reforms if they were legally recognised as tillers.¹¹ As Kunhaman (1981: 52) writes, some Adivasi families were assigned ownership rights to “infertile land” that they had “encroached” upon because of the pressure from migrant farmers.

Indeed, the objective of the land reform was to distribute land. But the administrative mechanisms and institutional

procedures that were prerequisites for the distribution of land enabled migrant farmers to get ownership of land. Before the land distribution, a survey was conducted by the Bureau of Economics and Statistics in 1966–67. The objective of the survey was to fix who the cultivator was, legally (Herring 1980: 60). The surveyors had to rely on any document—for instance, rent or tax receipts—that ensured a proprietary relationship with the land. In a place like Attappady, the person who held the document would have been difficult to identify because of the large-scale practice of informally mortgaging land. So, in most cases, surveyors allotted ownership to those cultivators that they found at the moment of the survey (Moithunni, 30 April 2013, Attappady, in discussion with the author).¹² In all such cases, migrant farmers had the advantage. As we have said elsewhere, many of them managed to get a MR from the landlord's office for land they leased from the Adivasis.

This survey method largely failed to account for the system that some Adivasis followed. A surveyor reported that the *moopan* (chieftain) was leasing land from the *karyasthan* and distributing it among members of the *ooru* (hamlet). Moreover, individual families would sometimes fail to recognise their own holding during the survey. “At the time, we wanted to identify the individual holder. Due to the confusion, we gave ownership of all the land in the *ooru* to the *moopan*” (Moithunni, 30 April 2013, Attappady, in discussion with the author).¹³ The surveyors also recorded multiple claims to the same land. According to Moithunni, in some cases, there was a piece of land that both an Adivasi and a migrant farmer laid claim to. He said, “Mostly, Adivasis would claim the land orally, based on their history of cultivating the land, but the migrant farmers' claims were based on receipts. Therefore, we would accept the migrant farmers claim to ownership” (Moithunni, 30 April 2013, Attappady, in discussion with the author). For the state to recognise legitimate ownership, documents were important. So those who were not habituated to the recognised documentation practices were excluded from the state's distributive benefits.

Who Is a 'Tiller'?

There was an elaborate process for claiming ownership of land.¹⁴ Scholars argue that the success of land reform in Kerala as compared with other states was due to the active participation and involvement of political and civil societies (Chasin and Franke 1991; Radhakrishnan 1989; Franke and Chasin 1989). If we accept this argument, then we must admit that the political process through which land reform in Kerala became “radicalised” excluded the Adivasis (Franke and Chasin 1989). Why did the postcolonial state, civil society, and political society, especially those with communist politics, not consider the question of Adivasi land ownership a political one? The answer to this could be found in the ideological and discursive relationship of land reform with colonialism and nationalism.

According to Judith Whitehead (2010), John Locke's concept of the wasteland—a state of nature where people enjoy the

fruits of the earth, as opposed to value-producing land, created through the application of labour—created the basis for the categorisation and administration of land in colonial India. This materialised through the working of the Permanent Settlement Act (1793), the Ryotwari Settlement of Western India Act (1830s–1840s), and the Indian Forest Act (1865). Whitehead demonstrates not only the construction of different landscapes of value, but also argues that this, in turn, creates different social subjectivities, like tribes and castes, because they inhabit these landscapes. “Hill populations were seen as outside of civil society; their uses of the land were consequently primitive, wasteful and destructive” (Whitehead 2010: 93). Colonial categories were adopted by postcolonial India as natural categories, whether related to land or the categorisation of communities as “tribes.” Prathama Banerjee (2016: 141) argues that the principle of labour value in land use influenced mainstream nationalist and communist politics, which were articulated based on the “land to the tiller” principle. Moreover, the communist agrarian imagination centred on the hardworking, productive peasant, who engaged in sedentary agriculture on large riverine plains. Banerjee (2016) claims that they did not take into account other modes of use and habitation of land. The Adivasis were thus not considered as proprietors of land and were thus excluded from the political process associated with the redistribution of landed property. Since the Adivasis did not fit into the category of “labourer,” the welfare schemes that were created for landless labourers in the post-land reform era did not impact them (Kjosavik and Shanmugaratnam 2004). Therefore, the Adivasis were excluded from the whole process of land reform.

The Power of Development: A Different History

The question, then, is how to rewrite the history of development incorporating those who have, thus far, been excluded. A better framework to write development histories should involve a more complex, and perhaps contradictory, understanding of the development process. The exclusion of Adivasis from landownership should not be seen as their alienation from development, but as an effect of the development process itself. When we study the rationale of development policies and their effects, we must link them with power structures.¹⁵ The history of Adivasi communities of Kerala in the 20th century shows how they were gradually alienated from productive resources. At the same time, they have been reduced to a governmental category associated with welfare.

The idea of “protecting tribes” because they are weak, from powerful traders and moneylenders, was one of the major concerns during the late colonial rule. The “Rules for the Treatment and Management of Hillmen,” which was a part of the Forest Regulations of Travancore, 1893, reflected this (Suresh 2009). Likewise, regulating and controlling the “alienation” of the land belonging to “tribes” was part of the strategy for managing “agency areas” (Aiyappan 1948: 22).¹⁶ Most committees in the postcolonial period suggested and recommended the “protection” of tribal land. These committees also reported cases of “land alienation” in tribal areas. The

Government of India (1961a), in the Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission,¹⁷ gives a long description of the various “methods” through which land was alienated from the tribes, and the lacunae in existing laws in a few states.

About Kerala specifically, the report said that there were no “protective” measures against “exploitation” by moneylenders (Dhebar 1961: 386). It also mentioned that large areas of tribal land were being alienated in Kerala, and there were no legal measures to control this process (Dhebar 1961: 386). The situation in Attappady figured in the all-India Dhebar Commission Report. As a measure to prevent the dispossession of tribal land, the report suggested placing tribes under state control, and giving *patta* (title deeds) to tribal people for the land they hold as “tenants,” as a mechanism to curtail the alienation of land (Dhebar 1961: 386). These details clearly indicate that the seriousness of land alienation was known to experts at the time and that the administrative technique they recommended was protection from outsiders.

A discussion in the Kerala Legislative Assembly in 1957 about land issue in Attappady reveals how it was perceived in the political world of that time. P K Chathan, the local self-government minister, said that the government had taken appropriate measures to stop the encroachment of the land of *girivarghakkars* (hill tribes) in Attappady in Palakkad. The minister was responding to the resolution proposed by a communist member of the legislative assembly (MLA), Krishna Menon. In his resolution, Menon had demanded the appointment of a committee, led by a non-official, to collect information on how to curtail the encroachment of the land that the *girivarghakkars* had been cultivating for so many years, by *puram nattukars* (outsiders). “Puram nattukar” can also mean “people who are from another country,” or “people from another place.” Congress MLA, C M Matthew, objected to the use of this phrase. He said people who were migrant settlers from Thiru-Kochi were also poor and should not be seen as outsiders since they were from the same state. Menon finally withdrew his resolution but clarified that he used “puram nattukar” to mean Tamil migrants, Thiru-Kochi migrants, and a feudal lord from Mannarkkad (*Mathrubhumi* 1957).

Adivasis too raised the issue of the scarcity of land allocated to them for cultivation. A newspaper reported that a group of *kattunivasikal* (forest dwellers) complained to two ministers from Madras, who were visiting the Attappady region, that “they were not getting enough land for the cultivation.” They subsequently requested the ministers “to allot separate forest land once in three years,” and added that “the janmis, who owned the forest, are allotting it to others” (*Mathrubhumi* 1950).

The expert committees, political society, and state apparatus had information about the specificities of the Adivasi land in question. But, unlike with other welfare measures (Suresh 2015), the government did not take any legal or administrative measures to resolve it. Postcolonial governmentality retained the colonial strategy regarding Adivasi spaces. Their inhabitation and cultivation were not qualified as value-producing.

The land reform was definitely anti-feudal, but it was also developmentalist. E M S Namboodiripad, the first chief minister of the elected communist state government, argued that “land reforms must not discourage capitalist entrepreneurs” (Herring 1980: 69). For him “capitalism in agriculture is an advance on the present situation in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country” (Namboodiripad 1952: 61). Therefore, when agriculture was restructured through the discourse of development, those who accumulated power became dominant, and those who did not have that power were made subordinate or excluded.

Conclusions

This study tried to address how Adivasis were excluded from the developmental process of Kerala, and the connection between this exclusion and their invisibilisation in the historiography of postcolonial development. The study examined an important event that the development historians of Kerala consider a “radical” land reform. The study found that the legal and administrative procedures that aimed at redistributing landownership excluded Adivasis. Legal categories were created during the colonial regime as part of the process of governing the “primitive” locals. This process largely involved transposing local land relations into the dominant European framework. The framework reduced the diverse rights to land that existed in the precolonial era to just one category: private property. Within this dominant framework, Adivasi practices like shifting cultivation were not considered “productive” activities. Their status as tenants-at-will in colonial land relations had no legal validity, and the land that they were using and cultivating was no longer their property.

In the postcolonial history of the politics of land, the Adivasis’ specific relations with land were never addressed or articulated. So the administrative and political processes through which tenants got ownership of the land could not recognise Adivasis as tenants. Techniques such as land surveys and materials such as documents that had the power to legitimise land ownership privileged the migrant farmers over the Adivasis.

In the context of the invisibility of Adivasis in developmental historiography, this study argued that a critical historiography of development helps us understand that the exclusion of Adivasis happened due to the power of development. In postcolonial Kerala, Adivasis have been increasingly subjected to welfare programmes and their culture and traditions have remained under state “protection,” but at the same time, the state has not acted to enable them to get landownership.

This situation also gives us a glimpse into the complexity surrounding the emergence of “Adivasi politics” after the 1980s, especially when one remembers the fact that the state instituted a law related to “tribal land” in 1975 (Sreekumar and Parayil 2006; Steur 2009). But, of course, that is another story, of the interweaving of state interventions and the transgressive politics of the subaltern that uses the law and yet goes beyond it.

NOTES

- 1 The formation of a united Kerala, based on language, happened in 1956; the first government was formed by the Communist Party of India in 1957.
- 2 The first state government of Kerala was dismissed by the central government in 1959, which alleged the deterioration of law and order in Kerala.
- 3 Two judgments of the Kerala High Court in 1962 invalidated the implementation of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1959 in Malabar and Travancore.
- 4 The United Front led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist)—CPI(M)—legislated the Kerala Land Reform Bill, 1969, which came into effect on 1 January 1970 after the fall of that government. The reform was administered for a decade by a coalition led mostly by the Communist Party of India (CPI), while the CPI(M) led the opposition.
- 5 The researcher thanks the assistants, Suresh S and Rajan K, for collecting data for the ICSSR project (Suresh 2015).
- 6 Immediately after the British got control of Malabar through the Treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, the Governor of Bombay appointed a joint commission to clarify the land relationship and formalise the administrative system in Malabar (Rejikumar 2010).
- 7 Innes (1908) refers to Francis Buchanan, who travelled through Malabar in 1800–01 and reported on the complex land relationship that existed in Malabar.
- 8 This use of land is interpreted by scholars as ownership of tribes (Kunhaman 1981: 61).
- 9 In his study, Velluva (2006) has shown that in 1932, a migrant bought land near Mannarkkad.
- 10 A detailed survey of which families lost land, to whom, the details of the area, and how it was lost was conducted by the Integrated Tribal Development Project (ITDP) (GoK 1982).
- 11 In the Wayanad district, Adivasi communities like the Kurichiyars had become landowners through the land reforms (Kjosavik and Shanmugaratnam 2004).
- 12 Moithunni is a migrant from Mannarkkad who worked as a kolkaran with Moopil Nair. Later, he was appointed as a government surveyor; he was part of the survey team of 1966–67.
- 13 Moithunni said that he had personally faced the problem of other Adivasis claiming his land.
- 14 Radhakrishnan (1989) gives an elaborate description of the institutions that were working for the success of land reform and the procedures associated with establishing oneself as a cultivator.
- 15 Two studies worth mentioning here are those by Li (2007) and Ferguson (1994).
- 16 Current scheduled areas with more tribal populations were administratively described as “excluded areas” or “partially excluded areas” during colonial times. Partially excluded areas were also described under the colonial regime as “agency areas” (Aiyappan 1948: 1).
- 17 Otherwise known as the Dhebar Commission, based on the name of its chairperson, Uchharangrai Navalshankar Dhebar.

REFERENCES

Aiyappan, A (1948): *A Report on the Socio-economic Conditions of the Aboriginal Tribes of the Province of Madras*, Madras: Government of Madras.

Banerjee, Prathama (2016): “Writing the Adivasi: Some Historiographical Notes,” *Indian Economic & Social History Review*, Vol 53, No 1, pp 131–53.

Bhaskaran (2004): *Mother Forest: The Unfinished Story of C K Janu*, Trans N Ravi Shanker, New Delhi: Kali for Women and Women Unlimited.

Bijoy, C R (1999): “Adivasi Betrayed: Adivasi Land Rights in Kerala,” *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 34, No 22, pp 1329–35.

Bose, Sugatha and Ayesha Jalal (1997): *Nationalism, Democracy, and Development*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Chasin, Barbara H and Richard W Frank (1991): “The Kerala Difference” *New York Review of Books*, 24 October, <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1991/10/24/the-kerala-difference/>.

Dhebar, Uchharangrai Navalshankar (1961): “Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission,” Government of India, New Delhi.

Ferguson, James (1994): *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Franke, Richard W and Barbara H Chasin (1989): *Kerala: Radical Reform as Development in an Indian State*, San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First Books.

Frankel, Francine (1978): *India's Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ganesh, K N (2016): *Reflections on Pre-modern Kerala*, Thrissur: Cosmo Books.

Gol (1961a) “Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission,” Government of India, New Delhi.

— (1961b): “Village Survey Monograph,” Part VI: Tribal Areas, Census of India, Government of India, New Delhi.

— (1981): “Kerala Village Survey Report of Agali of Attappady,” Part X–C, Series 10, Directorate of Census Operation, Government of India, New Delhi.

GoK (1982): *Survey Report of Tribal Lands and Collection of Data of the Tribals at ITDP*, Vol I & II, Government of Kerala, Ernakulam: Kerala Government Press.

Guha, Ramachandra (1983): *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in Western Himalayas*, Calcutta: University of California Press.

Herring, Ronald J (1980): “Abolition of Landlordism in Kerala: A Redistribution of Privilege,” *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 15, No 26, pp A59–A61, A63–A69.

Innes, C A (1908): *Malabar Gazetteer: Vol I and II*, 1997, F B Evans and S Hemachandran (eds), Kerala Gazetteers Department, Thiruvananthapuram.

Iyer, Venketeswara T V (1935): *A Working Plan for the Ghat Forests of Palghat Division: 1933 to 1942–43*, Madras: Superintendent of Government Press.

Kaviraj, Sudipta (2010): *The Imaginary Institution of India*, Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

— (2011): *The Enchantment of Democracy in India*, Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Kjosavik, Darley Jose and Nadarajah Shanmugaratnam (2004): “Integration or Exclusion? Locating Indigenous People in the Development Process of Kerala, South India,” *Forum for Development Studies*, Vol 31, No 2, pp 232–73.

— (2007): “Property Rights Dynamics and Indigenous Communities in Highland Kerala, South India: An Institutional—Historic Perspective,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol 41, No 6, pp 1183–260.

Kunhaman, M (1981): “Alienation of Tribal Land: The Case of Attappady in Kerala,” *State and Society*, Vol 2, No 2, pp 49–61.

Li, Tania Murray (2007): *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Marumakkathayam Bill of V P Narayanan Nambiar (Bill no 13 of 1931) in the Madras Legislative Council, Law (Legislative) Department, G O 892, 21 August 1931 (KS).

Mathrubhumi (1950): “Attappady Sandarsicha Manthrikku Girijanangalute Nivedanan” (Hill Tribes Submit Memorandum to the Minister Visiting Attappady), 1 January, p 4.

— (1957): “Attappadyile Bhoomi Kayyettam: Niyamamasabhayil Churcha” (Land Encroachment in Attappady: A Discussion in Legislative Assembly), 21 December, p 1.

— (1965): “Attappadyile Krishi: Erkkadam Kothukadam” (Cultivation in Attappady: Erkadu and Kothukadu), 21 June, p 2.

Mathur, P R G (1977): *Tribal Situation of Kerala*, Trivandrum: Kerala Historical Society.

Menon, Dilip (1992): “Conjectural Community: Communism and Malabar, 1934–1948,” *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 27, Nos 51/52, pp 2705–07.

Moorkoth, Meera Jency (2012): *Countering Hegemonic History: Understanding Adivasi Land Politics in Kerala*, Working Paper No 8, Buenos Aires: CLACSO Southern Paper Series.

Namboodiripad, E M S (1952): *On the Agrarian Question in India*, Bombay: People's Publishing House.

Philip, Kavita (2004): *Civilizing Natures: Race, Resources, and Modernity in Colonial South India*, New Brunswick and New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Radhakrishnan, P (1989): *Peasant Struggles, Land Reforms, and Social Change: Malabar 1936–1982*, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Raman, Ravi K (1997): *Global Capital and Peripheral Labour: Political Economy of Tea Plantations in South India, 1850–1950*, PhD thesis, Kerala University.

Rejikumar, J (2010): “The Joint Commissioners’ Report in Malabar 1792–93,” Kerala State Archives, Government of Kerala.

Sankar, S and Muralaeeharan P K (1990): “Human Ecology in Attappady Reserve,” *Tropical Forest Ecosystem: Conservation and Development in South East Asia*, K K N Nair et al (eds), Peechi: Kerala Forest Research Institute, pp 72–76.

Sreekumar, T T and Govindan Parayil (2002): “Interrogating Development: New Social Movements, Democracy, and Indigenous People's Struggle in Kerala,” *Kerala: The Paradoxes of Public Action and Development*, Joseph Tharamangalam (ed), New Delhi: Orient Longman, pp 215–57.

Steur, Luisa (2009): “Adivasi Mobilisation: ‘Identity’ versus ‘Class’ after the Kerala Model of Development?” *Journal of South Asian Development*, Vol 4, No 1, pp 25–44.

Suresh, M (2009): “Negotiating Placeness: Tribal Communities in Western Ghats,” Working Paper No 9, Centre for Social Studies, Surat.

— (2015): “Development in Post-Colonial India: Practices and Experiences of a ‘Tribal’ Region,” unpublished project report, Indian Council for Social Science Research, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.

Tharakan, Michael (1976): “Migration of Farmers from Travancore to Malabar from 1930–1960: An Analysis of Its Economic Causes,” MPhil diss, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Varghese, T C (1970): *Agrarian Change and Economic Consequences: Land Tenure in Kerala 1850–1960*, Bangalore: Allied Publishers.

Velluva, Sanathanan (2006): *Land Settlement and Degradation: Dynamics of Land Use in Recently Settled Forest Areas of Kerala*, New Delhi: Serials Publications.

Whitehead, Judith (2010): “John Locke and the Governance of India's Landscape: The Category of Wasteland in Colonial Revenue and Forest Legislation,” *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol 45, No 50, pp 83–93.


Wholesale Price Index

The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate declined to -1.8% in June 2020 from 2.0% reported a year ago, but lower than -3.2% a month ago. The index of primary articles fell by (-)1.2% against 6.4% registered a year ago, but lower than -2.9% a month ago. The index for food articles decreased by 2.0% compared to 7.3% recorded a year ago, higher than 1.1% a month ago. The index for fuel and power declined by (-)13.6% against (-)2.1% reported a year ago. The index for manufactured products decreased by 0.1% compared to 1.0% registered a year ago.

Consumer Price Index

The CPI inflation rate increased to 6.18% in June 2020 from 3.1% reported last year, but lower than 6.3% a month ago. The CPI-rural inflation rate rose to 6.20% from 2.2% registered last year and 6.18% a month ago and the urban inflation rate increased to 5.9% from 4.3% a year ago, but was lower than 6.4% recorded a month ago. As per Labour Bureau data, the CPI-inflation rate of agricultural labourers (CPI-AL) increased to 7.2% in June 2020 from 6.3% registered a year ago while that of industrial workers (CPI-IW) decreased to 5.1% in May 2020 from 8.7% reported a year ago.

Movement of WPI Inflation January-June




* Data is provisional; Base: 2011-12 = 100.

Trends in WPI and Its Components June 2020* (%)

	Weights	Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year (Averages)		
				2017-18	2018-19	2019-20
All commodities	100	1.4	-1.8	2.9	4.3	1.7
Primary articles	22.6	2.3	-1.2	1.4	2.7	6.8
Food articles	15.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	0.3	8.4
Fuel and power	13.2	5.5	-13.6	8.2	11.5	-1.8
Manufactured products	64.2	0.4	0.1	2.7	3.7	0.3

* Data is provisional; Base: 2011-12=100; Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Movement of CPI Inflation January 2018-June 2020



* June 2020 is provisional. Source: National Statistical Office (NSO), Base: 2012=100.

Inflation in CPI and Its Components June 2020* (%)

	Weights	Latest Month Index	Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year (Avgs)	
					2018-19	2019-20
CPI combined	100	151.6	0.5	6.1	3.4	4.8
Consumer food	39.1	152.2	0.3	7.9	0.1	6.7
Miscellaneous	28.3	146.5	0.2	5.7	5.8	4.4

CPI: Occupation-wise

	Index	Over Month	Over Year	2018-19	2019-20
Industrial workers (2001=100)#	330.0	0.3	5.1	5.4	7.5
Agricultural labourers (1986-87=100)	1018.0	-0.1	7.2	2.1	8.0

* Provisional; #May 2020; Source: NSO (rural and urban); Labour Bureau (IW and AL).

Foreign Trade

The trade balance reported a surplus of \$0.8 billion in June 2020 compared to the deficit of \$15.3 bn reported a year ago. Exports decreased by (-)12.4% to \$21.9 bn and imports even more by (-)47.6% to \$21.1 bn from \$25.0 bn and \$40.3, respectively, reported a year ago. Oil imports went down by (-)55.3% to \$4.9 bn and non-oil by (-)44.7% to \$16.2 bn from their respective values of \$11.0 bn and \$29.3 bn, registered a year ago. During April-June 2020-21, the cumulative exports declined by (-)36.7% to \$51.3 bn and imports by (-)52.4% to \$60.4 bn from \$81.1 bn and \$127.0 bn, respectively, recorded during the same period last year.

Index of Industrial Production


Due to the nationwide lockdown to contain COVID-19, the number of units responding stood low. The quick estimates for the month of May 2020 was based on weighted response rate of 86%. The index of industrial production stood at 88.4 in May 2020. The index figures for manufacturing stood at 82.4, mining at 87.0 and electricity at 149.6 in May 2020. As per use-based classification, the index for production of capital goods stood at 37.1 and infrastructure goods at 84.1. The index for consumer durables stood at 42.2 and non-durables at 132.3.

Merchandise Trade June 2020

	June 2020 (\$ bn)	Over Month (%)	Over Year (%)	April-June (2020-21 over 2019-20) (%)
Exports	21.9	15.0	-12.4	-36.7
Imports	21.1	-4.9	-47.6	-52.4
Trade Surplus	0.8	-125.4	-105.2	-80.2


Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Components of Trade June 2019 and June 2020



Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.

Movement of IIP January-May



* May 2020 are quick estimates; Base: 2011-12=100.

Industrial Indices: Sector-wise May 2020* (%)

	Weights	May 2019	May 2020	Financial Year (Avg) 2018-19	2019-20
General index	100	135.4	88.4	3.8	-0.8
Mining	14.4	110.1	87.0	2.9	1.6
Manufacturing	77.6	135.8	82.4	3.9	-1.4
Electricity	8.0	176.9	149.6	5.2	1.0

Industrial Growth: Use-based

	Index	Over Month	Over Year	2018-19	2019-20
Primary goods	34.0	131.9	105.5	3.5	0.7
Capital goods	8.2	103.9	37.1	2.7	-13.8
Intermediate goods	17.2	138.8	77.6	0.9	9.1
Infrastructure/construction goods	12.3	145.0	84.1	7.3	-3.7
Consumer durables	12.8	133.8	42.2	5.5	-8.7
Consumer non-durables	15.3	149.8	132.3	4.0	0.0

* May 2020 are quick estimates; Base: 2011-12=100; Source: NSO (rural and urban); Programme Implementation.

Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: <http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx>.

Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities and the Forex Market—Weeks Ending 3, 10 and 17 July 2020

1 Settlement Volume of Government Securities (G-Sec) Transactions (Face Value in ₹ Crore)

Week Ended	17 July 2020		10 July 2020		3 July 2020		19 July 2019		2020-21*		2019-20**	
	Number of Trades	Volume	Number of Trades	Volume	Number of Trades	Volume	Number of Trades	Volume	Number of Trades	Volume	Number of Trades	Volume
Outright	17640	273848	18065	277368	15328	278151	36360	479090	192668	3443278	354592	4625929
Repo	3081	419186	3145	453746	3226	537523	2480	266550	40501	6162816	37229	4166021
TREP	4402	903811	4474	913188	4355	932978	3995	649564	65566	13771744	63191	10299122
Total	25123	1596846	25684	1644302	22909	1748652	42835	1395205	298735	23377838	455012	19091071
Daily Avg Outright	3528	54770	3613	55474	3066	55630	7272	95818	2752	49190	4792	62513
Daily Avg Repo	616	83837	524	75624	645	107505	496	53310	519	79010	465	52075
Daily Avg TREP	880	180762	746	152198	871	186596	799	129913	841	176561	790	128739

2 Instrumentwise Outright and Repo Details (Amount in ₹ Crore)

	Outright	Repo	Outright	Repo	Outright	Repo	Outright	Repo
Central Government	226946	282416	222691	301362	212738	345559	428819	172186
State Government	13784	95325	19725	94003	14361	104347	18596	60374
Treasury Bills	33118	41445	34952	58381	51052	87617	31675	33990
Total	273848	419186	277368	453746	278151	537523	479090	266550

3 Top 5 Traded Central Govt Dated Securities (17 July 2020)

Security Description	Trades	Value (₹ Crore)	% Value to Total
5.79% GS 2030	5282	57918	25.52
6.19% GS 2034	3588	41204	18.16
6.45% GS 2029	2438	31233	13.76
5.22% GS 2025	468	12882	5.68
6.18% GS 2024	480	8965	3.95

4 Category-wise Buying/Selling Activity (Market Share %) (17 July 2020)

Category	Outright		Reverse Repo		TREP Lending	TREP Borrowing	NDS Call		IRS MIBOR		IRS-MIFOR	
	Buy Side	Sell Side	Buy Side	Sell Side			Buy Side	Sell Side	Buy Side	Sell Side	Buy Side	Sell Side
Cooperative Banks	5.58	5.06	0.12	0.16	0.71	0.28	60.16	2.16	-	-	-	-
Financial Institutions	0.39	0.12	0.00	0.00	1.23	5.75	-	-	-	-	-	-
Foreign Banks	20.82	25.24	16.79	29.23	0.07	12.46	2.29	1.07	28.23	51.71	74.51	23.53
Insurance Companies	1.97	0.80	2.12	0.00	21.34	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mutual Funds	18.72	8.35	76.66	0.00	64.28	1.99	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	4.71	3.20	0.00	2.29	12.19	5.07	-	-	-	-	-	-
Primary Dealers	8.99	15.68	1.68	49.77	0.01	7.09	0.00	45.60	27.19	18.59	0.00	0.00
Private Sector Banks	23.72	28.87	2.53	15.86	0.15	46.14	23.07	20.21	38.41	23.24	19.61	76.47
Public Sector Banks	15.11	12.67	0.08	2.70	0.00	21.23	14.47	30.96	6.17	6.46	5.88	0.00

5 Trading Platform Analysis—Trading Value (Face Value in ₹ Crore) (17 July 2020)

Week Ended	OTC			NDS-OM			Brokered Deals			Total	
	Number of Trades	Volume	Market Share (%)	Number of Trades	Volume	Market Share (%)	Number of Trades	Volume	Market Share (%)	Number of Trades	Volume
Central Government	963	35506	17.45	13538	167919	82.55	93	8715	4.28	14501	203426
State Government	457	8410	60.39	695	5515	39.61	34	1471	10.56	1152	13925
Treasury Bills	100	20131	61.80	339	12444	38.20	25	5485	16.84	439	32575
Total	1520	64047	25.63	14572	185878	74.37	152	15671	6.27	16092	249926

6 Settlement Volume of Forex Segment

Segment	17 July 2020		10 July 2020		3 July 2020		19 July 2019		2020-21*		2019-20**	
	Number of Deals	Volume (\$ mn)	Number of Deals	Volume (\$ mn)	Number of Deals	Volume (\$ mn)	Number of Deals	Volume (\$ mn)	Number of Deals	Volume (\$ mn)	Number of Deals	Volume (\$ mn)
Cash	1412	26045	1426	26087	1620	28927	1290	18285	17976	278812	23714	327923
Tom	2106	36990	1826	30372	1874	25887	2002	22173	23930	342736	38048	430005
Spot	45750	54497	54371	57746	51806	55991	70168	61970	560724	611132	1128312	1034641
Forward	544	6731	366	6820	13630	88462	786	5988	48756	356703	57842	435293
Total	49812	124263	57989	121025	68930	199267	74246	108417	651386	1589383	1247916	2227861
Average	9962	24853	11598	24205	13786	39853	14849	21683	9047	22075	17332	30943

7 Tenor-wise Forward Trades

Tenor	17 July 2020			10 July 2020			3 July 2020			19 July 2019		
	Number of Deals	Value (\$ mn)	% to Total Value	Number of Deals	Value (\$ mn)	% to Total Value	Number of Deals	Value (\$ mn)	% to Total Value	Number of Deals	Value (\$ mn)	% to Total Value
< 30 Days	101	4653	69.1	71	5147	75.5	567	12360	14.0	135	4116	68.73
> = 30 Days & < = 90 Days	51	808	12.0	22	410	6.0	778	16885	19.1	103	932	15.56
> 90 Days & < = 180 Days	48	422	6.3	28	330	4.8	1245	19307	21.8	55	279	4.66
> 180 Days & < = 365 Days	52	749	11.1	49	793	11.6	3230	31530	35.6	77	561	9.37
> 1 year	20	98	1.5	13	140	2.1	995	8380	9.5	23	100	1.68
Total	272	6731	100	183	6820	100	6815	88462	100	393	5988	100.00

* Data pertain to 1 April 2020–17 July 2020. ** Data pertain to 1 April 2019–19 July 2019.

(i) Tables 1 to 5 relate to Securities Segment, and (ii) Tables 6 and 7 relate to Forex Segment.

Source: Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCL).

Sameeksha Trust

A Special Appeal

For more than half a century, the **Economic & Political Weekly (EPW)** has been a major presence in India's intellectual space. It has been a crucible for ideas and a forum for debate, which has created a journal of international repute that has become a virtual institution. *EPW* provides a multidisciplinary platform for academics and practitioners, researchers and students, as well as concerned citizens, for critical engagement with economy, polity and society in contemporary India.

It has always been a struggle to ensure *EPW's* financial viability and sustainability. The resource constraint has been exacerbated by our conscious decision to abstain from receiving grants from governments and donations from abroad, to preserve the autonomy and independence of the journal.

With the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent nationwide lockdown, *EPW* is now experiencing an unexpected and drastic drop in revenue from retail sales (as there has been no print edition for three months) and advertisement income (as advertising has contracted sharply with the crisis in the economy), resulting in an acute financial crisis. This is not unique for *EPW* alone. However, while other print media organisations have resorted to closures, large-scale retrenchment of staff, and salary cuts, it has been our endeavour not to undertake such drastic measures in *EPW*. In the first two months of the lockdown, full salaries were paid to all *EPW* staff. The Editor and his team adopted drastic austerity measures and cut expenditure to the bone. In spite of this, there was a large operational deficit every month, which could aggravate further if the problems associated with and following the lockdown, persist. If this excess of expenditure over income goes unchecked, a stage would come when we would no longer be able to keep *EPW* alive.

The situation became so critical in the month of June that there was no other choice but to implement a temporary measure of reducing staff salaries. This is being done for the months of June and July 2020 in a graduated progressive manner ranging from 0% to 40%. The situation, however, continues to remain extremely uncertain. The financial situation of *EPW* will be reviewed again in August 2020.

In these difficult and troubled times, an institution of *EPW's* stature and credibility is needed more than ever before. Well-wishers of *EPW* have been reaching out and urging us to do whatever necessary to ensure *EPW's* sustainability.

We therefore appeal to the community of readers, contributors, subscribers and well-wishers of *EPW* to come forward and make donations to the extent each one can, so as to ensure that *EPW* continues to perform its historic role. This is urgent. And it is of utmost importance. We hope you will join us in supporting *EPW*.

Trustees, Sameeksha Trust and Editor, EPW
9 July 2020

How to make donations:

We welcome donations from Indian citizens as well as from non-resident individual Indians and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), but only in Indian currency and through regular banking channels. Donations in foreign currency and from political parties are not accepted. Donations can be made in one of the following ways:

1. Through NEFT/RTGS:

Name of the Account: Sameeksha Trust
Bank: Union Bank of India
Branch: Mumbai Samachar Marg
Account No: 317901010029033
IFSC CODE: UBIN0531791

2. By Cheque or Demand Draft:

These should be drawn in favour of
"Sameeksha Trust" and sent to: Editor
Economic & Political Weekly
320-322, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013

All donors will have to send a photocopy (or scanned image) of Permanent Account Number (PAN) and a covering letter, clearly stating that "this donation is to the corpus of the Sameeksha Trust" in order to receive the Income Tax rebate under Section 80G of the Income Tax Act.

Covering letter and PAN card details can either be emailed to donation@epw.in or posted to our address given under (2) above.

For further information, please email to donation@epw.in

NATURE HAS MADE ALL THE PLANTS GREEN. SO HAVE WE.

While most cement companies are into building urban centres, we are doing our little bit to ensure that Mother Nature isn't destroyed in the process. Which is why, all our 18 plants across 11 states are green. Pun unintended.

HERE ARE SOME CONCRETE PROOFS TO SUBSTANTIATE THE FACT:

- First cement company in India to use 100% renewable power
- 40% of the total installed power generation capacity as green power
- Producing cement with the lowest carbon intensity
- Low water consumption across all the plants

SO LET'S BUILD RESPONSIVELY TO KEEP THE WORLD GREEN.



www.dalmiabharat.com